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“Corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.” 
—The World Bank, 1997 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Corruption is not a new topic, but it has increasingly become a central policy issue around the 
world. It is considered a significant source of corrosive effects that sabotages the stability of 
societies, threatens democratic and moral values, and hampers economic development 
(Mauro, 1995). Virtually all countries consider corruption a criminal act, and many 
international organizations have attempted to limit corruption (Spicer et al., 2004). Many 
countries have launched periodic spring cleaning through anticorruption campaigns. 
Nonetheless, corruption persists (Bogmans & de Jong, 2011;  Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 
2009; Johnson et al., 2000). According to Transparency International’s (2005) survey, 
corruption is considered rampant in more than 70 countries. The World Bank claims that 
corruption costs $1 trillion each year (Kaufmann, 2005). Of the 6000 people surveyed in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, 56% report that they were asked to pay bribes in the past year, according to 
Transparency International’s survey conducted between 2010 and 2011.  
 In line with the increased attention in the economic policy arena, corruption has 





established theories that explain the rise and fall of corruption (see Bardhan, 1997, for an 
extensive review of the literature). In the extant literature, researchers have attempted to 
explain bribery from the perspective of society at large. Sociologists, for example, hold that 
the roots of corruption are cultural. Economists focus on the lack of transparent institutions or 
poor quality of public services as causes of corruption (Treisman, 2000; Wu, 2009).  
 Although the (empirical) literature on corruption and economic performance at the 
country level has been relatively well developed, the relationship between bribery and 
performance at the firm level is underaddressed. Such a firm-level perspective may be 
worthwhile, as it allows for new questions related to the antecedents and implications of 
corruption at the firm level. For example, what is the relationship between corruption and 
entrepreneurial activities? Why are some entrepreneurs more likely to pay bribes than others? 
Can variations in bribery explain variations in organizational performance? Answering these 
questions may provide a significant contribution to the extant literature and introduce a 
perspective on bribery that complements the existing macro perspectives. Moreover, 
particularly because of the complex relationship between entrepreneurial activity and large-
scale institutional change, questions taking a more micro perspective on the relationship 
between firm behavior and corruption are typically relevant for transition economies. Despite 
substantial progress in corruption research, it is not yet fully understood why firms in a 
transition economy may be willing to pay bribes and how bribes are related to their 
performance. Consequently, transition economies offer an appropriate research context for a 
study of entrepreneurship and bribery. 
 
1.2 Research aim and questions 
The aim of this thesis is to complement existing corruption research and increase 





context of a transition economy. A firm-level perspective on corruption in a transition 
economy is important because in a transition economy, an organization is often the basic unit 
of corruptive practice (cf. Luo, 2004). The relationships between firm-level corruption, its 
antecedents, and its implications for firm performance are the subjects of study in this thesis. 
The main research questions are twofold: (1) What are the determinants of firm-level 
bribery? and (2) What is the relationship between bribery and entrepreneurial performance?  
 
 The more specific purposes of this thesis are the following. Its first aim is to investigate 
whether there is a relationship between firm characteristics, firm context, and bribery 
incidence. Firm characteristics (Clarke & Xu, 2004; Svensson, 2003; Wu, 2009) may 
influence the willingness to pay bribes due to specific forces created by organizational traits 
(Clarke & Xu, 2004; Svensson, 2003; Wu, 2009). Within-firm characteristics may create 
conditions of force or need, thus stimulating  predisposition for corporate illegality such as 
bribery (Baucus, 1994; Baucus & Near, 1991). For example, it is more likely that large firms 
would pay bribes because they face more forces due to organizational complexity. In 
addition, the business context may explain firms’ engagement in bribery (cf. Martin et al., 
2007). For example, (perceived) competitive environments may present external forces for 
organizations to bribe. Although firm-level bribery has been empirically investigated (Chen 
et al., 2008; Clarke & Xu, 2004), little is known about the impact of organizational 
characteristics (internal force) and contextual conditions (external force) on its likelihood. 
Therefore, the first aim of this study is to understand whether and, if so, how variations in 
firm and context characteristics determine the variation in firm-level bribery in a transition 
economy.  
 The second aim of the thesis is to study whether there is a relationship between personal 





bribe payments (Aidis & van Praag, 2007), little is known about the effects of personal 
networks on firm-level bribe behavior in general. Firms (in a transition economy) do not 
operate in a vacuum; they are embedded in networks of personal relationships, and these 
networks’ characteristics could determine the likelihood for transition economy firms to 
engage in bribery. The network of personal relationships is important because it can promote 
actions, create opportunities for the network members, and thereby generate value (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Therefore, the second main purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate whether and how personal relationships determine the likelihood of firm-level 
bribery in a transition economy.  
 The third aim is to investigate the possible relationship between bribery and 
organizational performance. In this respect, the current research focuses on the characteristics 
of the organization as the unit of analysis (cf. Aidis & van Praag, 2007). Organizations in a 
transition economy can choose whether to engage in bribery activities (e.g., use bribes to 
manipulate officials to obtain contracts or loans). This does not imply that all organizations in 
a transition economy actively engage in bribery; on the contrary, some are more involved in it 
than others. Organizations do not respond to bribery demands uniformly and, likewise, do not 
supply the same amount of bribes to the same government officials at the same time for 
similar products and services. Firms in a transition economy presumably pay bribes to 
improve performance. Therefore, I aim to understand whether and to what extent bribery 
improves organizational performance in a transition economy.  
 
1.3 Research Background 
The existing theoretical explanations for corruption include, among others, principal–agent 
models, corporate crime perspectives, and ethical decision-making theories (Trevino & 






the agent receiving the bribe (i.e., the demand side of bribery) and grand corruption (i.e., 
corruption that involves a substantial amount of money and high-level officials). In contrast, 
this study focuses on agents paying bribes and petty corruption (i.e., corruption involving 
small sums of money and typically junior or lower-level officials). Firm-level corrupt 
behavior has not been explicitly investigated in organization theory. I attempt to fill this void 
by grounding my work in institutional and anomie theory (Chapter 4); social network theory 
(Chapter 5); and social capital theory (Chapter 6). This approach is in line with a leading 
discussion on organizational corruption in the 2008 special issue of Academy of Management 
Review. Social capital theory (Burt, 1997) offers a network perspective and, in so doing, 
explains why organizations pay bribes to foster organizational performance. Whereas 
bargaining theory (Svensson, 2003) can be used to analyze how firm characteristics are 
related to control rights and power that determine firm-level bribery behavior, anomie theory 
(Martin et al., 2007; Merton, 1964) explains organizational level deviant behavior caused by 
external or internal perceived forces. Researchers have used institutional theory (North, 1990) 
to explain organizational behavior in emerging economies; it emphasizes the influence of 
institutional systems that shape organizational strategy and processes. The conceptual 
framework and the structure for this thesis are presented in Figure 1. 
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1.4 Research context 
In the Asian region, many countries report impressive growth rates. Countries such as South 
Korea and Taiwan, as well as transition economies such as China and Vietnam, report annual 
growth rates of on average 8% (Lau & Park, 2003; Wu, 2009). At the same time, agencies 
such as Transparency International consistently rate most Asian countries as having the 
highest levels of corruption (Wu, 2009). This can be denoted a paradox because it is widely 
believed that corruption inhibits economic growth and lowers investments (Burky & Perry, 
1998; Mauro, 1995), distorts competition (Hamra, 2000), increases income inequality (Li et 
al., 2000), and reduces economic drivers of growth such as foreign trade and human capital 
(Friedman et al., 2000). Many Asian countries have announced antibribery campaigns and 
signed international anticorruption agreements. Nonetheless, despite the strong efforts of  the 
national governments to limit corruption, the phenomenon continues to exist (Johnson et al., 
2000). 
 This thesis focuses specifically on Vietnam, for several reasons. First, it is the third 
largest transition economy after China and Russia (Masina, 2006). Moreover, there are many 
(new) private initiatives in Vietnam, even though these private companies face many 
obstacles to start and run their businesses. For example, in a context such as Vietnam, where 
legal institutions are too weak to secure property rights and problems of moral hazard 
abound, relationships with public officials are crucial. Bribery may be an important tool to 
foster these relationships, much more than in Western economies, where regulatory 
institutions are advanced and in general work appropriately. 
 Vietnam has reported a strong increase in entrepreneurial activities but also has a 
reputation of high levels of corruption. It is among the top ten of the most corrupt countries 





according to Global Integrity Organization, is now habitual for Vietnamese firms. Much 
anecdotal and some case study evidence of corruption in Vietnam is available. Case studies 
help identify and explore processes; therefore, corruption studies have used this method to 
study particular corruption-related events (World Bank, 2000). Using case studies, 
management researchers have revealed some insights into the origin, flow, and process of 
network-based corruption and the role of corruption methods such as red envelope (money 
payment), adult entertainment, and power exchange. Notwithstanding the importance of case 
studies, they focus on isolated events and therefore lack opportunities to generalize findings, 
determine correlations, and discuss causalities. Therefore, this study collects and analyzes 
firm-level information for a sample of 606 companies in 2004 and a sample of 201 
companies in 2009, both from the Mekong River Delta region in Vietnam. These data sets 
provide a unique opportunity to study key components of bribery at the firm level.  
 
1.5 Findings, academic contribution, policy recommendations, and managerial 
implications 
The academic contributions of my research consist of new theoretical insights and new 
empirical results to support these. An extensive review of empirical bribery research (see 
Chapter two) indicates that firm-level research is relatively rare. As a result, firm-level causes 
and consequences of bribery remain an underexplored area of research, to date. The lack of 
firm-level research in general and for transition economies in particular implies that the 
underlying causal mechanisms that determine bribery as well as the consequences thereof for 
firms are not well understood. This thesis makes the following theoretical contribution to the 
extant literature that aim to fill these research gaps. First, in Chapter four I develop a theory 
of forces that explains why some firms more than others are forced to bribe. Here, the 





forces of bribery. The former include the (perceived) level of competition and the (perceived) 
level of local government. The latter include the size and the age of the focal organization. In 
this chapter, I contribute to anomie theory (Martin et al., 2007; Merton, 1968) and 
institutional theory (Welter & Smallbone, 2011) by arguing how in the context of transition 
economies these internal and external forces determine the likelihood of bribery. Second, in 
Chapter five I develop a firm-level network theory of bribery. Here, the theoretical 
contributions include the specification of a model that shows how particular characteristics of 
personal networks determines bribery incidence. That is, the theoretical model differentiates 
between firm-level ties or contacts of different kinds: strong ties with local officials and 
strong ties with government officials. Additionally, I develop theoretical arguments to 
hypothesize how diversity of firm networks may explain bribery in a transition economy as 
well. Taken together, the theoretical model presented in Chapter five offers an important 
contribution to existing business network theories (Adler & Kown, 2002; Peng & Zhou, 
2005; Granovetter, 1973). Third, in Chapter six I offer a theoretical contribution to firm-level 
bribery research (Svensson, 2003; Aidis & van Praag, 2007) by specifying why the 
relationship between bribery and firm performance is complex and can best be represented as 
an inverted U-shaped relationship. The theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 6 explain 
that bribes are performance enhancing but subject to diminishing returns because, among 
others, high levels of bribes increasingly absorb the returns on entrepreneurial activities. The 
theoretical contributions are complemented with the empirical findings reported in this thesis 
based on relative unique Vietnamese firm-level data. 
 So, in Chapter four I find that firm characteristics (e.g., age, size, life cycle) affect a 
firm’s likelihood of paying a bribe. Similarly, variations in the business environment (e.g., 





likelihood of paying a bribe. The results in Chapter five suggest that personal ties with local 
government officials affect the likelihood of bribery. Such ties reinforce exclusive identities, 
encourage in-group loyalty and particularized trust, and thereby increase the incentives of and 
the opportunities for illegal practices such as bribery. Finally, in Chapter six I find a 
nonlinear relationship between the level of the bribe and firm performance, indicating that in 
the transition economy context, relatively small bribes are beneficial to performance, whereas 
larger bribes have negative effects. Taken together, these findings increase the field’s 
understanding of the firm-specific antecedents and implications of bribery and, in this 
respect, complement macro and country-level studies of the bribery phenomenon. 
 Understanding the firm-level specific dimensions of bribery is important as guidance for 
developing government policies that aim to reduce bribery in transition economies. This 
study’s findings provide several important implications for policy makers. First, this study 
finds that the (perceived) quality of the local government and the (perceived) level of 
competition influence a firm’s likelihood of engaging in bribery. This offers a clear indication 
that to limit corruption, transition economy governments should put their effort in improving 
the institutional environment in general and local government performance in particular. A 
well-functioning government with well-educated bureaucrats, security of property rights, and 
clear and transparent regulations are needed to reduce corruption. This may require a more 
holistic approach to create a synergy among, for example, (cross) checks and balances, law 
enforcement, education awareness campaigns, and cooperation between the state and private 
sector. A well-functioning control practice, together with a strong anticorruption system, 
enables policy makers to develop an effective corruption warning system. In so doing, it may 
decrease opportunities for public officials to solicit bribery. In addition, it may reduce anomic 





effect of the perceived level of competition on bribery involves specific local business 
environments or local norms, a change of local social norms is necessary for any attempt to 
lower corruption. Changing norms requires a great deal of time in a local society, and thus the 
policy measures must be persistent.    
 Second, the findings suggest that an appropriate understanding of the relationship 
between corruption and different types of personal ties is important for policy makers. This is 
because entrepreneurs vary in the strength and variety of personal ties with public officials. 
Such differences create various responses to the likelihood of bribery, meaning some 
entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in bribery while others are less. Building a 
relationship with lower-level officials may honor in-group favors, loyalty, and particularized 
trust that fosters nepotism and favoritism. As a result, corruption flourishes in a transition 
economy. Therefore, if the relationship between the particularized trust and bribery is a 
critical problem, governments can limit corruption by measures such as introducing regular 
staff rotation in local public administration (Lambsdorff & Nell, 2006). Such actions may 
weaken the particularized trust between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur and thus reduce 
opportunities for bribery demands.  
 The managerial implications from this study are threefold. First, the findings suggest a 
clear implication to entrepreneurs: Internal control within the firm is important to circumvent 
the likelihood of bribery because firm characteristics contribute to bribery practices. If 
managers are better prepared to cope with internal force that promotes bribery behavior, they 
could diminish the likelihood of supplying bribes. Furthermore, if they are also more aware 
of the contextual forces (e.g., competitive environment, institutions) that may facilitate 





bribery behaviors. In addition, entrepreneurs may better predict their rivals’ deviant responses 
if they engage in bribery practices. 
 Second, the findings provide evidence that strong ties facilitate bribery incidence. It also 
implies that if strong ties with local government officials’ networks facilitate bribery 
practices, it may cause harmful effects for outsiders (potential bribe payers). Consequently, 
collective action against bribery is necessary for all firms, because everyone becomes better 
off if they are all able to mutually commit to not paying bribes (Kingston, 2005). 
 Finally, this study implies that bribery may have both advantages and disadvantages. 
Although entrepreneurs may view it as an investment that helps firms operate successfully in 
institutionally weak transition economies, they should acknowledge that bribery may crowd 
out alternative investments and erode incentives for innovation or other activities. The higher 
the bribes, the more likely they are to deteriorate organizational performance.      
 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
This dissertation consists of a literature review, a chapter that offers a detailed description of 
the research context and the two survey samples, and three empirical studies. Chapter 2 
provides a review of the empirical literature on corruption and identifies gaps for the three 
empirical chapters. The central aim of this chapter is to highlight the role of firm-level 
bribery studies, which center on an organizational view, a relatively underexplored 
perspective in the corruption literature. The literature review illustrates that firm-level studies 
of corruption are few and far between but are necessary to understand elements of this 





 Chapter 3 describes the research context and the data collected for this research in more 
detail. In this chapter, I discuss the particular research on Vietnam and highlight the role of 
entrepreneurs in this country. In addition, I provide a description of data collection using two 
business surveys in detail.   
 Chapter 4 investigates which firms in a transition economy pay bribes to government 
officials and which do not. Although there are a few prior studies focusing on the effects of 
firm  and context characteristics on the likelihood of bribery (Chen et al., 2008; Clarke & Xu, 
2004), this chapter complements these studies by analyzing how internal and external forces 
may explain the likelihood of bribery. I argue that although all firms face forces to pay bribes 
in a transition economy, they differ in their response to perceived internal and external forces. 
The empirical analysis in this chapter applies a logistic regression model using a 2004 sample 
of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs to predict the effects of firm and context characteristics on 
bribery incidence.   
 Chapter 5 examines how personal ties affect bribery incidence and how different types of 
ties and network diversity influence its likelihood. Entrepreneurs may vary in the strength and 
variety of personal ties with public officials. Thus, Chapter 5 investigates whether variation 
in these characteristics determines variation in bribery incidence. To answer the preceding 
questions, I use a logistic regression model based on the 2009 sample of 201 Vietnamese 
entrepreneurs.  
 Chapter 6 investigates the relationship between the volume of the bribe and firm 
performance. I argue that bribery facilitates entrepreneurial performance because it allows 
entrepreneurs to develop trust and foster a network of informal relationships with public 
officials, thereby reaping the accompanying benefits (e.g., favorable treatments, overcoming 
liabilities of newness, legitimacy). However, bribery may also have disadvantages such as an 





and the negative effects of embeddedness. I determine the relationship between bribery and 
performance using 2004 data of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs, controlling for various 











Corruption is a multifarious phenomenon with multiple causes and effects. Over the years, an 
increasing literature stream that explains the causes and consequences of corruption has 
emerged (Argandoña, 2003; Azfar et al., 2001; Zahra et al., 2005). The study of corruption 
has become more multidisciplinary and dispersed, ranging from pure theoretical and pure 
empirical work to detailed descriptions of single corruption scandals. The understanding of 
factors that determine corruption as well as the consequence of corruption has received 
widespread attention from scholars in law, economics, organization, and management fields. 
Thus, corruption has considerably consumed the ink and papers of academic research. 
 The aim of this chapter is to review existing empirical studies on the determinants and 
consequences of corruption. To be sure, there is a great deal of variation among empirical 
research in terms of the aim, constructs, hypotheses, measures, samples, and research 
methods. This makes a strict comparison of empirical studies difficult if not impossible. 
Nevertheless, this chapter provides an in-depth overview of the empirical findings in the 
corruption literature. To explain the determinants and consequences of corruption, I classify 
the studies into four levels of analysis: country-, firm-, individual-, and multilevel studies. A 





are combined in one model. In so doing, I  identify the gaps in the corruption literature and 
develop the research questions for this study. 
 For this chapter, I use the 2004 literature review by Transparency International (Luo, 
2004) as a point of departure. This review identifies 4000 books and journal articles 
published on corruption in the 1990–2000 period. Among other findings, the study reveals 
that 74% address politics and public administration issues, 10% take a historical perspective, 
9% focus on law and the judiciary, 4% on economics, 2% on ethnography and culture, and 
1% on business ethics. Therefore, I conclude that an entrepreneurial perspective, which is the 
focus of this thesis, toward corruption is very rare. I complement the study of Transparency 
International as follows. I selected empirical corruption studies for a period following the 
window of observation of Transparency International—that is, I study corruption in the 
1999–2010 period (cf. Andvig et al., 2000; Jain, 2001; Seldadyo, 2008). In addition, I focus 
on empirical studies to align the insights from the literature with my research. To find 
corruption studies, I used a keyword approach: I used “corruption”, “bribery”, “bribe”, 
“graft”, “entrepreneurship”, “entrepreneur”, and “performance” as keywords in the title to 
search articles in three databases (i.e., EBSCO host, JSTOR, and PICARTA). Furthermore, I 
used the same keyword approach to cross-check the findings from the first round in ten 
leading journals in economics, international business, organizational behavior, and 
management (i.e., American Economic Review, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of 
Development Economics, European Journal of Political Economy, Academy of Management 
Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies, British 
Journal of Political Science, Journal of Business Ethics, and Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization). The search effort resulted in 65 studies that empirically analyze causes and 





 Notably, I found that most empirical studies in the window of observation focus on the 
causes and consequences of corruption at the country level (43 of the 65 articles). Moreover, 
only a few are firm- (14) or individual- (5) level studies. A combination of levels of analyses 
is even more exceptional (3 studies). The literature search also revealed that corruption is a 
largely ignored in the small business, entrepreneurship, and management fields (a notable 
exception is Tonoyan et al., 2010). 
 The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of corruption and 
bribery. Section 3 presents the causes of corruption, and Section 4 reviews its consequences 
as identified in the literature. The last section summarizes the main findings and identifies the 
research gaps that prompt the research questions for the current study. 
2.2 Definitions 
One of the difficulties in studying corruption is to obtain a concise definition (Jain, 2001). A 
definition is important because, among other things, it eventually determines how corruption 
can be measured (Collier, 2002; Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002; Lancaster & Montinola, 
1997; Philp, 1997). The word “corruption” is used to mean different things in different 
(country) contexts (Bardhan, 1997). The term’s definition ranges from an ad hoc individual 
act of an illegal payment to the endemic malfunction of an entire political system. The 
definitions used in the 65 studies of corruption vary from “the misuse of public power” and 
“moral demolition” to more strict legal definitions such as “an act of bribery concerning a 
public servant and a transfer of wealth”. It is important that the concept of corruption be 
clarified before any corruption model can be developed. Thus, this section summarizes and 







2.2.1 What is corruption? 
The question “What is corruption?” is often raised in the literature. The definitions of 
corruption developed by the World Bank and Transparency International are commonly used 
(see Tables A 2.1, A 2.2, A 2.3, A 2.4, A 2.5, and A 2.6 in the appendix A); they define it as 
“the abuse (misuse) of public power (entrusted power) for private gain.” Corrupt transactions 
take place at the interface of the public and the private sector (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) 
through which public goods are illegitimately transferred into private payoffs (Heidenheimer 
et al., 1989; Luo & Han, 2009). 
 In the preceding definition, misuse or abuse typically involves applying a legal standard 
or a breach of legal norms (Johnston, 1986; Kaufmann, 1997). Public (entrusted) 
power/office refers to the power the public delegates to officials. Corruption occurs when the 
officials use the power to further their own interests at the expense of the common good 
(Jain, 2001). The misuse of public power for private gains can be traditionally understood 
either as private wealth-seeking behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
(Khan, 1996; Nye, 1967) or as a response to situations in which opportunities for gain and 
discretionary power to appropriate that gain are available (Misangyi et al., 2008). Public 
power, on the one hand, is abused for private benefit when an official accepts, solicits, or 
extorts a bribe. On the other hand, it is also abused for personal gain when officials actively 
offer bribes to other (high-level) bureaucrats to circumvent public policies for competitive 
advantages. Even without a bribe transaction, public power can be abused for personal gain 
through other forms of corruption, such as nepotism, patronage, embezzlement of state assets, 
and the distraction of state revenues. 
 The aforementioned definition of corruption may broadly capture, for example, the sale of 
government property by government officials, kickbacks in public procurement, bribes (i.e., 





government funds (i.e., stealing money or other government property), fraud (i.e., cheating 
the government through deceit), nepotism (i.e., favoritism shown by public officials to 
relatives or close friends), and extortion (i.e., money or other resources extracted by the use 
of coercion, violence, or the threats to use force). These concepts are used interchangeably, 
but corruption is the most often used and is defined in the tradition of the World Bank 
(Amundsen, 1999; Jain, 2001). 
 The term “corruption” is often used interchangeably with “bribery” (Andvig et al., 2000) 
or a closely associated phenomenon (Weber & Getz, 2004). In the definition of the World 
Bank, bribery is defined as “the offer or solicitation, promise or gift of undue pecuniary or 
other advantages whether made directly or through intermediaries, to (foreign) officials or to 
a third party with the aim of influencing the actions of a public official or the officials’ 
duties.” This definition thus captures several features, namely the following: (1) giving, 
offering, or soliciting, which encompasses both sides of the transaction (i.e., the supply [the 
private sector or the supplier] and demand [the public sector or the receiver] sides of bribery); 
(2) something of value, including money, services, jobs, favors, payoffs, or (future) promises; 
(3) influencing the actions of a public official or the officials duties, which implies that the 
action goes against the law, formal regulation, moral standard, or other legal agreement. 
From the aforementioned definition, bribes can be understood as payments made to induce a 
government official to act contrary to his or her duties (James, 2002). Note that there are at 
least two participants in a bribe transaction: the payer (someone from the private sector) and 
the receiver (someone from the public sector). 
 Thus, bribe transactions can be executed by different actors for different purposes. Firms 
can bribe with the intent of influencing a government’s decision to choose which firms will 
be allowed to supply goods, services, or receive a government contract; to allocate benefits or 





specific schools). In addition, firms may bribe officials to reduce the amount of tax or other 
fees, to obtain issuance of a license, to speed up bureaucratic delays, or to change the 
outcomes of legal processes. For example, Luo & Han (2009) indicate that “graft” or “bribes” 
refer to the extent to which the firm engages in various forms of payments to public officials 
to “get things done” with regard to government or public services such as customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services, and so on. 
 Bribery is a bilateral (bargaining) event that involves a person from the public sector (a 
bribe receiver) and a person from the private sector (a bribe payer) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 
Treisman, 2000). This thesis focuses on the bribe payer; that is, the entrepreneur (in a 
transition economy) is the unit of analysis (Aidis & van Praag, 2007; Martin et al., 2007). 
Entrepreneurs can choose whether to engage in bribery activities and use them to manipulate 
officials to, for example, obtain contracts or loans. I do not imply that all entrepreneurs 
actively engage in bribery; on the contrary, some are more involved in bribery than others. In 
other words, entrepreneurs do not pay the same amount of money to the same officials for 
similar services or products at the same time. One of this thesis’s aims is to understand this 
variation. 
 
2.2.2 Types of corruption 
According to World Bank, a distinction can be made between administrative or petty 
corruption, which refers to paying bribes (between bureaucrats and the political elite or 
between bureaucrats and the public) for services involving the implementation of regulations, 
and state capture or political corruption/grand corruption, in which firms or the political elite 
attempt to influence the formulation of laws, regulations, decrees, or other government 
policies to their own advantage (Fries et al., 2003; Hellman et al., 2003). Grand corruption is 





corruption involves smaller sums of money and typically junior officials. The subject of this 
study is the first category, petty corruption. It refers to the extent to which firms offer 
payments to public officials to “get things done” regarding public services, such as customs, 
taxes, licenses, regulations, services, and so on. 
 Bribery can also be categorized by its purposes. For example, a distinction can be made 
between so-called actual and necessary bribes. The former includes bribes to obtain an 
illegally entitled service. For example, firms pay a bribe to reduce tax payments. In contrast, 
the latter includes bribes to obtain a legally entitled service. These bribes are the so-called 
grease money or speed money payments (Argandoña, 2005). For example, firms may pay 
bribes to avoid bureaucratic delays. There are many equivalent terms for this type of bribery, 
such as grease money, kickbacks, sweeteners, payoffs, and gratuities. These concepts are also 
called “facilitation payments” (Argandoña, 2005). Bribery and facilitation payments have 
minor but nonetheless important differences. For example, Argandoña (2005) suggests that 
the main difference between bribes and facilitation payments is that facilitation payments 
tend to be made to obtain something to which the payer is legally entitled. Whether 
facilitation payments are illegal may depend on the context in which firms operate. There is a 
grey area in which facilitation payments are offered in terms of charity or donations, gifts, or 
contributions to political parties (e.g., payments for travel)1. Note that some of these issues 
will, in practice, be impossible to regulate by international law and thus need to be addressed 
by national law to specify whether particular forms of facilitation payments are illegal. 
 
                                                     
 
1
 Notwithstanding the relevance of international law, these examples illustrate the need for national 
legislation to address corruption, because the illegal dimension of corruption is determined by 





2.2.3 The debate about corruption definitions 
The debate about definitions of corruption is fostered by its ambiguous nature (Kuncoro, 
2006). Many studies do not specify their definition of corruption and/or implicitly align with 
the World Bank or Transparency International definition (Heidenheimer et al., 1989). In most 
cases, people are unable to observe the acts of corruption because they occur implicitly. Thus, 
a commonly accepted definition that captures all aspects of corruption phenomena seems to 
be an open question (Kurer, 2005). This challenges a study of corruption. A precise definition 
of corruption will eventually determine its measure and the factors that are included in the 
research model to explain corruption (Jain, 2001). In what follows, I discuss various scholars’ 
views on the definitions of corruption and the ambiguity that may result thereof. 
 
2.2.3.1 Content 
Although the World Bank’s definition of corruption as “the abuse of public power for private 
gain” has been frequently used, a different consensus among scholars prevails (Hodgson & 
Shuxia, 2007). For example, it is debatable what the “abuse of public power” or “private 
gain” actually means. Johnston (1996) claims there are two fields of study in the corruption 
literature: The first one focuses on the behavioral aspects of corruption, and the second 
defines corruption in terms of the relationship between the principal (state) and the agent 
(public servants) (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Many behavior-oriented scholars 
hold the view that corruption is the abuse of power of public office for personal gain in a 
manner that contravenes the rules of the game (Guerrero & Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2008; 
Heidenheimer et al., 1989; Khan, 1996; Nye, 1967; Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008). From a 
principal–agent theory perspective, most researchers pay attention to the interactions between 
the parties involved: the principal (state) and the agent (public servants). Here, corruption is 





(1982) definition, Husted (1999) and Kwok and Tadesse (2006, p. 767) suggest that 
corruption is an “arrangement” that involves “an exchange between two parties (the official) 
and the payer which has an influence on the allocation of public resources now or in the 
future”. Note that they also define corruption as the abuse of public authority for private ends. 
 
2.2.3.2 The problem of ambiguity 
The often-used World Bank definition is ambiguous for various reasons. First, a question 
exists whether the narrow definition of corruption—which limits corruption to particular 
agents, sectors, or transactions (e.g., corruption defined as deviation from the formal rules 
that regulate the behavior of public officials)—applies to all societies. The definition is 
primarily designed to describe corruption in democratic societies and thus may or may not be 
viable to describe it in nondemocratic societies. Therefore, Li (2009) calls for a more fine-
grained perspective to define corruption in nondemocratic societies, more so when a country 
is in a transition process from a centrally led government to a market economy. For that 
reason, researchers have suggested that a more generic definition referring to corruption in 
terms of power abuse would be appropriate to describe corruption in nondemocratic or 
transition contexts, in which it often is pervasive and massive (Luo, 2002).  
 Second, although the World Bank’s definition of corruption is frequently used, or 
indirectly referred to, the use of this definition implies that studies focus on the public sector 
part of the two-party corruption event. This means that the private sector part is often ignored 
(Aidt, 2003; Jain, 2001). The World Bank definition only considers the causes of corruption 
and its abuse within public sector authorities. For example, Mauro’s (1995) influential macro-
level study only considers the (negative) effects of corruption on economic growth. As 
another example, Shleifer & Vishny (1993), who define corruption as “the sale by 





the government side of corruption only (cf. Daron & Verdier, 2000; Graeff, 2003; Graeff & 
Mehlkop, 2003; Meschi, 2009; Polinsky & Shavell, 2001; Treisman, 2000). 
 Third, if the definition of corruption is limited to the public sector part, scholars may face 
difficulty in determining the boundary between the public and private sectors. For example, 
some organizations are formally private but are de facto owned by the state. Changes of 
ownership rights may also result in classification problems. In addition, some enterprises are 
private companies in some countries and public organizations elsewhere or have a mixed 
form of ownership (e.g., postal services, railways, universities, hospitals). Therefore, 
accepting an alternative or a broader definition may be necessary to account for a country-
specific context (Hodgson & Shuxia, 2007). 
 Fourth, the World Bank’s definition does not account for the fact that not all abuses of 
public office are corruptive. Several activities by public officials can be classified 
straightforwardly as fraud, extortion, or embezzlement but, according to the definition, not 
corruption. Embezzlement, for example, is not considered corruption from a legal perspective 
but rather a crime; however, it is included in the broader definition of corruption (see the 
preceding discussion). For example, if a public official simply illegally appropriates a sum of 
money from the budget without providing any service to anyone, this is not corruption but 
theft, because although it relates to abuse of pubic power, it does not involve any other party 
such as a firm or a civilian. Fraud, which is a broader legal term that covers more than bribery 
and embezzlement, involves a manipulation or distortion of information by public servants 
who seek private benefits. Extortion relates to money and other resources extracted through 
coercion or threats from public officials. 
 Finally, the concepts of “public office” (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Treisman, 
2000), “public power” (Baksi et al., 2009; Barth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2008; Collins et al., 





Huntington, 1968; Johnston, 1996; Kaufmann et al., 2008; Klitgaard, 1988; Luo, 2002; Méon 
& Sekkat, 2005; Méon & Weill, 2010; Park, 2003; Powpaka, 2002; Weitzel & Berns, 2006; 
Wu, 2009), “public roles and resources” (Egger & Winner, 2005; Robertson & Watson, 
2004), “public or collective responsibility” (Husted, 1999; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006), and 
“government authority” (Meschi, 2009) are used interchangeably. The question is whether 
they actually are the same. Many would agree with Nye’s (1967) emphasis on public roles; 
that is, corruption involves the behavior of an official in his or her public role or public 
responsibility, whereas public power refers to the power delegated to officials by the public. 
By the same token, “government authority” may be equivalent to “public power” because it 
refers to the power authorized. In other words, the definition of public office, defining 
corruption as violating formal rules of office, is operational but fails to cover cases in which 
legislation itself is corrupt (Kurer, 2005). 
 In summary, depending on the context, the word “bribery” can have different meanings. 
According to the World Bank (2000), for example, bribery is the abuse of public office for 
private gain. In my research I align with this definition of the World Bank but adapt these to 
the particular circumstances of a transition economy, more specific the uncertainty of weak 
institutional environments and the local independency and discretionary power of local public 
officials. I define bribery as the payment of cash by an organization with the aim of 
influencing the actions of a public official. This definition is relevant for the research context 
of my study because it specifically accounts for (a) the type of bribery (i.e., money and not, 
for example, visits to bars), (b) the research unit of the briber (i.e., a firm and not, for 
instance, an individual), and (c) the aim of bribery (i.e., the receiver of the bribe is a 
government official being paid to make arrangements for the firm in question). Hence, my 





economies because it includes three conditions that need to be satisfied in order for bribery to 
have a useful meaning in the research context under consideration, that is, Vietnam. 
 
2.3 The determinants of corruption 
This section reviews the 65 empirical studies with respect to the causes of corruption. The 
aim is to explore existing empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption. It is 
important to understand the factors that cause corruption because it provides the opportunity 
to identify research gaps. The first subsection presents country-level determinants of country-
level corruption. Next, I review firm-level determinants of firm-level corruption, followed by 
determinants of individual-level corruption. Last, I discuss multilevel studies of corruption. 
 
2.3.1 Country-level determinants of country-level corruption  
Seldadyo (2008) identifies four groups of macro-level causes of corruption: (1) economic, (2) 
political, (3) judicial and bureaucratic, and (4) religious and geocultural factors. Using this 
classification, I review the 65 empirical studies of corruption. Table A 2.1 (see appendix A) 
offers an overview of these studies, presenting information about the authors, the definition 
of corruption used in the study under consideration, and the dependent variable and 
determinant of corruption of interest (including the main significant findings) for each study. 
 
Economic factors 
Economic factors refer to a wide variety of variables, among which are national income, 
government expenditures, government size, international trade, and economic freedom. 
Economic factors also include demographic variables such as human capital (schooling) and 





 National income is a typical variable used to explain corruption (Ali & Isse, 2003; 
Damania et al., 2004; Persson et al., 2003; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 1997). There is a wide 
consensus in the literature about the existence of a negative correlation between corruption 
and national income (usually measured by per capita gross domestic product) (Ades & Di 
Tella, 1999; Braun & Di Tella, 2004; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Chang & Golden, 2007; 
DiRienzo et al., 2007; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Kunicova & Rose-
Ackerman, 2005; Lancaster & Montinola, 1997; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Serra, 2006; 
Treisman, 2000). The explanation is that higher income will lower the incentives for 
corruption because public servants with sufficient income will have less need to supplement 
their income with corruption. The evidence for this proposition is mixed. For example, Braun 
and Di Tella (2004) analyze panel data sets of 75 countries and find that higher national 
income could also increase corruption. The authors explain this counterintuitive finding as a 
result of a decline of moral standards that occurs during a fast-growing economic period. 
 The size of government is also an important source of corruption. The argument for 
corruption and government size is based on the assumption that reducing the government’s 
role in an economy may lower corruption. In contrast, a large government with more 
regulations and other forms of market intervention may generate more opportunities for 
bribery; that is, the larger the (relative) size of the public sector, the greater the likelihood of 
corrupt public official behavior. In addition, the more regulations the government has in 
place, the more likely private sector actors will bribe government officials to circumvent legal 
requirements. Some scholars find a positive impact of the size of the government on 
corruption (Ali & Isse, 2003). Husted (1999) finds evidence that a larger government in 
societies characterized by a greater acceptance of authority causes more corruption. 
 However, the size of government is also negatively associated with corruption when size 





government expenditure involves higher wage levels for the public sector, thereby reducing 
the incentives for corruption. Montinola & Jackman (2002) find evidence that government 
size (proxied by government expenditure) is negatively associated with corruption for a 
sample of the Oil Producing and Exporting (OPEC) countries. Graeff  & Mehlkop (2003) and 
Fisman & Gatti  (2002) also find the same results.  
 Corruption can also be explained by other economic variables such as import share, 
international trade, and economic freedom. Treisman (2000), Herzfeld & Weiss (2003), and 
Frechette (2006) all suggest that the share of import in national income correlates with 
corruption. A greater share of import in national income decreases corruption because it is 
associated with lower tariffs on imports (Seldadyo, 2008). Import restrictions such as quota 
and licenses may foster a need for and opportunities to bribe. Likewise, a high export of raw 
materials (e.g., oil, gas, minerals) in particular increases the probability of corruption 
occurring, especially in resource-abundant countries (Frechette, 2006), because these 
activities are under the control of the government and often require private firms to have 
licenses for the use of the resources. 
 Studies on the relationship between foreign direct investments and corruption show 
mixed findings. For example, Kwok & Tadesse (2006) suggest that corruption decreases 
when foreign direct investments increase. With foreign direct investments through 
multinational companies, host countries are exposed to rules and regulations from the home 
countries of the investing firm, thereby somewhat constraining local government officials in 
their bribery acts. However, Robertson & Watson (2004) argue and present evidence for the 
proposition that a change in foreign direct investments will positively correlate with 
corruption. Foreign direct investment indicates that foreign firms are eager to capture 
opportunities in a host country. Host nations may resort to corruption as a means of sharing 





 Foreign trade (openness), economic freedom, and foreign aid are also important sources 
of corruption. Ades and Di Telia (1999) suggest that openness to foreign trade is a primary 
factor for experiencing relatively low levels of corruption (cf.  Brunetti & Weder, 2003; 
Fishman & Gatti, 2002; Persson, 2003). This argument suggests that the greater the barriers 
to entry and exit that firms face, the greater the distortions in a business environment, and 
therefore the more widespread corruption will be (Baksi et al., 2009; Gurgur & Shah, 2005). 
The impact of foreign aid on corruption shows mixed effects. Whereas Tavares (2003) 
reports a negative relationship between foreign aid and corruption, Ali & Isse (2003) suggest 
a positive relationship. Foreign aid may increase government consumption but, at the same 
time, also create opportunities for government corruption practices. However, foreign aid 
may also be associated with rules and conditions that limit the discretion of the recipient 
country’s officials, thereby decreasing opportunities for corruption. 
 Economic freedom is argued to reduce corruption. According to the Heritage Foundation, 
economic freedom is defined as the fundamental right of every human being to control his or 
her own labor and property. Treisman (2000), Gurgur & Shah (2005), Ali & Isse (2003), Park 
(2003), and DiRienzo et al. (2007) find support for this view, but Graeff & Mehlkop (2003) 
find mixed results. Graeff & Mehlkop indicate that the impact of economic freedom on 
corruption depends on the area to which economic freedom applies. For example, improving 
the legal structure (e.g., the security of private ownership rights, the risk of contract 
repudiation by government) leads to less corruption because a weak legal structure generates 
opportunities for corruption. 
 In addition, other sociodemographic determinants such as human capital (education) and 
population size have an impact on corruption. In general, human capital is negatively 
associated with corruption. Investing in educational systems in poor countries with weak 





Tadesse, 2006; Persson, 2003). A better-educated population will suffer less from bribery 
activities by politicians because better educational systems expose people to new ways of 
thinking and potentially prompt them to change the old ways of life, including corruption 
(Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Thus, this finding implies that a more educated society would be 
expected to tolerate bribery less. There is conflicting evidence for corruption and a country’s 
population size. Knack & Azfar (2003) find that when population increases, it leads to an 
increase in the level of corruption. In a large country with a relatively low density of 
government officials per citizen, citizens may bribe officials to jump in the bureaucracy 
queue (Fisman & Gatti, 2002). However, Tavares (2003) reports that population size 
negatively affects corruption. 
 
Political factors 
The impact of democracy and other factors are present in many empirical studies. Other 
factors include the electoral system (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005), governmental 
administration (Chang & Golden, 2007), political instability (Park, 2003), political freedom 
(Swamy et al., 2001), and presidentialism (Chang & Golden, 2007). 
 The literature shows mixed findings for the commonly held hypothesis that democracy 
decreases corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Braun & Di Tella, 2004; Emerson, 2006; 
Frechette, 2006; Henderson & Kuncoro, 2010; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; 
Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Serra, 2006; Tavares, 2007; Treisman, 2000). Research shows 
that the negative effect of democracy on corruption is often conditional on other democracy-
related variables such as freedom of the press (Brunetti & Weder, 2003), because democracy 
increases the level of transparency and checks and balances within a political system. 
Moreover, political participation, political competition, and constraints on executives increase 





(2007) suggest that the availability of information by means of digital access can create more 
transparent rules, laws, and transactions, resulting in greater accountability and thus less 
corruption. In contrast, higher levels of government intervention or centralization increases 
corruption incidence (Montinola & Jackman, 2002) because it distorts competition and 
introduces opportunities for bribery by political actors. 
 In addition, Tavares (2007) finds that deregulation of markets diminishes corruption. He 
also shows that political and economic reforms may increase corruption for countries that 
deregulated markets more than five years after they democratized. Economic reforms 
decrease corruption by introducing (more) competition, and political reforms make 
politicians accountable to voters. Sung (2004) finds a curvilinear relationship between 
democracy and corruption. In addition, Sung shows that the manner in which democracy 
affects corruption depends on the initial democratic conditions as well as the eventual 
democratic achievements of a country. Sung’s results indicate a negative connection between 
corruption and democracy in both less democratic countries and democratic countries, though 
a positive connection predominantly exists in democratic ones. 
 It is acknowledged that corruption increases under sociopolitical instability (Park, 2003; 
Serra, 2006). A greater political instability generates the perception among politicians and 
bureaucrats that the probability of winning elections does not depend solely on their actions 
but also on bribes, thus increasing the incentives to bribery. Democratic elections may create 
opportunities for corruption. Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman (2005) and Persson et al. (2003) 
find that choosing politicians through party lists (or closed lists) increases corruption because 
the voters have limited ability to hold politicians accountable. Chang & Golden (2007) find a 
positive relationship between district size and corruption under open-listed proportional 
representation. Persson et al. (2003) report that under closed-listed proportional 





 The role of government decentralization or federalism in causing corruption is a subject 
of debate among scholars. The argument is that decentralization increases the accountability 
of government bureaucrats that may better suit local populations in terms of the provision of 
public goods. Fisman and Gatti (2002) report a negative impact on corruption; that is, fiscal 
decentralization leads to less corruption (cf. Ali & Isse, 2003; Gurgur & Shah, 2005). In 
contrast, Treisman (2000) shows a positive correlation between corruption and federalization. 
Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman (2005) and Fan et al. (2009) report the same result. Measuring 
decentralization relates to transfers of responsibilities from a central government to other 
levels of (national) government. Thus, although federalism is associated with corruption 
(Goldsmith, 1999), a divided political structure also facilitates opportunities for corruption 
(Brown et al., 2006). If decentralization creates many tiers of government, it may weaken 
accountability, as voters find it difficult to place blame for failures or successes (Fisman & 
Gatti, 2002). 
 
Judicial and bureaucratic factors 
The quality of bureaucracy or of the judicial system is an important factor in explaining 
corruption. First, public sector wages are strongly associated with measures of the quality of 
bureaucracy, thereby affecting the level of corruption. Scholars claim that two of the most 
prominent indicators for the relative high levels of corruption in developing countries are the 
low civil servants’ wages and a lack of institutions for detecting corruption. Herzfeld & 
Weiss (2003) provide evidence that when civil servants’ wages increase, corruption decreases 
significantly. In addition, Rijckeghem & Weder (2001) and Brunetti & Weder (2003) find 
that corruption decreases when the quality of bureaucracy is enhanced. Second, there is a 
consensus regarding the negative impact of the rule of law on corruption (Ali & Isse, 2003; 





This is because a weak legal system in which basic rule of law is lacking or missing may 
provide opportunities for corruption through its failure to legally constrain those in power. 
 
Religious, cultural, and geographical factors 
Research has highlighted religion, culture, and geography as important factors that influence 
corruption. Many scholars find that countries with a dominant Protestant religion tend to have 
lower corruption because of the public’s willingness to denounce malfeasance in politicians 
and bureaucrats (La Porta et al., 1999). Regarding cultural variables, scholars have found that 
ethnolinguistic heterogeneity increases corruption (La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000): 
The opportunity for officials to bribe may increase in highly decentralized ethnic groups. In 
addition, the dominance of one ethnic group in a country may foster unbalance in the power 
between minorities and the dominant ethnic group, thereby creating potential for corruption. 
Highly fragmented communities are more likely to tolerate corruption than more 
homogenous societies. 
 Colonial heritage is another cultural variable that may also matter for explaining 
corruption. The commonly held arguments for a positive relationship between colonial past 
and corruption involve the decisive nature of government, whereas a negative relationship is 
often explained by the heritage of past colonial systems. The empirical results are mixed. 
Gurgur & Shah (2005) and Tavares (2003) suggest that colonialized economies tend to suffer 
from corruption. The decisive nature of the society, control habits, and institutions are 
inherited from the colonial masters. This often results in a highly centralized regime, which 
increases the opportunities for bribes, as is the case in India, Kenya, Pakistan, and Indonesia 
(Gurgur & Shah, 2005). In contrast, Herzfeld & Weiss (2003) and Serra (2006) find that 
former British colonies have lower levels of corruption. According to these authors, this is 





and existing protections against public abuse provided by the British common law system. 
Treisman (2000), Swamy et al. (2001), and Persson et al. (2003) find similar evidence for a 
colonial past’s negative impact on corruption. 
 Cultural values may play a key role in determining corruption. Recent studies have 
reported that countries with a higher degree of masculinity are likely to inhibit more 
corruption (DiRienzo et al., 2007; Husted, 1999; Park, 2003; Robertson & Watson, 2004; 
Sanyal, 2005). Others find evidence that corrupt countries are characterized by high 
uncertainty avoidance (Husted, 1999;  Robertson & Watson, 2004), high power distance 
(Husted, 1999; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Sanyal, 2005), and less individualism or more 
collectivism (DiRienzo et al., 2007; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). These results notwithstanding, 
Kwok & Tadesse (2006) show that the relationship between power distance, 
individualism/collectivism, and corruption are significantly lower with the presence of 
foreign direct investment. This is because, as mentioned previously, the presence of foreign 
direct investment may constraint local government officials in their corrupt acts because of 
regulations in home countries. 
 Finally, the geographic location of a country—measured by latitude and longitude—may 
also determine corruption. La Porta et al. (1999) find that countries located far from the 
equator tend to have less corruption. Ades & Di Tella (1999) suggest that corruption and 
trade distance are strongly associated for countries located far away from exporting nations 
because distance may provide a natural barrier to protect such countries from foreign 






2.3.2 Firm-level determinants of firm-level corruption  
Firms operating in the same country may vary in their propensity to pay bribes because of (1) 
characteristics specific to the individual firms, (2) organizational context, (3) employees’ 
individual characteristics and different perceptions of the external environment, and (4) 
location. This section offers a review of firm-specific factors that influence corruption 
classified into the aforementioned four groups. Table A 2.2 (see appendix A) offers an 
overview of these studies, presenting information about the authors, the definition of 
corruption used in the study under consideration, and the dependent variable and determinant 
of corruption of interest (including the main significant findings). 
 
Firm characteristics 
Studies of bribery on the individual firm level are rare but have attracted increasing attention 
in recent years. For example, Svensson’s (2003) prominent study uses a sample of 176 firms 
in Uganda and finds that profits and the estimated alternative returns on capital are drivers of 
bribery: Profitable firms are able to pay more bribes, and firms with a higher alternative 
return to capital can pay lower bribes because the greater the firm’s ability to pay a bribe 
(proxied by profits or sales in Svensson’s study), the more vulnerable position the firm is in a 
negotiation process, thereby increasing the likelihood to pay a bribe. Conversely, a firm will 
pay fewer bribes if the refusal to pay bribes costs a firm less. Consistent with Svensson’s 
(2003) study, Clarke & Xu (2004), using a survey of utilities in 21 transition economics in 
Eastern Europe and central Asia, show that firms are more likely to pay bribes when they are 
more profitable. Safavian et al. (2001) reports the same result. Notably, Safavian et al. also 
find that entrepreneurs with diverse income portfolios are less likely to experience bribe 





 Other firm-level studies have identified firm characteristics such as firm age, firm size, 
manager characteristics, and types of ownership to explain variation in bribes across firms. 
Kuncoro (2004) and Cabelkova & Hanousek (2004), for example, find that older firms are 
less likely to bribe because they are more likely to have established an ongoing relationship 
with government officials, which reduces bribes in that a strong tie with officials may create 
an advantageous position for private firms in the bribe bargaining process. In contrast, de 
novo private firms are expected to pay more bribes than other firms (Clarke & Xu, 2004). A 
plausible explanation is that de novo firms will earn more profits than established ones and/or 
are more vulnerable to bribery demands due to a lack of political influence (political 
protection). In contrast, Collins et al. (2009) find that the likelihood of a firm engaging in 
corruption is considerably influenced by a manager’s social ties with officials and his or her 
propensity to rationalize paying bribes. 
 The type of ownership can explain differences in bribes paid by firms. Family or self-
employed companies are more likely to pay bribes because they are vulnerable to bribery 
demands and are thus perceived by officials as ideal “trading” partners (Wu, 2009). 
Government-owned firms are less likely to pay bribes than those without government 
ownership because they receive institutional support from government agencies. In addition, 
the international activities of a firm may matter. Export firms engage less in bribery because 
they are less susceptible to local corrupt environments and may receive more preferential 
treatments, especially in emerging economies in which export-oriented policies are strongly 
supported (Luo & Han, 2009). Moreover, export firms may have greater access to external 
finance and thus have more bargaining power in negotiations for loans with local banks or 






Business context  
Recent studies have suggested that the influence of industry contexts on corruption may also 
be a significant factor. Svensson (2003) finds that the incidence of bribery can be explained 
by the variation of policies or regulations across industries. Firms must pay more bribes when 
dealing with officials whose actions directly influence their business activities (e.g.,  
exporting, importing) than those who do not. Kuncoro (2006) finds that a firm’s willingness 
to pay bribes is a function of government-related burdens such as licensing, tax (cf. Wu, 
2009), monthly inspections (cf. Safavian et al., 2001), and time spent with bureaucrats (cf. 
Kuncoro, 2004). 
 Furthermore, researchers have acknowledged that the quality of the legal environment 
and local government services determines corruption (Guerrero & Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2008; 
Wu, 2009). Thus, weak institutions lead people to trespass legality and increase the 
willingness to pay bribes. Barth et al. (2009) report that corruption decreases as courts and 
law enforcement are improved and become more objective. The more transparent the 
interpretation of laws and regulation is perceived to be and the more efficient government 
services are, the less firms are willing to pay in bribes (Wu, 2009). 
 Competition may influence corruption; however, empirical results indicate conflicting 
findings for this factor. Wu (2009) finds a positive connection between competition and 
corruption for Asian firms, but Clarke & Xu (2004) find a negative relationship in 21 
transition economies in Eastern Europe and central Asia. When market competition increases, 
firms may find opportunities to sell their products in new markets, and this decreases their 
dependence on government (procurement) contracts to meet sales targets (Ades & Di Tella, 
1999; Clarke & Xu, 2004). Barth et al. (2009) find that competition among banks (in 56 





could reduce the informational rents that loan officers or banks can extract from their 
customers and thus enhance detection of bank-lending corruption. 
 Researchers have also argued that characteristics of the industrial context affect 
corruption. Collins et al. (2009)  claim that firms operating in professional service industries 
(e.g., accounting, consulting and legal services, financial services, health care) are less likely 
to pay bribes because they face greater normative forces than those in nonservice industries 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Kuncoro (2004) suggests that firms in the service sector must 
pay more bribes than those in manufacturing or agriculture because they obtain most of their 
revenue in cash on a daily basis—which attracts attention from government officials. 
 Last, Luo & Han (2009) find evidence that local firms with oversea investments and firms 
with stronger local market power engage less in bribery than others. Firms with overseas 
investments are less dependent on local agencies and are subject to higher standards of 
corporate governance and accountability mechanisms to stakeholders, which decreases 
incentives to engage in bribery (Yadong, 2006). 
 
Location 
The particular geographic location in which a firm operates may affect the likelihood to 
bribe. In Indonesia, Kuncoro (2006) finds that city-based firms appear to pay somewhat 
higher bribe rates than rural companies. Cabelkova & Hanousek (2004) report that the larger 
the town, the more corrupt state institutions are perceived by private firms. In contrast, Luo & 
Han (2009) find that location has a positive influence on firm corrupt actions; that is, those 
located in smaller cities appear to be involved in more bribery activities. Although Kuncoro 





bribes for Indonesia, he does find that firms in oil-rich districts are more likely to pay bribes 
than those in non-oil-rich districts. 
 
2.3.3 Individual-level determinants of firm-level corruption 
It is worthwhile to mention that the corruption literature indicates that individual (actor-
specific) characteristics may also explain variation in bribes across firms. Table A 2.3 (see 
appendix A) offers an overview of these studies, presenting information about the authors, 
the definition of corruption used in the studies under consideration, and the dependent 
variable and determinant of corruption of interest (including the main significant findings). 
 Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008), for example, find that men are more prone to 
corrupt behavior than women. In a similar vein, Swamy et al. (2001) suggest that women on 
average are less tolerant of corruption. Gatti et al. (2003) find that employed, less wealthy, 
and older people appear to be more averse to corruption. Among other reasons, it is suggested 
that older people are less prone to corruption because they are less involved in bureaucratic 
procedures in daily life (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004). 
 Studies have argued that education influences corruption (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004). 
Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) suggest that the higher a person’s education level, the 
more likely (s)he will pay a bribe. They argue that education is a proxy for opportunity costs 
and that the higher the opportunity costs, the higher the probability of paying a bribe. 
However, Luo & Han (2009) find a negative connection between leadership education and 
corruption. The former is inconsistent with studies at the macro level, which argue that the 
higher the level of education at the population level, the lower the incidence of bribery. 
 Recent studies also provide valuable insights to understanding how the perception of 





that the greater the perceived corruption of an organization, the more probable it is that a 
person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe. Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia 
(2008) suggest that people sharing the idea that institutions are corrupt are more prone and 
willing to pay bribes. Moreover, they also find a negative connection between blaming and 
bribery incidence, meaning that the bribery decision may be based on an individual person’s 
moral and ethical understanding of the situation. In addition, Powpaka (2002) finds evidence 
that the attitude toward bribery (or the perceived consequences of bribery behavior) and the 
subjective norms (e.g., the perceived approval by important others) positively affect a 
manager’s decision to bribe (cf. Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008), whereas the perceived choice (i.e., 
the power or opportunity to choose to give a bribe to win a contract) negatively influences the 
decision to bribe. Thus, the more favorable the attitude toward bribery behavior, the stronger 
the intention or desire to perform this behavior (Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008). 
 
2.3.4 Multi-level studies of corruption 
My literature review indicates that very few multilevel empirical studies on the causes of 
corruption exist. Nonetheless, the few studies that have a multilevel perspective are worth 
mentioning. I define multilevel studies as those that combine, for example, country- and firm-
level characteristics in one model.  
 First, Mocan (2008) uses information on 49 countries and combines macro-level 
characteristics (e.g., unemployment rates, average education of the population, population 
size) and individual characteristics (e.g., age, income, gender, civil and employment status) 
into one model. Mocan reports a set of notable results. For example, he finds that a one 
percentage point increase in the male unemployment rate in a country increases the risk of 





population is negatively related to corruption. Mocan reports partial support for the effects of 
population size in developing countries, suggesting that with a larger population, the number 
of contacts with government officials increase. Mocan also shows that individual 
characteristics may determine bribery. For example, men are more likely to be asked for a 
bribe because they are perceived as having more contacts or interactions with government 
officials in daily life and having a higher tolerance for illegal behavior (cf. Mocan & Rees, 
2005). Older people and unmarried people are less likely to be asked for a bribe because they 
deal less frequently with the government. A notable result from Mocan’s (2008) study is that 
people with higher personal income and better education in developing countries are more 
likely to be targeted for bribes. Mocan explains this by noting that these people would have 
more contacts with the government. In addition, people who live in smaller cities have a 
lower incidence of being asked for a bribe (Mocan, 2008) because they have lower risk of 
exposure to bribery or fewer opportunities to interact with extensive government 
bureaucracies than those in larger cities. In addition to individual-level variables, Mocan 
(2008) finds that in countries where the risk of expropriation (as a proxy for the quality of 
institution; see Acemoglu et al., 2001) is lower, the likelihood of being asked for a bribe is 
also lower. 
 The second multilevel study, Chen et al. (2008), uses a data set with information from 55 
countries to investigate the combined effects of macro variables and industry- and firm-
specific variables on the likelihood of firms paying bribes. For example, at the country level, 
they find that education level (measured by the average number of years of schooling for 
adults) has a negative relationship with the incidence of being asked for a bribe (Chen et al., 
2008). It confirms the perspective that a more educated population is expected to be less 





positively associated with bribery, particularly in developing countries. Chen et al. also note 
that countries with a common law tradition have less bribery than those with other legal 
systems. The common law system tends to expand the rights of property owners and limit the 
power of governments. A greater protection of property against the state embodied in the 
common law systems improves various aspects of government performance, and reduces 
corruption (cf. La Porta et al., 1997; Treisman, 2000). With regard to the influence of culture, 
Chen et al. find that Hofstede’s masculinity indicator has a significant positive effect on the 
incidence of bribery, meaning that more masculine societies tend to have higher incidence of 
bribes. At industry level, Chen et al. (2008) claim that a firm in an industry with more intense  
competition is more likely to pay bribes because a more competitive market may provide 
strong incentives for firms to use any means possible to gain a competitive edge—even 
illegal methods such as bribery. At the firm level, Chen et al. find that firms with greater sales 
are less likely to bribe because they are expected to have more assets to pursue legal action 
against public officials who ask for bribes. Moreover, larger firms have more resources 
(including political ties) to pursue legal action. In addition, exporting firms are more likely to 
engage in bribes than nonexporting firms because they have more interactions with officials 
(e.g., customs clearance, licenses). Firms that depend heavily on public infrastructure tend to 
pay more bribes to officials than those that do not to smooth business operations.  
 The final multilevel study, Martin et al. (2007), uses a data set with approximately 4000 
firms worldwide to investigate multilevel antecedents of firm-level bribery. At the macro 
level, Martin et al. find that social welfare and political constraints relate negatively to 
bribery incidence. Social institutions are expected to drive or inhibit anomic conditions that 
can result in deviance such as bribery (cf. Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001). Strong political 





balances in the form of regulations imposed to limit and constrain the power of politicians 
and lawmakers (cf. Delios & Henisz 2000, 2003). In contrast, (perceived) financial 
constraints (at the organizational level) can increase a firm’s likelihood of bribing to 
overcome finance limitations. Moreover, Martin et al. find that the level of competition in the 
market is positively associated with the incidence of bribery; in other words, they find 
evidence that higher degrees of perceived competition increase the likelihood that firms 
engage in bribery.  
 National culture is another macro-level variable that influences the likelihood of engaging 
in bribery. Martin et al. (2007) find evidence that the cultural value of both an achievement 
orientation and a human orientation is negatively related to the incidence of bribery. In-group 
collectivism is negatively associated with bribery incidence because, as Martin et al. explain, 
collectivist cultures emphasize the role of societal members who may deter firm deviant 
behavior such as bribery aimed at forwarding self-interested goals and aspirations. 
 
2.4 The consequences of corruption 
Next, I turn to the consequences of corruption identified from the empirical corruption studies 
from 1999 to 2010. I identified two groups: The first group studies country-level 
consequences of country-level corruption and the second studies firm-level consequences of 
firm-level corruption. Table A 2.5 (see appendix A) offers an overview of these studies, 
presenting information about the authors, the definition of corruption used in the study under 
consideration, and the dependent variable and determinant of corruption of interest (including 






2.4.1 Country-level consequences of country-level corruption 
Economic factors 
The effects of corruption on economic growth and foreign direct investments has been firmly 
established (Mauro, 1995). In general, scholars find empirical evidence that supports the 
existence of a linear negative relationship between corruption and economic growth and 
investment (Brouthers et al., 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Habib & Leon, 2002; Méon & 
Sekkat, 2005; Méon & Weill, 2010). An exception is Egger & Winner (2005), who find 
empirical support for a positive relationship between corruption and (inward) foreign direct 
investment. They explain this by noting that (inward) foreign direct investment can facilitate 
transactions in countries with excessive regulation (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1979). Investors 
who greatly value their access to certain assets are simply willing to pay for this access (Lui, 
1985). 
 Unlike other scholars, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) finds that the impact of corruption on 
foreign direct investment can have both negative and positive effects. He shows that 
corruption in a host country results in (1) less foreign direct investment from countries that 
have signed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s “Convention on 
Combating Bribery Abroad”, due to the costs of being caught and the mutual monitoring 
mechanism but (2) more foreign direct investment from countries with high levels of 
corruption. Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006) therefore conclude that a nonmonotonic relationship 
between corruption and economic growth exists. They argue that corruption is beneficial for 







The impact of competition on corruption is well established (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Bliss & 
Di Tella, 1997). However, researchers have also noted that the level of corruption itself is a 
determinant of competition. Using cross-country data, Emerson (2006) finds that the level of 
corruption is inversely related to competition, meaning that the higher the level of corruption, 
the lower the level of competition in an economy, because corrupt officials are assumed to be 
able to demand bribes from formally registered firms. If officials are entitled to issue licenses 
and/or implement regulation, they can thereby limit the number of formally registered firms 
in a market at their own interest. As a result, the level of competition decreases. 
 
Likelihood of engaging in bribery and political behavior 
The relationship between foreign direct investment and corruption has been debated among 
researchers (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). In particular, the relationship between the political 
behavior of a multinational enterprise and corruption in a host country is considered critical 
to international expansion and firm growth. Luo (2006) finds evidence that when perceived 
corruption in a business segment increases, a firm’s likelihood of cooperating with a host 
government decreases. Cooperation between a multinational firm and a host government may 
be considered collusive in the public’s eye (Lambsdorff, 2002), and colluding with a corrupt 
government may harm a firm’s reputation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). In addition to Luo’s 
(2006) findings, researchers have shown that when perceived corruption increases, a 
multinational firm’s focus on ethical codes also increases, because multinational firms often 
emphasize ethical codes of conduct to organizationally respond to increasing host-country 






2.4.2 Firm-level consequences of firm-level corruption 
A common understanding of corruption researchers is that bribery is detrimental to a nation’s 
welfare (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 1997). However, bribery also provides a means of coping with 
resource shortages, distorted markets, and administrative incompetencies (Leff, 1979; Nye, 
1979), which suggests benefits for firms. In what follows, I review insights of firm-level 
studies about the firm-level consequences of corruption. I classify and summarize the 
empirical literature of the firm-level effects of corruption into three groups: (1) economic 
factors, (2) institutional factors, and (3) behavior. Table A 2.6 (see Appendix A) provides an 
overview of these studies. 
 
Economic factors  
As mentioned previously, in general, at the country level, corruption is considered 
detrimental to investments and economic growth (see Mauro, 1995; Méon & Sekkat, 2005). 
In a similar vein, corruption at the firm level is also expected to be negatively correlated to 
firm performance. Gaviria (2002) finds that the growth rate of sales decreases as bribery 
payment increases. Fisman & Svensson (2007), using a sample of 243 firms in Uganda from 
14 industries located in five different areas in the period 1995–1997, find similar results. 
They find that a one percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a 
reduction in firm growth of three percentage points, an effect approximately three times 
greater than that of taxation. However, this consensus about the negative effects of corruption 
at a firm level has been challenged, especially in developing countries such as some Asian 
economies (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). Vial & Hanoteau (2010) find that firm output and firm 
labor productivity growths are positively associated with bribe payments. They show that 





compared with average indirect tax rates, which contribute less than half the average output 
growth of firms. Thus, Vial & Hanotou conclude that these findings support the “efficient 
grease” hypothesis, meaning that paying bribes helps firms overcome red tape and other 
barriers of doing business. 
Institutions 
Although corruption can enhance firms’ efficiency (Lui, 1985), researchers argue that this 
mechanism no longer applies when government regulations are considered exogenous hurdles 
that can be partially mitigated through illegal payments. From this perspective, restrictions on 
economic activities and bureaucratic procedures can be considered a consequence, rather 
simply the initiators, of government officials’ income-enhancing activities. Bureaucrats are 
often assumed to be able to adjust government restrictions to maximize bribe collection and 
not simply take them as given. Using a private sector survey conducted by the World Bank 
and Inter-American Development Bank, Gaviria (2002) finds that bureaucratic interferences 
and bribe payments are positively correlated at the firm level. Thus, bureaucratic interference 
is greater in firms that are more likely to pay bribes, defying the conventional wisdom that 
bribes can increase efficiency by allowing firms to circumvent bureaucratic harassment. In 
addition to the problem of government officials’ arbitrary use of regulations, another issue 
involves access to public services. Low-income people or different-sized firms may pay 
different amounts of bribes than others to obtain the same public services (Svensson, 2003). 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) find evidence that the accessibility of government services 






Likelihood of engaging in bribes and behavior 
Corruption affects not only the levels of foreign direct investment, but also its composition. 
Meschi’s (2009) empirical study—which uses data from Transparency International and the 
Political Risk Service data set of International Country Risk Guide—suggests that the 
likelihood that foreign partners terminate an international joint venture is positively and 
negatively related to the level of corruption. The greater the corruption, the more likely 
foreign partners will rely on local partners for their (intangible) assets, and the more they will 
be willing to keep the international joint venture (IJV) stable. In contrast, where government 
corruption is reduced, foreign firms are less dependent on local partners, and they are 
encouraged to terminate the IJV. This also means that if corruption is absent, foreign 




The main aim of this chapter is to summarize the key findings from empirical research on the 
causes and consequences of corruption. My literature search identified 65 studies, which I 
classified into four groups according to the unit of analysis: country-, firm-, individual-, and 
multilevel studies of corruption. When reviewing the literature, I found that most empirical 
studies in the window of observation (1999–2010) focus on the causes and consequences of 
corruption at a country level (43 of the 65 studies). Furthermore, only a few are firm-level 
(15), individual-level (4) or multilevel (3) studies. Taken together, this suggests that a micro 
perspective in empirical research on corruption is an underexplored area of research. 
Therefore, I study firm performance and firm behavior to the extent that they are related to 





As a result, there is no clear insight into the micro determinants of bribery behavior. Such a 
perspective is important because at every instance, there is an individual person making the 
decision to propose or accept the bribe. Consequently, the study focuses on the determinants 
and implications of the bribery decision. The main research question of this study can be 
formulated as follows: What are the causes and consequences of firm-level bribery? 
 One implication of this research question is that new data must be collected given that the 
existing databases offer country-level or industry-level information at best. To this end, I use 
a definition of bribery that enables collection of information from entrepreneurs in a 
transition economy: I define it as the payment of cash by a private organization with the aim 
of influencing the actions of a public official. Chapter 3 explains in detail how firm-level 
information was collected in one of the largest transition economies—Vietnam. This is my 
first contribution to the corruption literature. 
 Macro-level studies, offer a good understanding of the causes of country-level corruption 
by showing that the openness of an economy, the quality of political institutions, and legal 
and cultural roots are key determinants of corruption (Treisman, 2007; Wu, 2009). In 
contrast, irrespective of the unit of analysis, attempts to establish consensus on a model of 
corruption have met with limited success (Alt & Lassen, 2003). The many empirical models 
reviewed in this chapter have resulted in a large number of explanatory variables intended to 
explain corruption. Many of these models receive mixed empirical support at best and are 
sometimes not robust, meaning that a variable may be significant in a particular model but 
may lose its significance when other variables are added to the model. In line with the more 
recent firm-specific studies of corruption, my assumption is that firms operating within a 
country may vary in their propensity to pay money to government officials to get things done 





2008; Gavira, 2002; Svensson, 2003; Swamy et al., 2001), and (2) their relationships with 
government officials (network characteristics). To some extent, firm and (perceived) context 
characteristics have been addressed in the recent firm-level studies of corruption; however, 
these antecedents of corruption have not been systematically addressed or fully understood 
for firms in transition economies, thus presenting a conundrum. The focus on transition 
economies is interesting and thus can enrich corruption literature. This is because the 
transition process is often characterized by the changing and creating of (new) institutions 
that can create the potential niche for opportunistic behavior by the regulatory authorities. 
Accordingly, regulation-induced corruption and the high transaction costs inevitably 
accompany it. Father discussions on this context will be displayed in the next chapter. 
Therefore, Chapter 4 presents these determinants, analyzing whether and how firm-level 
bribery in transition economies is influenced by firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, firm age) 
and perceptions of the business environment (e.g., the quality of government services, level 
of competition). This is my second contribution to the corruption literature. 
 The importance of personal ties of entrepreneurs with government officials has been 
acknowledged but not, to the best of my knowledge, in relation to corruption, at least not 
explicitly. In the context of Asian countries, the development of personal relationships is 
considered vital for business success (Hitt et al., 2002). Personal relationships are necessary 
to achieve favors and eventually obtain better firm performance (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Therefore, Chapter 5 begins with the understanding that firms in transition economies operate 
in a business context; that is, firms are embedded in networks of personal relationships. I 
investigate whether and how the characteristics of these networks may determine bribery. 





 A fourth and final contribution to the current corruption literature involves the firm-level 
consequences of firm-level corruption in transition economies. The relationship between 
corruption and performance is a subject of ongoing debate. Corruption may be detrimental to 
macroeconomic growth but, at least to some extent, could be beneficial as well because it 
may increase efficiency in the presence of policies that distort business activities, 
incompetent bureaucrats, and excessive regulatory barriers. The most well-known 
explanation for the latter effects is the “grease-the-wheels” perspective, which suggests that 
bribes help to reduce administrative delays (Lui, 1985). Having said that, the conclusion 
derived from the literature review is that the relationship between bribery and organizational 
performance is not well understood and deserves much more attention that it has received 
thus far. For that reason, Chapter 6 investigates whether and, if so, how bribery has an impact 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Research context and data 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Research indicates that corruption in transition economies is more prevalent than in developed 
nations (Luo & Han, 2009). A rationale is that the transition process involves a simultaneous 
restructuring of the state and the economy, which creates opportunities for corruption. In general, 
the causes of corruption in transition economies include poorly designed (economic) policies, 
underdeveloped legal systems, low levels of education, weak accountability of public 
institutions, and a lack of enforcement mechanisms. Corruption is cited as one of the most 
problematic factors for doing business in transition market economies (Luo & Han, 2009). 
Empirical evidence suggests that corruption hampers economic growth, reduces investment and 
income, augments inequality, and increases the volume of unofficial economic activities 
(Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995).  
A transition economy such as Vietnam offers an interesting research laboratory in which to 
study corruption because it has been identified as a fast-growing market (Hawksworth & 
Cookson, 2006) with high levels of corruption. Figure 2 illustrates that Vietnam, compared with 
other transition economies, has a relatively high corruption perception index (CPI) of 2.6, on 
average. (The CPI index ranges from 1 = the highest level of corruption to 10 = the lowest level 





growth (measured by annual percent change in gross domestic product [GDP] with constant 
prices). On average, Vietnam has achieved a 7.22% growth rate for the decade 2000–2010. 


















Source International Monetary Fund (IMF)-World Economic Outlook 
















































































The purpose of this chapter is to present the research context of this study in more detail. First, I 
review existing data sets and measures of corruption as well as discuss their limitations. Given 
these limitations and lack of data, I decided to collect new data in Vietnam. That is, I constructed 
two different data sets and in section 3.4 I will explain the difference between these data sets and 
which one I use for the various empirical parts in this study. Next, I discuss the role of 
Vietnamese entrepreneurs and bribery. Finally, I present the data collection process used in the 
three empirical chapters of this thesis. 
 
3.2 A review of existing data sources and measures 
3.2.1 Data sources and measures 
During the past century, various sources have collected and published corruption data. Two types 
of data can be categorized: (1) poll-based data (primary data) and (2) poll-of-polls-based data 
(secondary data). An example of poll-based data is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
data set, which has become popular due to its intertemporal coverage of countries. The ICRG 
indicator captures the likelihood that government officials will demand unofficial payments as 
well as expected illegal payments through government tiers. It reports data for almost 150 
developing and developed countries since the 1980s. The data cover a wide range of economic, 
political, and financial risk indexes. Using 12 components of political risks, the guide measures 
corruption using a score ranging from 0 to 6, where a higher score means less corruption. The 
measure of corruption can be obtained from statements such as (1) “high government officials 
are likely to demand special payments” (Svensson, 2005) and (2) “illegal payments are typically 
expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import 





Winner, 2005; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006; Meschi, 2009). Thus, the data 
set provides information on actual and potential corruption. The latter is addressed by means of 
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favors-for-favors”, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously strong ties between politics and business.  
 Second, other data and corruption measures derive from the World Economic Forum (since 
1979) data set, also referred to as the Global Competitiveness Report (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; 
Knack & Azfar, 2003), and the World Competitiveness Yearbook (since 1987) of the Institute 
for Management Development (IMD). The former has expanded each year, and it now includes 
more than 130 major and emerging economies. It reports the perception of corruption 
acknowledged by top and middle-tier executives around the world. The latter is based on surveys 
among local managers and reports corruption for both domestic and foreign firms operating in 58 
countries. Both the WCYand IMD corruption indexes refer to the extent to which improper 
practices in the public sphere take place. They have opposite scales: 0–10 (most corrupt) for 
WCR, and 0–10 (least corrupt) for IMD (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003; Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006).  
 Third, the most common poll-of-polls-based data set (secondary data) is Transparency 
International’s (TI), which as of this writing covers 150 countries. The annual TI Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), first released in 1995, is the best known of all TI’s tools. It ranks more 
than 150 countries according to the perceived levels of corruption as determined by 
businesspeople, country experts, and local population opinion surveys. It is an average of various 
corruption surveys’ indexes (those reported by the World Economic Forum, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, International Crime Victim survey, IMD, Political and Economic Risk 
consultancy, World Bank, and Africa Competitiveness report) (Lambsdorff, 2005a,  2005b). It 





though most authors usually rescale this index from 0 (least corruption) to 10 (most corruption) 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Meschi, 2009; 
Treisman, 2000).    
 Fourth, the often-used (Knack & Azfar, 2003; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005) Graft 
index developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) is part of the Governance Index or World Bank 
indicator  (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Egger & Winner, 2005; Emerson, 2006; Méon & Sekkat, 
2005; Méon & Weill, 2010). Like the CPI, the Graft index is also based on single perception 
indexes computed from surveys of business people, local citizens, or experts’ opinions, using 
data from 11 institutional sources. It ranges from a minimum of −2.5 (lack of corruption) to a 
maximum of 2.5 (high corruption). It also reports standard errors for each country estimate. 
Higher standard errors reflect greater uncertainty about the actual level of corruption. The graft 
index correlates highly with CPI, with correlation coefficients between .94 and .99 (Kaufmann, 
et al., 1999, 2005a, 2005b). The primary differences between the CPI and the Graft index are the 
aggregating methodology and country coverage. The Graft index aggregates individual 
corruption indicators using an unobserved components model that presents corruption values 
coming from each source as a linear function of the unobserved component (the existing true 
corruption) plus a disturbance term, which reflects the perception errors and the lack of sample 
coincidence among individual indicators. In contrast, the CPI is constructed as a simple mean of 
individual sources that are standardized and equally weighted. Although the Graft index provides 
ratings for 155 countries in 1999 compared with 99 for the CPI index, it is important to note that 
                                                    
 
2 The governance index includes six elements—namely voice and accountability, political instability and 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption—and ranges 
from –2.5 to +2.5. Like CPI, an increase in control of corruption index reflects a better control of 






the Graft index uses ratings even if there are only one or two underlying data sources, whereas 
the CPI index uses ratings only if data are available from at least three underlying sources. 
 Fifth, another relatively new corruption indicator—constructed primarily for internal use by 
the World Bank and thus not available for outside researchers—rates every member country that 
is an active borrower. As part of the World Bank’s annual Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), it rates 136 countries on 20 aspects of policy and governance on a six-point 
scale. One of these items measures “transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public 
sector”. Despite its advantages (e.g., that is the country coverage of the CPIA index is 
independent of country size), scholars suggest that errors in measurement are more than that of 
the TI and Graft indexes, which aggregate information from numerous sources (Knack & Azfar, 
2003).     
 Sixth, the Business International (BI) Corporation, which is part of the Economic Intelligence 
Unit, also reports levels of corruption in various countries with a focus on which business 
transactions involve corruption or questionable payments. It uses a data set based on a worldwide 
network of correspondents and analysts and was first published for the period 1981–1983. The 
BI corruption index is scaled from 0 (minimum corruption) to 10 (maximum corruption) (Ades 
& Di Tella, 1997; Mauro, 1995).  
 Seventh, the World Business Enterprise Survey (WBES) has recently attracted much 
attention from scholars studying corruption at firm level (Barth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2008; 
Clarke & Xu, 2004; Fan et al., 2009; Luo & Han, 2009; Martin et al., 2007; Wu, 2009). The 
WBES for Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries are also known as the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS). They are jointly conducted by the 





this survey has been conducted approximately every three to four years since 2002. The 
manufacturing and services sectors are the primary business sectors of interest. Formal 
(registered) firms with five or more employees are targeted for interview. However, state-owned 
firms are not considered eligible for interviews. Most WBES questions are measured by 
percentages or Likert scales on statements such as the following: (1) “On average, what percent 
of revenues do firms like yours typically pay per annum in unofficial payments to public 
official?” (2) “How often do firms in my line of business have to pay some irregular additional 
payments for government officials to get things done?” (3) “It is common for firms in my line of 
business to have to pay some irregular additional payments to get things done.” (Answers to 
question 3 are measured on a six-point Likert scale ranging from “always true” to “never true”.)     
 The eighth and final sources of corruption data are the World Value Survey (WVS) (Gatti et 
al., 2003; Swammy et al., 2001), established in 1981 and running through 2008, and the World 
Audit Organization (WAO) (Emerson, 2006). The former reports survey results of dozens of 
developed and developing countries, and includes information on the attitudes and values of the 
citizens. For each type of behavior, such as dishonest or illegal actions, respondents are asked to 
place themselves on a 1–10 scale, on which 1 indicates the statement is never justified, and 10 
indicates that is always justified. The question on bribery prompts the respondent to review the 
sentence, which involves someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties. The WAO is a 
source for corruption measures in civil societies. It is a (relative) ranking of all countries listed 
from least corrupt to most corrupt. The level of civil liberties as a proxy for democratic freedom 






 The aforementioned data sources have been used to measure corruption in a great number of 
studies. Some scholars show levels of corruption (Fisman & Svensson, 2007; Guerrero & 
Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2008; Henderson & Kuncoro, 2010; Svensson, 2003; Vial & Hanoteau, 
2010), whereas others measure corruption by individual perception (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 
2004; Gaviria, 2002; Guerrero & Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2008; Kaufmann et al., 2008; Rabl & 
Kühlmann, 2008; Safavian et al., 2001), the attitude toward corruption (Gatti et al., 2003), the 
intention to give bribes (Powpaka, 2002), the likelihood of engaging in corrupt transaction 
(Collins et al., 2009), or the number of corrupt activities (Del Monte & Papagni, 2007).  
 The studies on the determinants and consequences of corruption have three common features 
(Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1995). First, most of them are based on cross-country analyses. Second, 
they apply a data set with subjective perceptions of experts with the assumption that the indexes 
correlate with underlying, actual levels of corruption. Indeed, the three most commonly used 
indexes of perceived corruption are based on the subjective evaluations of experts:  the CPI of 
TI, a rating of control of corruption published by a team led by Kaufmann at the World Bank, 
and the ICRG data produced by the Political Risk Service. Third, corruption is perceived to be 
predominantly determined by a country’s political institutional environment (Kaufmann & Wei, 
1999). In addition, the use of cross-country data and perception indexes seems feasible because 
of limited costs of collecting quantitative data on bribery.  
 
3.2.2 Limitations of existing data sources  
Although the data sources mentioned previously have been used in publications in leading 
journals in economics, political science, and sociology, their limitations are nevertheless evident 





corruption itself but only opinions of issues of which respondents may not have any direct 
knowledge. Such a perception index is typically constructed from the opinions of a few experts 
per country, and its quality depends heavily on the knowledge of these experts in the countries. 
Furthermore, they involve of perceptions of activities that are the hidden and thus largely 
unobservable. It seems that perceptions about corruption are formed more by what people 
believe may generally occur but less so by what is personally experienced (Razafindrakoto & 
Roubaud, 2005). Recent empirical evidence has shown that perceptions are a poor reflection of 
the prevalence of corruption practices (Abramo, 2008; Olken, 2007). For example, one of the 
most cited studies, Mauro (1995), finds that perceived corruption hampers economic growth 
through its effects on investments, but he found weak evidence about the ongoing effects of 
corruption on increased costs or decreased productivity. 
 Second, issues involving the aggregation of sources by Transparency International and the 
World Bank have been raised (Treisman, 2007). Constructing each index may be problematic 
because they use different individual sources and it is difficult to compare surveys. For example, 
some sources are based on evaluations by Western experts; others are the opinions of 
international businesspeople or country inhabitants. Some report the frequency of bribes, the 
amount of bribes, certain regions’ bribery levels, or high-level (grand) government corruption, 
whereas others focus on the burden imposed on the economy. Therefore, it may be difficult to 
understand what exactly the average is measuring; in other words, choosing specific components 
for particular cases may be more effective in determining the quality of the measurement or the 
reliability of the outcomes rather than using only one index. In addition, the comparability of 





differ in the interpretation or evaluations of corruption. Because of the aggregate nature of the 
data, they offer little information about the corruption of individual agents. 
 Third, perception data are the only publicly available information on corruption levels. There 
have been efforts to create new proxies for measuring corruption in specific contexts; however, 
only a few scholars have been able to establish objective data. For example, Di Tella & 
Schargrodsky (2003) report that a reduction in prices paid by hospitals in Buenos Aires during an 
anticorruption campaign relates to the scale of kickbacks. An index of corruption constructed by 
Golden & Picci (2005)—who compare the present stock values of infrastructure and previous 
infrastructure spending in Italy—also measures corruption more objectively because it relies on 
data. Others have attempted to replace perceived corruption with measures such as convictions 
for corruption, rates of prosecution, or abuse of office. However, the latter measures may 
undermine their validity. They seem to reflect the capability and the integrity of the police or 
judiciary system rather than to capture the actual scale of the corruption phenomena.   
 More recently, new measures from Transparency International’s Global Corruption 
Barometer (GCB) surveys, the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), and United Nations 
Interregional Crime Research Institute’s (UNICRI) crime victims’ surveys have become 
available. These measures do not concentrate on experts and public opinions about the 
pervasiveness of corruption but on personal experience with corruption. For example, the WBES 
asks business managers about their own experience with corruption. This method may create less 
bias from impressions garnered from the media (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004; Rossi et al., 
2004) and prejudices than that of the more subjective survey questions. However, ongoing 
debates around this measurement method arise because the information of the experience of 





officials’ “revenge”. Not surprisingly, scholars have raised the issue of whether there is a 
correlation between the subjective indexes and experience-based indicators (GCB, WBES, and 
UNICRI). The results report that there is a high correlation between them, with correlation 
coefficients between .6 and .8 (Treisman, 2007).  
 In summary, existing data sources and measures have limitations. Furthermore, the existing 
data do not offer sufficient opportunities to measure all constructs needed for this study. 
Therefore, to answer my research questions, I decided to collect new firm-level data using two 
business surveys in Vietnam. With these new data, I aim to circumvent three limitations 
mentioned previously. First, the data are directly collected from the entrepreneurs. Second, 
entrepreneurs are directly asked the amount of money used for bribery. Third, my aim is to 
obtain a sufficient number of observations in a transition economy—that is, Vietnam. The 
following sections describe the research context and data collection procedure, respectively. 
  
3.3 Research context  
Among the transition economies, Vietnam is one of the least studied. It offers a worthwhile 
research context, in that it is an extreme case: It lacks formal market institutions, but it 
nevertheless reports a robust growth of de novo private firms (Heberer, 2003). According to the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam, for example, the share of private firms increased from 
22.9% in 2000 to 32.1% in 2005.  
The country is the third largest transitional economy after China and Russia, with 80% of its 
population of more than 80 million people living in rural areas (Masina, 2006). Despite rich 
natural resources, Vietnam is a poor country with per capita GDP of US$832 (in 2007). The war 





the division of the country into North Vietnam and South Vietnam. This was soon followed by 
the war against the United States, which continued until the country was reunited in 1975. Under 
the reign of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Vietnam’s economy was modeled as a centrally 
planned economic model. This was not successful, and by the mid-1980s, Vietnam was close to 
bankruptcy after withdrawal of Soviet assistance and several years of conflict with China. Before 
the mid-1980s, essentially all economic activity in Vietnam was undertaken by state firms or 
cooperatives. The transition to a market economy began in 1986 with a series of economic 
reforms (doi moi). Most important, under state supervision, entrepreneurship was encouraged. 
However, although the number of de novo private firms increased rapidly, the proportion of low-
performing private firms also increased. According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 
the share of low-performing private firms of the total private firms increased from 18.77% in 
2001 to 22.68% in 2003 (private firms include collectives, sole proprietorships, limited liability 
companies, joint-stock companies with capital of the state, and joint-stock companies without 
capital of the state).  
 
Along with other Asian countries, Vietnam has a reputation for bribery; for decades it has been 
among the top ten of the most corrupt countries (World Bank, 2000). The Vietnamese 
government has made many attempts to limit bribery by means of legislation, sentencing 
offenders to long periods in prison and even imposing the death penalty (Johnson, Kaufmann, 
McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000). Nonetheless, bribery continues to exist. There are at least three 
explanations for its persistence. First, bribery tends to take place in secret; no contracts are 
written, making it difficult to detect in the first place (Bardhan, 1997). There are many cases in 





Furthermore, policy measures aimed at detecting and correcting bribery must be sustained over 
long periods of time to be credible. The campaigns in Vietnam are usually ad hoc and induce 
bureaucrats to direct bribery transactions toward lower-detection activities (McMillan & 
Woodruff, 2003). In addition, the content of antibribery regulation in Vietnam is often of low 
quality and complex. The resulting difference between “law on paper” and “law in reality” has 
often created more rather than fewer opportunities for bribery.  
Second, those who complain may, in turn, become the subject of retaliatory measures 
themselves. Many Vietnamese do not feel guilty about their own personal attempt at bribery 
(Masina, 1996). Close family and business structures are an integral part of Vietnamese society. 
It is widely accepted that these social relationships must be fostered through favors, gifts, or 
hospitality such as invitations to restaurants or karaoke bars. Those who oppose bribery become 
outcasts in a society in which bribery has become an ever-present and accepted phenomenon that 
extends throughout all areas of life (Heberer, 2003).  
Third, Vietnam is a growing and strongly decentralized economy. Its advanced system of 
permits and licenses especially affects entrepreneurs because their activities need government 
approval. As the economy expands and becomes more complex, public officials see more 
opportunities to make money (Bardhan, 1997). Agencies, ministries, and local governments have 
broad autonomy to introduce their own regulations. Subsequently, they all set their bribes to 
maximize their private revenues. Thus, bribery also persists because of a decentralized local 
government with badly trained and poorly paid bureaucrats who operate in a poorly developed 
institutional framework and use all power at their discretion to maximize their income. 
I chose Vietnam as the research context for this study for several reasons. First, it offers an 





economic growth with corruption. The paradox here is that corruption is often perceived to 
inhibit economic growth and lower investments. This paradox may result from unexplored 
determinants of bribery in macro-level or country-level studies. This study therefore aims to add 
novel insights into the causes and consequences of firm-level bribery to macro-level studies.  
Second, despite market reforms, Vietnam continues to report a weak formal institutional 
framework, which remains a major obstacle for firms (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Firms are 
confronted with a high degree of uncertainty in the Vietnamese business environment  (Boisot & 
Child, 1996). Although the number of small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) increased 
significantly, many firms are small, informal, short-term oriented companies that often have 
insufficient reputational capital and typically lack government support as well as market 
legitimacy compared with state-owned enterprises (Le & Nguyen, 2009; Li & Zhang, 2007; Xin 
& Pearce, 1996). The dual government mechanism in transition economies (i.e., a market 
economy and a government-led redistributive regime) implies that government officials at all 
levels still have considerable power to influence business practices (Boisot & Child, 1996; Li & 
Zhang, 2007) and resource allocations (Mallon, 2004; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Vietnam, like 
other emerging economies such as China, Taiwan, and Eastern European countries, is no 
exception (Le et al., 2006; Smallbone & Welter, 2001). Furthermore, the local state officials’ 
attitudes toward the private sector vary greatly (VNCI-VCCI, 2005). The attitude toward 
entrepreneurship is an important factor because it demonstrates whether a society accepts or 
tolerates entrepreneurship and thus affects entrepreneurial response (Welter & Smallbone, 2011). 
For example, the four main state-owned banks account for approximately 80% of total 
Vietnamese bank assets and prefer to support state-owned enterprises rather than entrepreneurs, 





(Masina, 2006). The costs and delays of setting up a business are on average much higher in 
transition economies. In Vietnam, an official application takes nearly six months and can cost 
150% percent of per capita GDP in government fees (McMillan & Woodruff, 2003). 
Third, in Vietnam, the coexistence of the new law-based state and socialist legality has 
created problems in three areas: legislative framework, the coordination of the legal framework, 
and the implementation of the legal framework. The National Assembly is responsible for 
drafting primary legislation, while ministries and People’s Committees at local government or 
province level are allowed to draft subordinate legislation, such as the decrees, decisions, and 
instructions that guide the implementation of the laws. In general, the quality of subordinate 
legislation is low, and the implementation of legislation is not supervised and controlled by 
central government (Webster, 1999). Consequently, administrators at different levels have 
considerable discretionary power to approve (business) projects and allocate resources (Mallon, 
2004; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). This discretionary power allocated to public officials can be 
arbitrarily used and manipulated. To put it differently, despite the formal allocation of rights and 
responsibilities among central government, city, and province levels, there exist inconsistencies 
and overlap between higher-level and lower-level subordinate regulation. In addition, the 
overlapping responsibilities  and poor cooperation of authorities provide considerable autonomy 
to local public officers and create the opportunity to manipulate rules and request bribes, 
particularly when private firms are involved. As a result, entrepreneurs in Vietnam face barriers 
in a broad range of policy, administrative, and institutional areas (Swierczek & Thanh Ha, 2003). 
Compared with state-owned enterprises, privately owned SMEs receive little support from the 
government and typically lack market legitimacy (Li & Zhang, 2007; Nguyen et al., 2005; Xin & 





3.4 Data collection procedures 
This study applies two data sets collected by means of two business surveys. Much anecdotal and 
case-study evidence of bribery in Vietnam is available (Heberer, 2003; Masina, 2006; 
WorldBank, 2000). Case studies help identify and explore processes, and for that reason, many 
bribery studies have used this method to investigate particular bribery-related events. These 
studies have shed light on the structure and methods of bribery. Using case studies, researchers 
have revealed insights into the origin, flow, and process of network-based bribery and the role of 
bribery methods such as red-envelope, adult entertainment, and power exchange. 
Notwithstanding the importance of case studies, they focus on single events and therefore lack 
the scope needed to generalize findings, determine correlations, and discuss causalities. This 
study intends to move beyond case-study literature and to collect firm-level information for a 
sample of companies. Although the survey method has limitations, the data provide the 
opportunity to develop insight into both factual information and subjective interpretations 
involving the role of bribery in entrepreneurial performance and the role of firm characteristics, 
context, personal networks, and entrepreneurial characteristics in relation to bribery. 
The data used in this study were collected using extensive surveys in (1) 6 provinces in 2004 
and (2) 14 provinces in 2009, both in South Vietnam. The data were collected using face-to-face 
interviews with 606 entrepreneurs in 2004 and 201 entrepreneurs in 2009. The interviews and 
data obtained enabled me to analyze the relationship between key constructs and bribery 
activities. The data collection methods in both surveys are the same (see below) but there are 
also differences that materialize in a different use of the datasets in this study. The data from the 
first survey of 606 entrepreneurs in 2004 allow to study the role of forces in bribery (Chapter 4) 





entrepreneurs in 2009, allow studying the network perspective of bribery presented in Chapter 5. 
The two surveys and the datasets that result from these differ in the number of observations and 
the number and type of questions included in each of them (see Appendix C1, C2 for the 
surveys). As a result, the data cannot be pooled into one dataset nor can the theoretical models be 
tested in both datasets. However, as said, the data collection procedure was the same in both 
surveys and this will be presented below.   
In Vietnam, secondary data can be easily collected for each province using local 
administrative offices such as those involving statistics, investments, and taxes; however, these 
data are often aggregated and thus are not applicable at the firm level. For this reason, the key 
activities of this research project included the design and implementation of a large-scale 
business survey to collect firm-level information. Such business surveys are rare in Vietnam, 
which means that business managers may not accustomed to providing confidential business 
information to outsiders or providing opinions on Likert-scale-rated questions (Aidis & van 
Praag, 2007).  
The research proceeded in three stages. In the preparatory phase of the fieldwork, I revised 
an existing business questionnaire (Le, 2003), discussing it with researchers and business 
practitioners and consulting other business questionnaires. Next, I implemented several pilot 
surveys in two provinces of the Mekong River Delta (MRD), namely, Can Tho and Kien Giang. 
This resulted in several modifications to the questionnaire, such as adding 27 more questions. In 
addition, I learned that personal interviews would be the best strategy for collecting firm-level 
data in Vietnam, for two reasons. First, given the sensitive nature of some of the questions (e.g., 
bribery, revenues), I expected a high level of nonresponse from a mail survey. (Using 





Vietnam.) Personal contacts are pivotal in the Vietnamese (business) culture. Bribery, for 
example, is a well-known phenomenon and to some extent a subject for debate—but only in 
personal conversation. Second, the secondary data’s reliability was questionable because it was 
not up-to-date, especially with respect to the number of newly established firms, mergers, and 
changes of ownership type. Therefore, I decided that a personal interview with business 
managers would be the best strategy to collect the required data. 
In the second stage, a team of interviewers was trained, which consisted of teachers and 
students from the School of Economics and Business Administration, Can Tho University, 
Vietnam. The selected interviewers were required to have experience in conducting surveys and 
were trained on the key topics of the survey. They were also made aware of the importance of 
the data they would be collecting for the university, with the intention of motivating them to take 
personal responsibility for the data collection as a means of improving data quality. In general, 
the interviewers were younger than the participants and thus did not pose a threat to the 
entrepreneurs. In addition, the interviews were conducted in the local dialect of Vietnamese, 
enabling interviewees to respond to more easily and provide more precise answers. 
 In the third stage, intensive interviews were conducted with (1) entrepreneurs from 606 
firms identified in 6 of the 13 provinces of the MRD (one of which had recently been 
reclassified) in 2004 and (2) entrepreneurs from 201 firms identified in 13 provinces of the 
MRD, Ho Chi Minh City, and the Binh Duong province in 2009. Ho Chi Minh City and the Binh 
Duong province are located in southeastern Vietnam. The reason for concentrating on the MRD, 
Ho Chi Minh City, and Binh Duong was that they have shown a significant increase in the 
number of private firms in recent years, the performance of which is differently reflected in 





the entire country. The provinces surveyed in 2004 were Kien Giang, An Giang, Dong Thap, 
Can Tho, Vinh Long, and Soc Trang. In 2009, the provinces in MRD were Kien Giang, An 
Giang, Dong Thap, Can Tho, Vinh Long, Soc Trang, Ben Tre, Bac Lieu, Long An, Tien Giang, 
Tra Vinh, Hau Giang, and Ca Mau. For cost efficiency reasons, the interviewers’ efforts were 
concentrated in these provinces: The density of firms is the greatest in these provinces. 
A sample was not selected before the interviews; rather, it was selected on the basis of those 
entrepreneurs willing to cooperate3. The interviewees were either the owners or the persons who 
directly managed the company, defined in this research as “entrepreneurs”.4 Demographic 
studies in advanced economies tend to focus on the role of the top management team because 
many companies are large and are supervised by teams. In Vietnam, however, the entrepreneur is 
the most appropriate unit of analysis because decision-making power is predominantly 
centralized in the hands of this person, especially when the person is also the owner, as is often 
the case. The entrepreneur has the power to make final decisions and has a direct impact on any 
strategy. 
If the prospective interviewees agreed, the interviewers began to interview them; if the 
interviewee refused, the  interviewer apologized and proceeded to the next firm. The 
questionnaire was conducted only if the owner was available to answer personally so that 
                                                    
 
3
 The sample selection method may possibly create biases. Nevertheless, the exploratory nature of the 
study may legitimize the approach as a first step (e.g. snow balling survey methods).  
4
 We take a broad view of entrepreneurship, focusing on not only the creation of new business 
organizations but also the generation of new economic opportunities (Casson, 2003). A person can be said 
to engage in an entrepreneurial venture if he or she perceives and creates new products, services, 
organizational schemes, or product market combinations and introduces his or her idea in the market in 
the face of uncertainty and other obstacles by making decisions on location, form, and the use of 
resources and institutions (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999). All respondents meet these criteria. All private 





complete and correct information could be obtained. If the prospective interviewees were absent, 
the interviewer left the questionnaire and requested a new appointment. At the beginning of the 
interview, the interviewers showed their university employee card and an introduction letter from 
the dean of the university that, among other things, ensured full anonymity of the company and 
information provided. During the interview, the main topics (e.g., work experience, education, 
investment, loans and industry context, bribery, personal ties, opinions about bureaucratic 
burdens) were discussed. Some extra questions were added to invigorate the interview and 
enable the respondents to tell their own story. To collect information on the respondent’s social 
contacts—the topic of research in Chapter 5—the egocentric network approach was used. This 
approach is widely used in entrepreneurship and small business research  (Marsden, 1987). The 
respondents (focal ego) were asked to provide information about existing ties (alters) and to 
judge the characteristics of ties linking egos to alters (i.e., the quality of ties).  
 
3.5 Sample characteristics  
This approach in both surveys resulted in satisfactory response rates. We contacted 
approximately 1000 prospective firms and obtained 606 useable responses in 2004 and contacted 
300 prospective firms and obtained 201 useable responses in 2009. On occasion, these samples 
were missing observations for particular items. For the regression analysis, I deleted all 
observations with missing values on any questionnaire item. This resulted in a conservative data 
set with 395 full observations in 2004 and 111 full observations in 2009, resulting in an effective 
response rate of 40% in 2004 and 37% in 2009. These response rates are considered adequate for 





surveys included not wishing to disclose information, being too busy, or feeling uncomfortable 
when being asked about the business.  
 As can be observed from tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix B both the 2004 and 2009 
samples contain missing observations for particular items. It was decided to delete all 
observations with missing values for any questionnaire items in order to attain a complete 
sample. I prefer to work with a conservative dataset albeit that bias may exist because I exclude 
cases for which (partial) information is lacking. In addition,  all variables were checked for 
outliers, which further reduced the number of observations included in the analyses of chapters 4, 
5 and 6. More specific, for the 2004 sample used in Chapter 4, cases were deleted that based on 
their z-scores, were identified as outliers. This applied to six observations for the bribery 
variable. In addition, six observations were deleted to exclude the collective ownership type. All 
in all this resulted in a sample used in chapter 4 that included 352 observations that are used for 
the regression analysis. Similarly, in chapter 5 111 observations out the 201 observations  
resulted for regression analysis.  Finally, for chapter 6, based upon the 2004 sample, these 
procedures resulted in 395 observations to be used in the analysis.  
 The descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations and correlations among variables) of 
the two original data sets are included in Appendix B. As has been explained above, these 
descriptive statistics  provide a first illustration of the characteristics of the data. A more detailed 
analysis is hampered because of the large number of missing observations and the existence of 
outliers for several variables.  For that purpose, the descriptive statistics of the data used are 
more relevant. More specific, the descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations and 
correlations among variables) of the 2004 dataset are in Tables 4.1, 4.3 and 6.1. The descriptive 





order of the chapters – are worthwhile making. First, of the 352 observations for 2004 analyzed 
in Chapter 4, 76% (268) reported that they did not pay bribes. According to our data, the yearly 
average amount of bribes paid by firms reporting positive bribes was VND 30.05 million 
(US$1,905.50). About 70% of the companies in our sample have fewer than 10 employees, and 
26% have 11 to 50 employees. On average, the age of the firms is 7.44 years. On average, the 
companies in our sample report to have 35.93 competitors. Of the respondents, 58.52% reported 
that the quality of the government in terms of efficiency is high or very high. In preparation for 
the regression analysis, I performed the customary tests (e.g., tests for heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity), to obtain reliable estimates. Note that for this 2004 sample used in Chapter 4, I 
first deleted cases that, based on their z-scores, were identified as outliers. This applied to six 
observations for the bribery variable. I also deleted six observations for the collective ownership 
type. Afterwards, I removed all observations with missing values resulting in the 352 
observations that are used for the regression analysis. Second, of the 111 observations (for 2009) 
analyzed in Chapter 5, 60% (95 firms) reported that they did pay bribes. According to our data, 
for the firms reporting positive bribes, the yearly average amount of bribes that firms paid was 
VND 94.03 million (US$5,273.10 with the 2009 official exchange rate of VND17,832 to US$1). 
On average, 87.56% reported that the quality of the ties with government officials that 
entrepreneurs have are from good to very good. On average, 91.28% reported that the ties with 
local government officials of a (very) good quality. The average network diversity score of 0.98 
implies that the companies in our sample on average have a heterogeneous network. Hence, 
almost all managers have ties with different groups. In preparation for the logit regression 
analysis performed in this chapter, I conducted the customary tests (e.g., tests for 





estimates are reliable and the logit model applied in Chapter 5 is suitable. Third, of the 395 
observations for 2004 analyzed in Chapter 6, 75% (297 firms) reported that they did not pay 
bribes. For the firms reporting positive bribes, the yearly average amount of bribes that firms 
paid was VND 60.2 mill (US$ 3,815). The yearly untransformed average volume of sales in the 
sample was VND 4,522 billion (US$ 270,290). In preparation for the regression analyses, I also 
performed the customary tests for the dataset used in Chapter 6 to obtain reliable estimates (such 
as tests for non-normality test, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity). These tests reported 
satisfactory results, indicating that the estimates are reliable. In addition, I used the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total revenues in 2004 in order to obtain a normal distribution. 
 Although often, survey research collects data from secondary data sources on simple but key 
characteristics, such as firm size and turnover, and applies bivariate tests to determine whether 
significant differences between the sample and nonrespondents exist, this information was not 
available for this data set. Therefore, I could not perform sample bias tests. As a second-best but 
commonly applies solution, I applied Harman’s (1967) single factor test to assess whether or not 
my data feature significant common variance (Chang et al., 2010; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003). For the first survey, unrotated factor analysis using the eigen-value-
greater-than-one criterion revealed six factors with the first factor explaining only 12.64% 
(substantially below the 50% threshold value for this). For the second survey, unrotated factor 
analysis using the eigen-value-greater-than-one criterion revealed five factors with the first factor 
explaining 47.30 % (also below the 50% threshold value). If a substantial amount of common-
method variance were presence, the factor analysis would have resulted in a single factor 
accounting for the majority of the covariance among the variables. So, in my case, it is unlikely 





exploratory nature of our research, I believe that the quality of the survey, the interview process, 
and the substantial number of respondents ensures sufficient confidence in the quality of the data 
sets (Coviello & Jones, 2004). 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter justifies the research context, samples, and methods for the thesis. Among the 
transition economies, Vietnam provides an interesting research case because the success of 
entrepreneurs in societies such as Vietnam is often derived from their own competencies and 
through their connections with bureaucrats. For example, ties with public officials in an 
overregulated environment and with bureaucratic constraints are important for entrepreneurs to 
gain access to scarce resources or to enter closely regulated industries. In such a context, bribery 
may be an investment entrepreneurs make to overcome burdens and get things done. 
 Thus, I determined that existing data sources and measures have considerable limitations and 
provided insufficient opportunities to measure all firm-level constructs of interest. Therefore, the 
research team conducted two extensive business surveys of Vietnamese entrepreneurs, one in 
2004 and one in 2009. These data offer opportunities to measure the construct as well as perform 
appropriate regression analysis. The two datasets are collected with the same data collection 
method but derive from questionnaires with different items and scales and can therefore not be 
pooled. I will use the 2004 data for my analysis of external and internal forces in Chapter 4 and 
for the relationship between bribery and firm performance in Chapter 6. I will use the 2009 data 






Appendix B Descriptive statistics  
Table B.1 The 2004 survey n= 606 (sample is used in Chapter 4 & 6 ) 
Question Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Missing 
C1.12 Bribery 17.02 109.95 0 1944 100 
C1.7.7 Sales (VND mill) 
   8,002.25     65,252.84  0          1,110,000  21 
C1.4 Formal education 10.67 2.63 1 13 15 
C1.5 Informal education 1.03 2.61 0 16 54 
C1.6 Work experience 8.36 7.07 0 44 93 
C1.1.1 Sole proprietorship 0.52 0.50 0 1 0 
C1.1.2 Limited liability 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 
C1.1.3 Joint-stock 0.02 0.15 0 1 0 
C1.10.1 Electricity cuts 
   2,646.96     43,708.13  0          1,000,000  80 
C1.7.8 State bank debt 
   1,156.31     12,773.52  0              240,000  1 
C1.2 Trade 0.50 0.50 0 1 3 
C1.2 Services 0.15 0.36 0 1 3 
C1.7.1 Firm size 25.63 152.76 1 2500 15 
C1.3 Firm age 7.59 7.54 0 62 0 
C1.8 Competition 2.90 0.91 1 4 5 
C1.11 Government quality 2.51 0.88 1 4 15 
C1.9 Competition (number of competitors) 
32.02 77.68 0 1200 64 
 
Table B.2 The 2009 survey  n=  201 (sample is used in Chapter 5 ) 
Question Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Missing 
C2.12 Bribery 94.03 548.23 0 5000 42 
C2.10 ties with local gov. officials 3.82 0.97 1 5 6 
C2.10 ties with gov. officials 3.81 0.96 1 5 8 
C2B.7; C2.9  network diversity 0.98 0.01 0.94 1 0 
C2.7; C2.8 change in member status 
-0.08 0.58 -3 3 27 
C2.13 bribe enforcement 3.49 0.85 1 5 27 
C2.14 business license 2.51 0.89 1 5 8 
C2.5 manager's age 44.23 9.39 22 70 6 
C2.6 gender: male 0.84 0.37 0 1 2 
C2.4 manager's education: diploma 
economics 
0.42 0.49 0 1 2 
C2.1 firm life cycle: start-up 0.24 0.43 0 1 2 
C2.2.6 firm ownership (sole 
proprietorship) 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Type of Ownership:    
 1- Sole proprietorship; 2- Limited company; 3- Joint-stock company; 4- Collective; 5- Family   
2. Please indicate main products in your business or industry sector: 
No. Products/Services/Trade Percent (%) per total revenues 
1.   
2,   
 
3. Firm age: __________ years or the number of years firms have existed:_______   
4. Educational level of the managers of the firms: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12  >12   
 (1Æ5: Elementary; 6Æ9: Secondary; 10Æ12: Highschool; above 12: University)  
5.The number of times participating in management training courses: 
0     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12     13    14    15    above 




1 No of Employees (frequently)  
2 No of seasonal employees (at the most peak 
time) 
 
3 Fixed Assets value (VND Mill)  
4 Current Assets (VND mill)  
5 Tax (VND mill)  
6 Total cost (except tax) (VND mill)  
7 Total Revenue (VND mill)  
8 Bank debts (VND Mill)  
9 Other debts  (VND Mill)  
 
8. In your opinion, the level of competition in the same business or industry sector is:  
 1-  Very low; 2- Low;  3- High;  4- Very High 










10. Please indicate costs due to malfunctioning public services: 
 No of times Average hours (hours per times) Damage (VND)* 
1. Electricity cuts    
2. Water supply cuts    
3. Telephone cuts    
4. Trafic     
(*) Please estimate total costs. 
 
11. In your opinion, what is the efficiency of the local government?  
  1- very low efficiency; 2- low efficiency; 3- high efficiency; 4- very high efficiency. 









1. Firm age:____or____years ago. 
2. Types of ownerhip: 1 - State, 2 - Joint-stock company, 3 – Limited company, 4 - Cooperative, 5 - Collective, 6 - 
Sole proprietorship, 7 - Family, 8 – Others 
3. Please list the name of main products or main services: 
No Main product name or 
services  
Industry sector Percent (%) per total revenues 
Service Trade Manufacturing 
1.      
2.      
3.      
 
4. Educational level of the top manager: 1 2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12  13. College 14. Bachelor 15. 
Bachelor in economics 16. Master 17. Master in economics 
5. Top manager's age__  When was top manager born?__ 
6. Gender (top manager) : 1 - Male, 0 - Female 
7. Are you now a member of: a- Youth union, b-communist party, c- labor union, d- trade union, e- social 
organization, f- free member.  
8. Was you a member of: a- Youth union, b-communist party, c- labor union, d- trade union, e- social organization, 
f-free member.  
9. Do you have a family relative or close friends who works for: a- government agency, b- state-owned 
enterprises, c- private enterprises. 
10. What is the quality of the personal ties of the managers with local authority/government agencies during 
the last three or five years? 
- Ties with local officials: 1- very poor quality, 2- poor quality, 3 – quite good quality, 4- good, 5- very good quality 





1 No of Employees (frequently)  
2 No of seasonal employees (at the most peak time)  
3 Fixed Assets value (VND Mill)  
4 Current Assets (VND mill)  
5 Tax (VND mill)  
6 Total cost (except tax) (VND mill)  





8 Bank debts (VND Mill)  
9 Other debts  (VND Mill)  
 
12. Monthly, how much must your enterprise pay ‘to lubricate’ its business affairs? _________ 1.000 VND. 
13. Statement: “Paying an amount of cash to ‘lubricate’ your business affairs is completely forced.....or 
completely voluntary? 
1- Completely involuntary bribe payments, 2 – involuntary, 3 – just do it as implicitly understood, 4- 
voluntary, 5 - completely voluntary bribe payments. 
14. Statement: "In the last three years, all business licences are difficult to obtain, they cost much time to 
come and pick up and other costs”: 








Firms, context, and bribery in  
a transition economy 
 
4.1 Introduction 
During the past decades, the number of corruption studies has mushroomed (Aguilera & Vadera, 
2008; Bardhan, 1997). Most of these studies are empirical and cross-country; moreover, many 
have a macro orientation, primarily because corruption is viewed as a function of the institutional 
environment. Although helpful, these studies can provide only limited insights into bribery at the 
level of individual actors or organizations in a country due to the aggregate nature of the (cross) 
country data. The intent of this research is to explain within-country variation of bribery. 
Therefore, this chapter  investigates which firms in a transition economy pay a bribe to 
government officials and which do not. For my explanation, I use the perspective of force. That 
is, I work from the perspective that firms are embedded in a particular context (external context) 
and, likewise, that managers are embedded in an organizational context (internal context). 
Although all firms face forces to pay bribes in a transition economy, I argue that firms differ in 
their response to perceived internal and external forces. Perceptions are important because the 





to perceived information and events (Daniels et al., 2002; Hodgkinson, 1997). This study is a 
reply to the call for more firm-level corruption research, as advocated in the special topic forum 
on corruption in the Academy of Management Review (2008). The sparse but promising firm-
level corruption research, among other things, has focused on strategies firms use to avoid 
potential harmful effects of corruption as they enter markets (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck 
et al., 2006) and findings that bureaucratic interference is greater in firms that are more likely to 
pay bribes (Clarke & Xu, 2004; Svensson, 2003; Swamy et al., 2001). The current research 
complements these studies by analyzing how internal and external forces may explain the 
likelihood of bribery. 
 The outline of this chapter is as follows. The following section briefly addresses peculiarities 
of private firms that operate in a transition economy. The next section introduces the overall 
theoretical logic. I explain how perceived internal and external forces contribute to the likelihood 
that a firm will pay a bribe. The perspective of perceived force helps formulate two illustrative 
sets of hypotheses that each explain why some firms, more (less) than others, are more (less) 
likely to be involved in bribery transactions. The next section tests the hypotheses with data from 
a business survey of 606 entrepreneurs in Vietnam. The final section provides a discussion and a 
conclusion to the chapter. 
 
4.2 Transition economies and bribery 
In discussing whether and how particular firms in a transition economy are involved in corrupt 
transactions, it is first necessary to briefly elaborate on the particular circumstances of private 
firms in a transition economy. In transition economies (see Bruton et al., 2008), an 





institutions (Hellman et al., 2003; Radaev, 2004). Entrepreneurs in transition economies face 
more uncertainty, risks, and generic business difficulties than those in advanced economies due 
to the void of formal institutions (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Puffer et al., 2010). An 
institutionally weak transition economy—with, for example, poorly trained bureaucratic staff—
often results in an unstable business environment and creates an institutional void sometimes 
filled by informal environments such as (personal) networks (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; 
McCarthy & Puffer, 2008). The void of formal institutions displays the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms. As a result, informal institutions can complement formal institutions (e.g., trust or 
networks enables firms to lower transaction costs). 
 The underdeveloped formal institutional framework results in forces that force firms to adapt 
to external conditions. For example, because of the high costs associated with regulatory 
compliance and high entry costs in the formal sector, together with a corrupt system of 
compliance control, firms may choose to operate in the informal sector. The informal sector 
refers to firms operating without being officially registered. It is a logical response of micro and 
small enterprises to a legal system that puts them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis large firms and 
state-owned enterprises.  
 From a country perspective, the effect of an underdeveloped institutional environment on 
firm deviant behavior (bribery) is important (Puffer et al., 2010) because bribery can promulgate 
the unproductive use of financial resources (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Although bribery can be 
regarded as an investment entrepreneurs must make to operate successfully in an institutionally 
weak transition economy (see also De Jong et al., 2010; Peng & Heath, 1996), it can be argued 





investments or innovation. Particularly in transition economies, such opportunity costs may 
hamper economic growth. 
 
4.3 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Economic agents are affected by their environment; for example, the environment forces them to 
meet particular requirements. In general terms, force is the perceived force that comes into play 
when targets are not met—that is, when company or managerial goals do not align with current 
circumstances. In a transition economy, the perceived force determines a company’s decision to 
engage in bribery because bribery is an instrument that can be used to release perceived forces. 
My point of departure is that context characteristics determine the decisions economic agents 
make. In what follows, I use this point of departure to study two levels of context: the firm 
embedded in a firm context and the entrepreneur embedded in an organizational context. I expect 
that both levels of contexts matter in a firm or manager’s likelihood of engaging in bribery. 
 
External forces 
During the past decades, different fields of research have studied the corruption phenomenon, 
offering a wealth of explanations for the existence of bribery activities. Macro-level (empirical) 
studies suggest that the likelihood of bribes paid by firms depend on such things as legal 
attributes, cultural characteristics, the level of human capital, and the institutional characteristics 
of a country (Chen et al., 2008; Mocan, 2008; Svensson, 2003). These determinants are valuable 
for explaining macro-level determinants of bribery across countries but offer little explanatory 





 The available corruption research applies different theoretical foundations with which to 
explain bribery activities. From an economic perspective, firms’ bribe-paying behavior can be 
considered a (rational) market response aimed at adjusting government failure or weak 
institutional structures that hamper entrepreneurship (Aidt, 2003; Méon & Sekkat, 2005). 
According to economics, bribery is primarily driven by efficiency considerations, which explains 
that firms are willing to pay bribes to speed up bureaucratic processes (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 
1964; Lui, 1985). Strategic management studies emphasize that the conditions or outside forces 
to firms, such as the scarcity of resources, act as fundamental drivers for organizational 
performance. A lack of resources explains why firms use corruption to adapt an organization to 
situations of uncertainty and, in so doing, aim to secure firm survival (Baucus & Near, 1991; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1989; McKendall & Wagner, 1997).  
 In a similar vein, social scientists apply anomie theory in explaining the influence of 
environment on a firms’ ethical behavior and firms’ decision-making processes (Martin et al., 
2007; Merton, 1964, 1968). Anomie theory is one of the leading sociological theoretical 
frameworks that help researchers understand deviant behavior, such as bribery, due to 
peculiarities in a context (Merton, 1968; Zahra et al., 2005). According to this theory, it can be 
argued that firm-level bribery primarily derives from the context in which it operates, because 
firms use deviant alternatives when legal means to achieve goals fail. Anomie theory proposes 
that people who are unable to achieve their aspiration by conventional means experience strain 
and may seek to relieve this strain by using deviant means such as bribery.  
 In line with anomie theory, institutional theory also emphasizes the impact of contextual 
conditions on entrepreneurial behavior (Welter & Smallbone, 2011), because entrepreneurial 





institutional context in particular explain entrepreneurial decisions. Behavior can be viewed as a 
reaction to institutional forces (Peng & Heath, 1996). For example, tax evasion may become 
necessary for firms to survive in an underdeveloped institutional environment in which legal 
arbitrariness occurs (e.g., arbitrary variation of effective tax rates across similarly situated 
taxpayers). 
 Thus, following this line of thinking, I argue that forces from (1) the perceived level of 
competition and (2) the perceived quality of the local government may explain bribery incidence. 
First, when faced with perceived forces of competition, firms are more likely to consider the use 
of illegal means (bribery) to obtain their targets (Baucus & Near, 1991; Martin et al., 2007). 
Martin et al. (2007) suggest that the greater the competition firms perceive e.g. for such things as 
scarce resources, the more likely firms will pay bribes. This is because entrepreneurs are more 
likely to behave in a deviant manner when they interpret the competitive environment to be less 
munificent (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975). Second, the quality of the local government is 
understood as an indicator that displays the efficiency of government (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Treisman (2000) defines the quality of the government as the provision of public goods and 
services that the public demands at minimum costs in taxation and regulatory burden. According 
to theories of institutional development, the quality of the (local) government is low when the 
(perceived) quality of regulation and the security of property rights is low (La Porta et al., 1999). 
The quality of the government (or bureaucracy) is thus associated with the government 
intervention power. The greater the intervention power regarding intensive regulations, discrete 
decision-making power, or arbitrariness, the lower the efficiency of the government and the 
greater the likelihood of government delays or other public administration distortions for firms 





public officials have discrete decision-making power to execute laws and enforce rules, so that 
their decisions on licenses, permissions, and taxes create force that directly affects firms’ 
behavior (Kuncoro, 2004; Svensson, 2003). Thus, public officials with high levels of 
discretionary power may use bureaucratic delays to demand for bribes (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993). In particular, if a firm perceives that regulations are ambiguous and officials are able to 
manipulate the interpretation of regulations, it may be more likely to pay a bribe (Chen et al., 
2008). In what follows, I specify the hypotheses for competition and quality of the government. 
 
The level of (perceived) competition is the first variable that explains how forces in the 
environment of an organization in a transition economy may foster the likelihood of bribery. 
Organizations are embedded in business systems to which they must adapt to survive (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Redding, 2004). Many variables shape a firm’s response to its institutional 
environment. It is generally accepted that the main goal is to align institutional structures with 
the firm’s attempt to gain competitive advantages (Witt & Lewin, 2007). Thus, environmental 
characteristics can create (perceived) forces and a need for bribery. The level of competition is 
among the most important forces. Industrial organization literature shows that profits decrease as 
the number of competitors challenging the survival opportunities of the company increases.  
 I hypothesize a positive link between bribery and perceived competition, suggesting that 
when the force of perceived competition increases, firms are more likely to engage in bribery as 
an attempt to relieve perceived competitive forces (Baucus & Near, 1991). If the agents perceive 
the environment as highly competitive, they experience forces due to, for example, difficulties in 
acquiring firm-specific resources that will help them meet competition and obtain desired levels 





Oliver, 1996; Vaughan, 1983). In a transition economy, firms operate in an underdeveloped 
institutional structure. Bribing public officials for special treatments or other benefits may 
present an opportunity for a firm to undermine its rivals, maintain its monopoly position, or 
prevent new firms from entering the market (Martin et al., 2007). Therefore, I hypothesize the 
following: 
H1. In a transition economy, there is a positive relationship between the perceived level of 
competition and the likelihood of paying bribes. 
 
The perceived quality of the local government is the second explanation for how external forces 
in a transition economy may determine the likelihood of bribery (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; 
Gurgur & Shah, 2005). Again, as with competition, it is the perceptions of quality that drive 
firms’ decision-making behavior. As mentioned previously, the (perceived) quality of 
government can be defined as the extent to which the government provides public goods and 
services to citizens at minimum costs in taxation and regulatory burden (Treisman, 2002) and the 
extent to which the government treats all individual firms impartially (Charron & Lapuente, 
2011). In an ideal world, the level and quality of services of a government is the same for all 
firms in a region or nation–state. However, this is often not the case in a transition economy 
because of the inherent differences of national or local officials in replying to firm requests for 
such things as information about rules and regulations. Thus, it is the arbitrariness of government 
decisions, the weak accountability of government officials, and the disputable implementation 
and monitoring of regulation that matters for the day-to-day, successful operation of a firm in a 
transition economy. Therefore, I argue that the (perceived) quality of the local government is a 





little or no inclination to pay a bribe if the quality of the local government is high—for example, 
when a local government makes consistent decisions that are relevant for all firms. In contrast, a 
low perceived quality of government services may impose substantial burdens on firms and 
provide a source of external force (Aidis & Adachi, 2007; Aidis et al., 2008; McMillan & 
Woodruff, 2002). Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H2. In a transition economy, there is a negative relationship between the perceived quality of the 
local government and the likelihood of paying bribes. 
 
Internal Forces 
Next, there are internal forces that explain why some managers in a transition economy engage 
more than others in bribery. Baucus’s (1994) corporate illegality theory suggests that internal 
forces that arise from performance, structure, and age are among the most important in 
explaining why managers engage in illegal behavior. As mentioned previously, the more forces a 
manager faces, the greater the likelihood that he or she engages in bribery. The rationale is that 
when force increases, a manager’s need to react in particular ways increases as well. In line with 
Baucus (1994), I elaborate why (1) structure and performance and (2) age matter as sources of 
internal force. Structure and performance are two dimensions that relate to the size of a firm. 
Note that previous research has indicated that although size and age tend to correlate in advanced 
economies, this is not always the case in transition economies reference needed. Many firms in 
transition economies, for example, may deliberately decide to stay small because of the strategic 





First, from an organizational perspective, it can be argued that particular organizational 
structures will result in bribery (Lambsdorff, 1999; Luo & Han, 2009; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 
2000; Zahra et al., 2005). Delmas & Toffel (2008) argue that the structure of a firm is a key 
determinant of the receptivity of managers to forces and thus affects a manager’s decision of 
how to respond to these (perceived) forces. A firm’s organizational structure (e.g., administrative 
rules) may force managers to comply with social sanctions (Lange, 2008). A more complex 
structure will result in more forces (e.g., more administrative rules). Furthermore, firm structure 
may also matter for the incidence of deviant behavior in terms of opportunities for managers to 
break rules on behalf of the firm (MacLean, 2001). That is, a more complex structure may align 
with a reduction in information flows that in turn may facilitate the ease with which managers 
can engage in bribery (Finney & Lesieur, 1982). 
In line with Baucus’s corporate illegality theory, anomie theory also predicts that 
managers who perform poorly are more likely to engage in bribery than those who perform well. 
Managers may have a need to improve short-term performance, which may push them to conceal 
information on actual performance, make mistakes on products, or engage in bribery. Thus, in 
anomic internal organizational contexts, the force to achieve organizational goals can drive 
managers to engage in bribery (Martin et al., 2007).5  
  Second, internal forces may result from the stage of the company in the overall firm life 
cycle (Naughton & Cornwall, 2006). In the early stages of their existence, firms experience more 
forces for survival than established firms (Stinchcombe, 1965). For example, in the first years of 
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 Furthermore, an organization’s performance is also a trigger for government officials to ask for bribes. 
This is an outside force. As Svensson (2003) explains, government officials use their perceptions of an 
organization’s performance to determine whether it is able to pay a bribe. Organizational performance is 





their existence, managers lack managerial skills, business experience, relationships with 
stakeholders, and market legitimacy needed for the company to survive (Das & He, 2006; 
Thornhill & Amit, 2003). However, I argue that these internal forces fade away as the company 
becomes older; for example, the force to exit a market due to bankruptcy or a lack of competitive 
resources declines with age (Singh & Lumsden, 1990). In what follows, I present the hypotheses 
for structure and performance (size) and for age.  
 
With regard to organizational structure and performance, in line with firm-level studies of 
bribery, I use firm size as an indicator for structure and performance. In Svensson’s (2003) 
bargaining theory, for example, the point of departure is that larger firms are likely to earn higher 
revenues (and for that reason, government officials use firm size as a proxy for their bribery 
demands). Following the perspectives of force, I therefore argue that in a transition economy, 
small firms are less likely to pay bribes than large firms. Small firms have little or no issue with 
internal forces due to organizational incentives or other structural attributes (Baucus & Near, 
1991). An increase in size will increase the degree of complexity and create problems of 
communication, coordination, and control (Vaughan, 1983). In addition, in small firms, the risk 
of detecting bribery activities is high. Managers that operate in a large and thus more complex 
organization have more opportunities to behave illegally without fear of being caught compared 
with those who work in a small firm. In a large firm, managers can better hide and can make 
better (mis)use of decentralized decision-making processes (Vaughan, 1983). The act of being 
caught has a greater impact on small firms than on larger firms because of they may lack 
financial resources to fund legal procedures (Yeager, 1986). Finally, small firms are less 





officials (Dabla-Norris et al., 2008; McKenzie & Seynabou Sakho, 2010; Svensson, 2003). 
Taking these factors into account, I hypothesize that small firms are less likely to pay bribes or, 
put differently, that large firms are more likely to pay a bribe. 
H3. In a transition economy, firm size has a positive relationship with the likelihood of paying a 
bribe. 
 
From the perspective of force, it stands to reason that in a transition economy, young firms are 
more likely to pay bribes than older firms (Fjeldstad et al., 2009; Liedholm & Mead, 1999). 
More in particular, I suggest that the relationship between firm age and the likelihood of bribery 
is nonmonotonic and U-shaped, for several reasons. First, the forces to gain legitimacy and to 
survive are the highest for young firms. Various studies have shown that the breakdown risks due 
to bankruptcy or a lack of financial performance is the highest for young firms. It is well-known 
that startup companies face many more constraints and thus greater force than those that have 
survived the liabilities of newness. Difficulty in accessing capital, registration, and licenses and 
developing competitive products or services can all result in forces that young firms in particular 
experience. As firms mature, the forces that so prominently appear in the first years of their 
existence fade away, reducing the need to bribe government officials. However, over time, firms 
will move toward a maturity stage in its life cycle reflected by obsolescence, which is difficult to 
counter due to inertia, outdated management skills, and other organizational features (Bruderl & 
Schussler, 1990; Sørensen & Toby, 2000). Firms may experience renewed forces to survive and 





officials may offer protection from the risks of maturity and competitive and market 
circumstances.6 The preceding arguments offer a support for the following hypothesis:  
H4. In a transition economy, there is a nonmonotonic U-shaped relationship between firm age 
and the likelihood of paying bribes. 
4.4 Research Methods  
4.4.1Dependent and independent variables 
The likelihood of bribery was measured with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm reports having a positive amount of money to government officials to conduct its business, 
and 0 otherwise. The particular question in the questionnaire was as follows: “Monthly, how 
much must your enterprise pay ‘to lubricate’ its business affairs?” The question was asked in 
Vietnamese. We used the usual forward and backward translation process to obtain the English 
version. The expression bôi tr˯n in the original Vietnamese question literally means “to 
lubricate”; it is a colloquial synonym for money paid as bribes to government offices or 
administrative regulators. The closest English equivalent is “to grease someone’s palm”. The 
survey explicitly defined “to lubricate” as money paid to government offices or administrative 
regulators. The measure does not include other forms of bribery such as gifts that may have 
monetary value as well. It is similar to the ones TI and the World Bank use. 
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 In addition, and complementary to the internal force arguments, (strategic) management scholars have 
argued that young firms might be more vulnerable to the demands of bribery because they have fewer 
resources and less political influence than older and thus established firms (Clarke & Xu, 2004; Collins et 
al., 2009). Olson (2000) also suggests that age matters in the likelihood of bribery because young firms 






 As explained previously, I measure the level of competition on the basis of the relevant 
number of competitors (rivals) in the same business or industry sectors as perceived by the 
entrepreneurs. Previous research has considered the perceived number of competitors an 
appropriate indicator (Barnett, 1997; McNamara et al., 2003). Self-reports of competition are a 
more comparative advantage method than traditional proxy measures and objective indicators 
such as concentration ratios (e.g., the Herfindahl index) in reflecting a firm’s beliefs (Cool & 
Dierickx, 1993). Thus, I work from the idea that entrepreneurs form their competitive maps (and 
other ideas) according to perceived information and events (Daniels et al., 1995; Hodgkinson, 
1997) and measure the quality of government by the respondent’s answer to the following four-
point Likert-scale statement: “In your opinion, what is the efficiency of the local government?” 
(1 = “very low efficiency” to 4 = “very high efficiency”)7. The measurement of the quality of the 
government in terms of efficiency is in line with prior studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Rauch, 
1995). Firm size was measured by the number of employees who in 2004 worked frequently for 
the company (log).8 The age of the company was calculated by subtracting the year the firm was 
founded from the current year (Goll & Rasheed, 2005). 
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 Studies in industrial economics and organizational ecology have presented other measures aimed to 
capture the subjective assessment of this concept, such as items asking for an estimate of market share 
loss after competitors dropped their price with 10 per cent (Boone et al., 2004; Zhou & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2010). My measure is a first proxy for competition intensity. Due to data availability, I 
could not apply alternative measures such as the ones presented in industrial organization or 
organizational ecology. This is an acknowledged limitation of this study.
 
8
 As elsewhere, the number of employees in Vietnamese organizations varied during the year. In general, 
these entrepreneurs do not maintain employee records with, for example, employee contracts that would 
allow respondents to precisely determine start and end dates for all their employees. However, given the 
relatively small scale of their companies, the respondents knew the number of employees with fixed 





4.4.2 Control variables 
Three sets of controls were entered when the hypothesized relationships were tested. The first set 
involved the entrepreneur’s human capital (Wright et al., 2007), which can be increased through 
formal and informal education. I defined the level of formal education as having an official 
degree as a result of full-time or long-term training, and it measured a person’s knowledge or 
competence base. Formal education was measured by the highest level of education the manager 
had obtained (Luo & Han, 2009). Macro-level studies have found that countries with higher 
levels of education are positively correlated with lower figures of corruption (Treisman, 2000). 
This correlation, in turn, has been interpreted as proof that education decreases corruption, which 
is supported by the argument that a more educated society would be expected to have lower 
tolerance for bribes. However, it is argued that although individual education and ethical 
awareness is positively associated, well-educated managers are likely to engage in bribery. This 
line of reasoning maintains that well-educated managers would see and capture bribery 
opportunities better than less educated managers because of their superior awareness levels, 
cognitive skills, and decision-making capabilities (Marvel & Lumpkin, 2007). Well-educated 
managers may rationalize or neutralize their illegal actions without any regrets or considering 
aspects of ethical problem in a transition economy (Anand et al., 2005). The second 
entrepreneurial characteristic aligns with the previous one: Informal education was measured by 
the number of times a respondent had participated in management training courses (Aidis & van 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
of persons with an oral agreement regarding working hours and salaries (written employee contracts are 
rare in Vietnam) and which people worked for the company throughout the year. I used this information 
to measure the size of the company. Respondents also indicated the number of seasonal employees. I 
decided not to use this information because the length of peak seasons was not known and typically varies 





Praag, 2007). Thus, the level of informal training was determined by participation in 
management courses, including short-term ones (postgraduate education).  
 The second set of control variables involves firm characteristics—that is, the firm’s type of 
ownership, costs due to malfunctioning public services, and the debt position of the firm. The 
type of ownership may possibly determine the incidence of bribery. For instance, with dispersed 
owners, managers may act opportunistically and follow their own interest at the expense of the 
firm. Controlling founder-managers on the other hand, may expropriate minority shareholders. 
Or, family owners may maximize family interests at the expense of other shareholders. Because 
of these alternative incentives and opportunities, my model accounts for ownership type. The 
type of ownership in Vietnam is determined by the Central Institute for Economic Management. 
The rights and obligations per ownership type are specified in the Enterprise Law (Central 
Institute for Economic Management, 2005). The Enterprise Law specifies five main ownership 
types: sole proprietorship, limited liability company, shareholding company, family business, 
and collectives. Collectives are not part of the sample and therefore are not included. I 
constructed three dummies; that is, ownership dummy 1 is 1 if the firm was a sole proprietorship 
and 0 otherwise, ownership dummy 2 is 1 if the firm was a limited liability company and 0 
otherwise, and ownership dummy 3 is 1 if the firm was a shareholding or joint-stock company 
and 0 otherwise. The family firm type of ownership is the benchmark case (Gundry & Welsch, 
2001). Next, I controlled for the estimated costs that firms must pay due to malfunctioning public 
services—in this case, electricity cuts. I measured public service costs using a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for firms that faced electricity cuts and 0 otherwise. It is argued that the greater the 
firm’s dependency on public services, the more likely firms are to pay a bribe due to the 





the firm. This study measures firm debt with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a 
loan from a state bank (and 0 otherwise). Firms with debts from state banks are likely to suffer 
from (external) force such as interest rate and cash flow problems (Clarke & Xu, 2004) because 
they depend on using public services and are under public control. 
 I also control for the industry context in which the company operates. For example, 
challenging conditions in the service sector—such as short investment horizons and decreasing 
financial returns due to environmental hostility or heterogeneity—may explain why firms in this 
industry tend to bribe government officials more often than firms in other industries such as the 
trade sector or manufacturing sector. The respondents operate in three main industries: services, 
trading, and manufacturing. I constructed two dummy variables to account for industry 
differences: one for services (that equals 1 if the firm operates in the service sector and 0 
otherwise) and one for trading (that equals 1 if the firm operates in the trading sector and 0 
otherwise). Manufacturing was considered the base case in the model and was thus not included. 
 
4.4.3 Estimation procedures 
I used a (logit) binary choice model to empirically test the hypotheses (Chen et al., 2008) while 
controlling for individual, firm, and industry characteristics. A firm has a single choice between 
paying and not paying a bribe to public officials. From the perspective of expected utility 
maximization (Svensson, 2003), a firm will pay the bribe if the expected utility from this action 
is greater than the expected utility of not paying it. Because the expected utility of paying the 
bribe is unobservable, I model the difference between the expected utility of paying bribe and not 
paying the bribe as follows: 





where y* is latent unobservable difference in expected utilities. The xi vector represents the 
entrepreneurial characteristics, contextual conditions, and control variables affecting the 
likelihood of bribery, and the ȕ′ vector is the corresponding parameters. İ is assumed to have a 
logistic (logit model) distribution.  
 I do not observe the latent variable y*, but I do observe whether a bribe has been paid out. 
Thus, the y binary variable can be defined as follows: 
y = 1 if y* > 0, and   (2) 
y = 0 otherwise. (3) 
It follows that 
Prob (yi = 1|xi) = Prob (İ + ȕ′xi) = F (ȕ′xi), (4) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of İ (Greene, 2003). I estimate the logit form 
because I assume a bell-shaped distribution for İ that has thicker tails than a standard normal. 
Maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate the parameters of the binary choice model. 
The logit distribution is given by the following: 
. 
 I estimate the logit form because I assume a bell-shaped distribution for İ that has thicker 
tails than a standard normal distribution. Maximum likelihood  procedure is used to estimate the 
parameters of the binary choice model. To specify the likelihood equation, I define p as the 
probability of observing whatever value of y was observed for a given observation: 

































where Pr(yi=1| xi) is defined by Equation 4. If the observations are independent, the likelihood 
equation is as follows: 
 . 
 It is impossible to compute the variance of y* from the observed data or the variance of y* is 
unknown, so the meaning of the partial change for each ȕ in y* is not clear (Long, 1997, p.70). 
To interpret the coefficients of the explanatory variables, I compute the ȕ standardized 
coefficients. Assuming that  is the unconditional standard deviation of yi*, the yi* 
standardized coefficients can be calculated with respect to xi, which indicates that for a unit 
increase in xi, yi* is expected to increase by  standard deviations, holding all other variables 
constant. Assuming that is the unconditional standard deviation of xi, the fully standardized 
coefficient can also be calculated for xi, which indicates that for a standard deviation increase in 
xi, yi* is expected to increase (or decrease) by standard deviations, holding all other 
variables constant.  
 To provide a better understanding of the partial change in the probability of bribery, I 
compute marginal effects for the logit model following Long (1997, p.74). The marginal effects 
depend on the magnitude of the ȕs for all variables and the levels of all x’s- values of other 































4.5 Empirical Results 
Table 4.1 provides means, standard deviations, and correlations. Of the 352 observations, 76% 
(268) reported that they did not pay bribes. According to our data, the yearly average amount of 
bribes paid by firms reporting positive bribes was VND 30.05 million (US$1,905.5). If we 
include firms reporting zero bribe payments, the average payment is VND 7.17 million 
(US$454.66). In our sample, 52% of the companies operate in the trade sector, and 15% in the 
service sector. Of the companies, 54% are sole proprietorship, 11% limited liability companies 
and 2% joint stock firms. About 70% of the companies in our sample have fewer than 10 
employees, and 26% have 11 to 50 employees. On average, the age of the firms is 7.44 years. 
The number of competitors is, on average, 35.93 competitors. Of the respondents, 58.52% 
reported that the quality of the government in terms of efficiency is high and very high 
efficiency. 
  
Table 4.2 summarizes results from the hierarchical logit regression analyses. In preparation for 
the regression analyses, I performed the customary tests to obtain reliable estimates. These tests 
reported satisfactory results; that is, there is no heteroscedasticity or multicollinearity. Among 
other things, I tested for possible bias caused by collinearity among variables by calculating the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the regression coefficients. Calculations of VIF ranged 
from a low of 1.09 to a high of 1.49, well below the cutoff figure Neter et al. (1985) recommend 
and indicating the absence of multicollinearity. To verify whether the logit model is suitable, I 
used the Hosmer-Lemeshow test for goodness-of-fit. For the model, the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
value is insignificant (p-value = .35), and therefore, I conclude that the model fits the data well. 





a different process from the level of corruption given that entrepreneurs are corrupt. To this end, 
I used a Tobit-2 procedure that includes two submodels: One is the probit (or logit) model and 
the other is a regular least squares that serves to explain the amount of bribery. The idea is that if 
I estimate the second submodel (ordinary least squares) and ignore the link to the first submodel 
(probit/logit), the estimators may not be consistent (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The results from 
the Tobit-2 model, however, show that no connection between the two stages exist, as 
exemplified by an insignificant value for the Mills ratio (B = –51.61; and nonsignificant with p = 
.58). Thus, a sample selection issue is of less concern, and I conclude that a logit model is an 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The various fit parameters show that the model increasingly fits the data better. The R-square 
index improves from 11.7% in Model 1 to 17.1% in Model 4. The data convincingly support H1 
and H2, which consider the (perceived) external force. For H1, the parameter estimate of 
perceived competition is positive and significant (ȕ = .004; p < .05), indicating that a greater 
number of perceived competitors make firms in a transition economy more susceptible to use 
bribery. For H2, which predicts that low quality of the local government will increase the need to 
pay bribes, the parameter estimate for government quality is negative and significant (ȕ = –.486; 
p < .01). H3 and H4 consider the (perceived) internal forces. Model 4 shows that firm size indeed 
is positively related with a firm’s likelihood to pay bribes but is not significant (ȕ = .259; n.s.). 
Thus, the data do not support H3. Model 4 offers significant support for the expected U-shaped 
relationship between firm age and the likelihood of bribery formulated in H4. The parameter 
estimate for the main term is negative and significant (ȕ = –.936; p < .10) and for the squared 
term is positive and significant (ȕ = .231; p < .05). In particular, with the mean value of firm age 
at .74 years in the sample and the estimated parameter coefficients for firm age and firm age 
squared, the minimum inflexion point for firm age is 2.03 years. Taken together, these data 
provide partial evidence that internal forces contribute to the likelihood of bribery. 
 With regard to the control variables, Table 4.2 shows that formal education is negatively 
associated with bribery, though it is not significant and therefore has no explanatory power for 
the main variable of interest (ȕ = –.008; n.s.). Informal education, however, is positively and 
significantly associated with bribe incidence (ȕ = .111; p < 0.05). To some extent, this conflicts 
with mainstream thinking about education, norms, and corruption. The content of business 
courses may offer an explanation for the significant effect. It is argued that business education 





competitive strategies that stress the importance of free-riding, defection, and selfishness 
(Ghoshal, 2005). In addition, management courses are attended to initiate and develop personal 
networks and, as such, enable entrepreneurs to learn about prevailing norms and practices of 
bribery (Brass et al., 1998). Table 4.2 shows that a firm’s likelihood to bribe is not significantly 
influenced by the type of ownership (Luo & Han, 2009). All forms of ownership are not 
significantly related to bribery incidence (single proprietorship companies: ȕ = .581; joint-stock 
companies: ȕ = 1.266; limited liability companies: ȕ = .707) and do not pay significantly higher 
or lower bribes than family firms (the benchmark case). In addition, the costs of public service 
interruptions are not significantly related to bribery incidence (ȕ = .155; n.s.). It suggests that in 
Vietnam, uncertainty of electricity cuts may harm a firm’s business operation but does not result 
in forces that drive firms to bribe government officials. The results for a firm’s debt position at a 
state bank are unequivocal: Debt position is an important variable that explains the likelihood of 
bribery and strongly aligns with the core ideas of internal forces of firms (ȕ = .747; p < .05). 
Finally, Table 4.2 shows that the sector in which the firm operates determines a firm’s likelihood 
of bribery. More in particular, the results show that firms in the service sector (ȕ = 1.419, p < 
.01) and in the trade sector (ȕ = .678, p < .10) are significantly more likely to pay bribes than 
those in the manufacturing sector (the benchmark case). 
 I performed four additional tests of robustness. First, I replaced the missing value for a 
particular question with an estimated value of that question. By doing so, I was able to include 
all 594 observations, compare the regression models, and determine whether a sample bias 
exists. The regression results were the same for the dataset in the main text. Second, although all 
the VIF values are well below the threshold value, in an additional test, I mean-centered the 





reestimated all models while including interaction terms between some firm and some context 
characteristics. In particular, it may be the case that micro-firms are more likely to pay bribes 
when they operate in a highly competitive environment or are confronted with a very low quality 
of government. Hence, the rational to perform these robustness tests is to examine whether the 
effects of context characteristics influence the strength or direction of the effects of firm 
characteristics on the likelihood of paying a bribe. I therefore estimated a model including an 
interaction term between micro-firm size and competitive environment and between micro-firm 
size and quality of government. However, none of the interaction terms report significant values, 
and the main effects remain as reported in Table 4.2. I also estimated a model with a three-way 
interaction term, that is, between micro-firm size, competitive environment and quality of 
government. This three-way interaction term also was not significant. This builds confidence for 
the chosen approach to study direct effects of firm- and (perceived) context characteristics on 
bribery incidence.  
 Finally, I reanalyzed the effects of firm size on the likelihood of bribery. As mentioned 
previously, I find a positive but nonsignificant effect of size on bribery. In setting of a transition 
economy, however, it may be important to discuss the particular characteristics of micro firms 
and bribery. In transition economies, the overwhelming majority of the companies are (very) 
small—that is, have fewer than ten employees. Until recently, the existence of these micro firms 
was considered a problem. These firms are often owned by individual people or families, have 
limited financial assets, apply simple technologies and procedures, are short-term oriented, have 
small market shares and low demand, lack managerial expertise (e.g., marketing research, 
forecasting techniques), and in general have limited ambitions to grow (Liberman-Yaconi et al., 





financial resources, and have difficulties to meet competition from large firms. Furthermore, it is 
argued that these firms have low levels of risk taking. Micro firms use personal or family capital 
and spend money only on what is essential for short-term returns. However, recently, the 
perspective on micro firms has changed. Many countries increasingly acknowledge the 
importance of these firms for the economic development of their nation–state in providing such 
assets as job creation, household income, and poverty alleviation (Acs et al., 1999). These firms 
are flexible, nonbureaucratic, and niche oriented (Liberman-Yaconi et al., 2010). Given these 
benefits, researchers have suggested that these firms deliberately decide not to grow (Liberman-
Yaconi et al., 2010) and that they operate in the “informal sector”, which refers to the paid 
production and sales of goods and services of entrepreneurs who are unregistered or hidden from 
the state for tax and/or benefit purposes (Williams & Round, 2007). Micro firms do not want to 
enter into the formal sector. not only because of excessive registration costs but also because 
they want to hide from the arbitrary system of compliance control. Taken together, this may 
foster the best way to hide from public officials and, as such, it might be expected that micro 
firms are less likely to pay bribes. To test this latter proposition, I constructed a new measure for 
micro firms with a dummy that equals 1 if a company has fewer than ten employees and 0 
otherwise. The summary statistics and regression results are in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Of the 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Two conclusions can be derived from Table 4.4. First, compared with Table 4.2, the estimates of 
parameter estimates for the main effects remain robust in terms of signs and significance. 
Second, Table 4.4 shows that micro firms indeed are less likely to pay a bribe (ȕ = –.586, p < 
.10). Taking these conclusions together, I conclude that firm size indeed matters for bribery, 
particularly for firms that are very small. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
To date, corruption has a long-standing research tradition. This work adds to existing corruption 
research by attempting to explain the bribery phenomenon from a firm-level perspective in a 
transition economy. More in particular, the key assumption is that firms operating within the 
same country may vary in their propensity or willingness to pay bribes due to forces that result 
from either (1) factors specific to the firms or (2) factors specific to their perceptions of the 
environment. This firm-level line of research is valuable because it shifts the attention away from 
the demand side of corruption (i.e., the government) toward the supply side of bribery (i.e., the 
firm). Most policy discussions focus on public officials, who are assumed to initiate bribery, 
which is not always the case. Firms are different from one another in their response to forces and 
the way they react to government corrupt behavior. In line with the recent firm-level studies of 
bribery (Clarke & Xu, 2004; Svensson, 2003; Swamy et al., 2001), the objective of this study is 
to investigate how internal and external forces determine the incidence of bribery. The former 
relate to firm-specific characteristics and the latter to (perceived) contextual characteristics. 
 Building on a unique data set of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs, I am able to quantify bribery 
at the level of the firm and to measure the key concepts. The study demonstrates that the 




external context in which firms are embedded. I found that the likelihood of bribery activities is 
determined by firm size, firm age, perceived quality of the government, and the perceived 
intensity of competition. Taken together, these characteristics substantiate my assertion that 
entrepreneurs offer bribes in a response to forces existing inside and outside the organization. 
 Thus, this chapter explains whether and how firms in a transition economy with weak 
institutions, such as Vietnam, are involved in corruption transactions. In so doing, this study 
provides empirical evidence for key elements of corporate illegality and anomie theory (cf. 
Martin et al., 2007). The theory of corporate illegality argues that in addition to motives and 
opportunities, there is a positive link in particular between force and the likelihood of illegal 
corporate behavior (Baucus, 1994). According to this theory, the characteristics of the 
environment and of the firm induce conditions of force that determine whether illegal behavior 
occurs. 
 This study suffers from several limitations, which offer opportunities for further research. 
First, the results highlight a size effect on bribery incidence albeit only when I account for a 
particular class of firms, that is, those with less than 10 employees (these firms are identified as 
micro firms in the literature). In line with other studies (e.g., Svensson, 2003; Vaughan, 1983), I 
use size as a proxy for underlying dimensions such as structure. Of course, it is a question to 
what extent the generic argumentation concerning size is generally valid for all of the underlying 
dimensions of size that I relate to bribery. Future research in particular may address this 
limitation and more explicitly account how structure and norms and ethics (that are now part of 
the size concept) relate to bribery incidence. In a similar vein, future research may analyze more 
complex models than the ones presented in this chapter. The models in this chapter present linear 




empirical findings have merits. As a test of robustness, I explored the opportunity of interaction 
effects between a few of the main variables in my model. For example, I tested the perspective 
that micro-firms in a highly competitive environment are more likely to bribe because various 
internal and external forces may work in tandem for these particular firms in these particular 
circumstances. The empirical results for this robustness analysis of my main findings, however, 
indicate that this is not the case: the interaction term for micro-firms and the level of competition 
is not significant. Nonetheless, future research with data from other firm-level samples in other 
national contexts may test the aforementioned complexities and as such verify whether or not 
internal and external forces may reinforce each other in the likelihood of bribery. 
 Second, the use of cross-sectional data from Vietnamese entrepreneurs in the MRD limits the 
generalization of these results. To increase generalizability, future researchers could replicate 
this study in other transition economies such as China and Russia. Third, it is well-known that 
cross-sectional databases prevent intertemporal, causal analysis of processes that determine the 
outcomes observed with the use of a questionnaire. Future researchers could attempt to develop 
panel data sets and as such enable a more dynamic analysis of the bribery phenomenon. Third, 
the measure for bribery used here considers solely the payment of cash. However, the interaction 
between an entrepreneur and a public official may also incorporate other forms of bribery (e.g., 
gifts, visits to bars). New data with other bribery measures would enable testing the role of firm 










In the previous chapter and in recent work on bribery it has been shown that firm characteristics 
(e.g., firm size, firm age, firm profit, ownership structure) and the business environment (e.g., the 
quality of government service, the quality of legal environment, competition, regulatory burden) 
influence a decision to bribe (Chen et al., 2008; Clarke & Xu, 2004; Gaviria, 2002; Kuncoro, 
2004, 2006; Wu, 2009). This contribution to the corruption literature is significant. First, it 
focuses on micro as opposed to macro, or country-level, determinants of bribery. Second, it shifts 
attention away from the demand side of corruption (i.e., the public officials) toward the supply 
side of corruption (i.e., the people or firms assumed to initiate bribery). However, firm managers 
do not operate in a vacuum. They are embedded in networks of personal relationships, and the 
characteristics of these networks may determine bribery. The web of social ties between agents 
and organizations is important because it may promote actions, create opportunities for the 
network members, and thereby generate value (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). It 
may also determine a person’s perception toward corruption, the more so when social 
relationships are used to achieve individual objectives. Despite this, little is known about the 




 Social relationships have been considered important factors of the culture and the business 
transactions in Asian countries. That is, successful transactions in business depend heavily on 
social relationships in most Asian countries (Hitt et al., 2002). For example, in societies such as 
China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, social relationships among families, friends, and business 
partners are highly valued. In these countries, a network of relationships has become important 
and necessary to achieve favors and obtain better performance (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 
1990; Hitt et al., 2002; Uzzi, 1997). A successful manager in these societies is often considered a 
well-connected person rather than a wealthy one.  
 Particularly in the context of transition economy, cultivating a personal relationship with 
government officials can be viewed as a unique type of entrepreneurial capital, which is expected 
to improve the performance of (new) ventures (Nee, 1992; Peng & Luo, 2000; Peng & Zhou, 
2005). Building a strong relationship with government officials can help firms to, for example, 
obtain goods and services, win contracts, cope with bureaucratic constraints, and obtain favors 
and protection not otherwise available (Xin & Pearce, 1996). In a transition economy context, 
bribery can  be considered an investment that firms need to make to maintain a network of social 
relationships and operate successfully in a weak institutional environment (Peng & Heath, 1996). 
 Although the effects of personal relationships with government officials on firm performance 
have been investigated, whether and how personal relationships relate to bribery incidence is not 
addressed in detail. To the best of my knowledge, this study is among the first to investigate the 
impact of social ties on bribery. The study proceeds in two steps. First, I provide a literature 
review of the particular context in which bribery occurs. Second, following insights from social 




More in particular, I explain how different types of ties and network diversity influence the 
likelihood of bribery.  
 This research makes the following two contributions to the extant literature. First, it 
emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs as the unit of analysis in analyzing possible effects on 
bribery of personal relationships with government officials in the context of an institutionally 
weak transition economy. Second, and relatedly, regarding bribery, this study complements the 
existing corruption literature by moving attention from the demand side characteristics to the 
supply side determinants of bribery in a business setting in an Asian economy (Aidis & van 
Praag, 2007; Martin et al., 2007). Not all entrepreneurs pay bribes, and entrepreneurs respond to 
bribery demands differently. Entrepreneurs may vary in the strength and variety of personal ties 
with public officials. Thus, the study’s key aim is to determine whether variation in these 
characteristics determines variation in bribery incidence.  
5.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
5.2.1  Bribery in the context of a transition economy 
In the context of a transition economy, personal ties with government officials at various 
levels—such as officials in industry bureaus, regulatory- and supporting organizations (Peng & 
Luo, 2000)—can be viewed as a unique entrepreneurial resource that improves the performance 
of (new) ventures (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Nee, 1992) as well as foster private firm survival 
(Peng & Luo, 2000; Xin & Pearce, 1996). Personal ties help firms compensate for institutional 




information, managers may cultivate personal ties (e.g., blat in Russia, guanxi9 in China) and use 
them when entering exchange relationships (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Powell, 1990) and 
obtaining resources or protection not otherwise available (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Birley (1985) 
and Larson (1992) find that personal networks contribute greatly to the success of small firms. In 
this relationship context, bribe and favors can be conceptualized as an element of reciprocal gift 
exchange dedicated to the maintenance of relationships. The stronger the relationship with 
government officials, the more likely entrepreneurs are to be able to access resources, mobilize 
resources, and obtain goods and services, as well as attain favorable treatment.   
 In a discussion of the relationship between social ties and bribes, the context of a transition 
economy in general and characteristics of existing government systems in particular cannot be 
neglected. This is because the process of institutional change in a transition economy creates the 
institutional voids that result from decentralizing decision-making power in the government 
administration.  The decentralization usually results in local administrators supervising the 
region, district, province, or village, and these officials have considerable discretion to, for 
example, raise taxes or handle licenses, even though this authority may be (imperfectly) 
constrained by formal central legislation. In particular, local officials are able to create 
complicated administrative procedures. Often, such procedures may conflict with regulation 
mandated by the central government. Such procedures may burden and confuse entrepreneurs 
because of unclear and overlapping regulation and lack of transparency. Firms may avoid the 
resulting administrative burden by paying a premium (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). To put it 
differently, the lack of central state supervision and enforcement characteristic for a situation of 
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 Guanxi, a Chinese term, refers to interpersonal connections or instrumentalpersonal ties that range from 
strong personal loyalties to ceremonial bribery (for a discussion, see, e.g., Fan, 2002; Xin & Pearce, 




institutional change, together with local public officials’ often low income, may increase the 
likelihood of the local public official asking for a bribe in an attempt to increase his or her 
standard of living. 
  In addition to the formal institutional voids due to institutional change in transition 
economies, there are informal effects. Processes of institutional change and the associated lack of 
institutional trust and uncertainty may create a segmentation of society, denoted as the hourglass 
society (Rose, 1995).  In such a society, there is a sharp distinction between existing upper- and 
lower-class networks. Moreover, upper-class networks operate differently from lower-class 
networks. In upper-class networks, participating public officials are part of the elite network. 
Such elite networks are characterized by specific subcultural values and norms that may be 
distinctly different from lower-class networks. Moreover, the institutional elite have more 
reputation to lose and more contact with outsiders, particularly international outsiders. In line 
with Rose’s metaphor, we suggest that personal ties with public officials in the different 
networks are subject to different norms and values that ultimately may lead to a different impact 
of the personal ties on the likelihood of bribery. In the upper-class network, due to the higher 
income levels, the need for bribes as a source of income is lower, and higher exposure to media 
and (international) outsiders creates the danger of reputation loss. Moreover, bribes may be 
culturally nonacceptable in the upper-class network. This contrasts with the needs and attitudes 
of the lower-class networks, in which the need to cope with low incomes and arguments of 





5.2.2 The characteristics of personal networks 
According to social network theory, a personal tie can be defined as any relationship, transaction, 
or interaction between two persons or all possible pairs of units (e.g., kinship, material 
transactions, behavioral interactions). A personal network, according to Dubini & Aldrich 
(1991), can be defined as the set of all persons with whom an entrepreneur has direct relations. A 
simple form of a personal network is a direct tie linking entrepreneurs to persons with whom 
they have direct transactions, such as services or consultants. The two most common types of 
personal networks10 are often personal ties with friends or relatives (Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1985) and business ties with executives of other firms such as suppliers, buyers, or 
competitors (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991; Larson, 1992; Peng & Luo, 2000; Uzzi, 1997). In addition, 
ties with public officials are considered another unique type of ties, especially in the context of a 
transition economy.      
 An understanding of the characteristics of the networks requires attention for the network 
structure and the content of ties. The network structure refers to the strength of ties that is 
determined by the quality of ties (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Yli-Renko et al., 2001) (e.g., their 
frequency, intensity, multiplicity) and the configuration of the ties (e.g., direct and/or indirect 
ties, network diversity, network size, network density), while the content of ties connotes shared 
norms, beliefs, and abilities (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Network diversity can be defined as the 
diversity of people a person can contact within his or her interpersonal environment (Marsden, 
1987, 1990). Network diversity measures the degree to which an ego-centered network contains 
diverse alters, for example, demographic characteristics or occupation (Marsden, 1987; Renzulli 
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 The terms “personal network”, “social network”, and “personal contact network” are frequently used in 




et al., 2000). This study focuses on an ego-centered network, which consists of a focal actor, 
termed ego, and a set of alters who have ties to ego. 
 Ties or contacts may be of different kinds (e.g., formal or informal, direct or indirect, 
frequent or infrequent). Among these types, the distinction between strong and weak ties first 
proposed by Granovetter (1973) is particularly germane to the contact issue. By differentiating 
between strong and weak ties, Granovetter (1973) describes how the diversity, homogeneity, and 
heterogeneity of these ties affect people’s actions. Tie strength thus can be defined as a function 
of three factors: the frequency of contacts, reciprocity (i.e., favors and obligations), and 
friendship. Strong ties pertain to frequent contacts that almost constantly have affective, often 
friendly, overtones and may include reciprocal favors. In contrast, weak ties are infrequent 
contacts because they are episodic and do not necessarily have an affective content. Strong ties 
are used to mobilize political resources and solidarity11, whereas weak ties are exerted to obtain 
the transmission of novel information and diffusion of innovation (Nelson, 1989). Strong ties can 
be measured, for example, by self-reports of receiving support from friends and family, and 
weak ties are proxied by support from business partners and acquaintances (Brüderl & 
Preisendörfer, 1998). Granovetter’s (1973) “strength of weak ties” hypothesis is widely known in 
various fields; it has fueled the debate on the relative value of strong versus weak ties. Strong ties 
are found to be more beneficial as they generate trust and cooperation between the actors (Ahuja, 
2000), and facilitate the exchange of high-quality information (Gulati, 1998), complex 
knowledge (Hansen, 1999), and tacit knowledge (Lundvall, 1993). Coleman (1990) & Burt 
(1992) suggest that actors who are better connected have a competitive advantage over poorly 
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 Solidarity is a form of strong social norms and beliefs associated with a high degree of closure of the 




connected actors. Using a sample of 1700 German founders, Brüdel & Preisendörfer (1998) find 
that strong ties are more critical than weak ties in explaining firm survival.  
 These studies and findings offer important input for understanding different types of ties. I 
suggest that not all types of ties are equally conducive to bribery. I argue that strong ties are 
important to explain bribery in the context of a transition economy. Strong ties are likely to be 
based on long-term relationships, high levels of closeness or intimacy, (particularized) trust, 
loyalty, and shared norms, which ultimately enforce reciprocity between group members and 
thereby lead to a greater probability of bribery.  
 
5.2.3 Hypotheses development 
As mentioned previously, in a transition economy, ties with public officials are needed, for 
example, to obtain official government approval for potentially lucrative public contracts or 
services (Djankov et al., 2002). Strong ties with public officials are necessary because if not, 
firms face hurdles to make an economic exchange and an increase in transaction costs due to 
incoherent and ever-changing business regulations. I suggest that with strong ties, entrepreneurs 
are more likely to pay a bribe because it is considered a gift that is an intrinsic element of the 
relationship with the public official. The gift is based on reciprocity, the favor of a lower 
administrative burden. Moreover, it is difficult to make the exchange in another way given the 
weak institutional environment. Warrent et al. (2004) suggest that firms offer money or other 
forms of compensation—such as hiring unqualified employees who are relatives of local 
government leaders and placing them in important positions or having a government bureaucrat 





Strong ties and bribery 
Strong ties are expected to foster bribery, for several reasons. First, when ongoing personal 
interactions between government officials and entrepreneurs are extensive, the opportunities for 
engaging in bribery transactions increase (Buchan, 2005; Collins et al., 2009). Thus, the 
frequency of interactions and the amount of time entrepreneurs spend with the government 
official are expected to be positively correlated to bribery (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). 
Furthermore, strong ties (e.g., those established through private conversations and assorted 
meetings) foster the willingness to engage in bribery. Because of the tacit and risky nature of 
bribery, government officials and entrepreneurs require time to build mutual understanding and 
trust before they will engage in these transactions. This is in line with Lave & Wenger (1991), 
who claim that new members of a network remain peripheral for a while so that they can 
internalize tacit meanings, norms, and values of behavior in socialization and habituation. 
Second, entrepreneurs who have strong ties with government officials are more likely to pay a 
bribe due to reciprocal nature of strong ties. When a person embeds within a social relationship 
(e.g., a family, an organization), the identification with the group leads to shared norms and 
creates the expectation or obligation to support others in the group (Coleman, 1990; Uzzi, 1997). 
Moreover, strong ties are sentimental and personalized and imply reciprocity with mutual 
obligations, shared interests, and long-term commitments to perpetual exchanges (Li, 2007; Lin, 
2007; Uzzi, 1997). With such characteristics, strong ties are more like a friendship or a family 
relationship. Relationships with friends and family are characterized by frequent contacts and 
emotional closeness. Such ties facilitate reciprocity, cooperation toward the inside members, 
high levels of trust, and in-group loyalty to the member’s interests at the expense of outsiders. 
Consequently, it increases in-group favoritism behavior (Harris, 2007). Banfield (1958) shows 




treatments to relatives when the value of family loyalty is high. This result is also supported by 
Lipset & Lenz’s (2000) country-level study, which suggests that countries with high scores on 
familism tend to be more corrupt. Moreover, other scholars show that managers with strong 
relationships with government officials may more readily consider engaging in corruption 
because of a sense of social obligation (Coleman, 1988; Collins et al., 2009; Westphal & Zajac, 
1997). This is particularly relevant if government officials need to rely on illegal payments for 
facilitating government services to obtain higher income levels (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Strong 
ties are likely to trigger bribery because they may help firms reduce the likelihood of 
opportunism in the absence of enforcement of agreements (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Taking 
the preceding factors into account, I predict a positive relationship between strong ties with 
public officials and bribery incidence. 
  As argued previously, in a transition economy, both upper- and lower-class networks are 
characterized by strong ties. There are several various reasons why the effect of strong ties on 
bribery will be different in the two networks of the society. First, administrative decentralization 
due to economic policy reforms that characterize a transition economy provides discretion to 
lower-class government officials. In addition, the lack of state control increases the possibility 
that a low level official will ask for a bribe. Furthermore, lower government officials need to 
supplement their income to obtain a decent standard of living, which increases the need for 
bribery demands. 
 Second, central government officials are less likely to have the opportunity to extort bribery 
in daily businesses that are largely delegated to local government officials. Moreover, they may 
receive higher incomes. In addition, bribes can be culturally nonacceptable in the elite network, 




status, and respect in the elite network is greater, which is likely to decrease incentives to engage 
in bribery transactions. Given these risks, strong ties with government officials may be built 
more adroitly on the basis of value-added services such as educational or training trips outside 
the country (Quelch & Tan, 1998), further reducing the likelihood of bribery transactions.  
 Third, local government officials may have more opportunities to extort bribes because they 
are better able to tightly manage and closely supervise firms in the local area (Walder, 1995, p. 
294). Thus, a local official’s interest in personal income is more likely to be translated into 
entrepreneurial behavior (Walder, 1995). For example, local tax officials are entitled to impose 
an arbitrary tax measures on firm sales. Thus, entrepreneurs are more likely to pay a bribe to 
local officials to avoid an arbitrary amount of tax.   
 Taken all arguments together, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Strong ties with local officials are positively related to the likelihood of 
paying bribes. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Strong ties with government officials are negatively related to the likelihood 
of paying bribes. 
 
 
Network diversity and bribery 
Prior empirical work has suggested that there is a positive relationship between the diversity of a 
person’s networks and performance (Pelled et al., 1999). Strong ties may limit the ability to 
access opportunities outside a group, whereas diverse contacts may produce more opportunities 
from different social relations. Network diversity can help firms to enhance ideas and cognitive 
resources, gather information, and impose the problem-solving capacity of the group because of 
knowledge heterogeneity as well as diverse experience (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; 




benefit people in such areas as access to jobs and promotions (De Graaf & Flap, 1988), increased 
opportunities for entrepreneurship (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991), and power in negotiations (Brass & 
Burkhardt, 1993; Burkhardt & Brass, 1990). For example, a diverse network with bankers, 
relatives, and friends would increase a firm’s ability to access to bank loans as well as other 
sources of finance (Nguyen et al., 2006; Winborg & Landstrom, 2001).  
 Few studies have addressed the correlation between network diversity and corruption (Choi, 
2007; Wise & Tschirhart, 2000). In line with the arguments of closed networks, which refer to 
the degree of (strongness) closeness of the relationship among families and friends within 
inward-looking group (Hwang, 1987), we hypothesize that there is a negative relationship 
between network diversity and bribery. This is because the diversity of the ego’s networks is 
likely to reduce dependence, cohesion, and conformity; a bureaucrat’s feeling of elitism; and 
core values that are cultivated in a (strong) closed network.   
 Thus, network diversity may decrease the likelihood to engage in bribery for several reasons. 
First, network diversity may increase the scope of opportunities open to entrepreneurs to gain 
access to similar resources at a lower cost. The number of weak ties is higher than that of strong 
ties when entrepreneurs increase the diversity of their networks. Weak ties provide more 
(unique) information, with low maintenance costs and often even more new ideas than are 
generated with strong ties (Burt, 2004; Kontinen & Ojala, 2011). Second, diversity may decrease 
trust between corruption partners. Furthermore, given different characteristics of a widely 
dissimilar groups or members, diversity may trade off risks of trust reduction (i.e., a decline of 
the values established over a long time within inward-looking groups, e.g., those with similar 




incentives to pay a bribe because of an increase in the alternatives to rule-breaking behavior 
available to entrepreneurs. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Network diversity is negatively related to the likelihood of paying bribes. 
 
5.3 Research Methods 
5.3.1 Control Variables  
I included several variables to control for individual and organizational characteristics and 
opinions about bureaucratic burden. In line with macro-level studies, formal education is 
expected to have a negative relationship on bribery likelihood. The main reason is that a more 
educated society would be expected to bribe less (Gatti et al., 2003; Rest & Thoma, 1986; 
Treisman, 2000). In this study, formal education was measured by a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the manager obtained a university degree in economics and 0 otherwise. Gender of the 
entrepreneur was measured by a dummy variable that indicates 1 for men and 0 for women. Men 
are more likely to pay a bribe than women because they are more active in the labor market than 
women and are thus expected to be more frequent targets of bribery (Mocan, 2008; Mocan & 
Rees, 2005; Swamy et al., 2001). In addition, men tend to behave in a more risk-taking manner 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996) and take fewer stances on ethical behavior (Glover et al., 1997). 
Top manager’s age was measured by subtracting the year the manager was born from the current 
year. Because of their experience, older managers are expected to be less prone to corruption 
because they are less involved in bureaucratic procedures (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004; Gatti 
et al., 2003).  
 I control for a change of member status of social groups, which is defined as the difference in 




existing number of direct ties an entrepreneur is involved with in various social groups (e.g., 
political parties, youth unions, labor unions, clubs, social organizations), from the number of 
direct ties that an entrepreneur had previously. A positive value indicates an increase in the 
number of new direct ties. It is argued that when the number of personal relationships increases, 
entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in bribes because of the increasing corresponding risks 
of malfeasance and increasing conflicts of interests (Buchan, 2005; Velthouse & Kandogan, 
2007). 
 I also control for the phase in the life cycle of a company. For this, I constructed a dummy 
variable (labeled “startup firm”) that equals 1 for firms two years of age and younger (and 0 
otherwise) to understand whether there are differences in the propensity of bribery practices 
between young or old firms. I expect that bribes help startup firms to develop a network of 
relationships with government officials, which, in turn, helps them overcome liabilities of 
newness as well as to achieve legitimacy (Peng & Luo, 2000). There are different forms of 
ownership.12 Firm ownership was measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm was a 
sole proprietorship (and 0 otherwise). A single proprietor has a strong motive to maximize his or 
her company performance, which offers more incentives and opportunities to bribe due to the 
absence of supervision forms (De Jong et al., 2010).    
 The respondents varied in their opinions about bureaucratic burden. It is well-known that a 
firm’s willingness to pay bribes is a function of government-related burden (Kuncoro, 2006). 
Less business-friendly institutions are more likely to increase an entrepreneur’s likelihood of 
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 The type of ownership in Vietnam is determined by the Central Institute for Economic Management. 
The rights and obligations per ownership type are specified in the Enterprise Law (CIEM, 2005), which 
specifies five main ownership types: sole proprietorship, limited liability company, shareholding 




becoming involved in corruption (Tonoyan et al., 2010). I measure this issue with a five-point 
Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 5 = “strongly agree” on the statement “In the last three 
years, all business licenses are difficult to obtain, they cost much time to come and pick up and 
other costs”). Bribe enforcement in this study is indicated by the degree of enforcement of 
paying a bribe measured on a five-point scale (1 = “completely involuntary bribe payments,” and 
5 = “completely voluntary bribe payments” on the statement “paying an amount of cash to 
‘lubricate’ your business affairs is completely forced… [or] completely voluntary” (Chen et al., 
2008, p. 232).   
 
5.3.2 Dependent and independent variables 
In this study, bribery is defined as the cash payment an organization makes with the purpose of 
influencing the actions of a public official (De Jong et al., 2010). The likelihood of bribery was 
measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports having paid money to 
government officials to conduct their business, and 0 otherwise. The specific question in the 
questionnaire was as follows: “Monthly, how much must your enterprise pay to ‘lubricate’ its 
business affairs?” The question was asked in Vietnamese. We used the usual forward and 
backward translation process to obtain the English version. The expression bôi tr˯n in the 
original Vietnamese question literally means “to lubricate”. This is a colloquial, synonym to 
money paid as bribes at government offices or administrative regulators. The closest English 
equivalent is “to grease someone’s palm”. In the survey, we explicitly defined “to lubricate” as 
money spent. The measure does not include other forms of bribery such as gifts that may have 
monetary value as well. The measure is similar to the ones Transparency International and the 




 To test the main hypotheses, I measure two dimensions that characterize the network 
structure: the strength of the ties and network diversity. For strong ties, we make a difference 
between ties with local officials and ties with government officials. Unlike government officials, 
local officials are civil servants in the local villages who are at the lowest level of the 
government’s hierarchical bureaucratic system and work at the place where the company is 
located. The strength of ties with local officials was measured by the perceived quality of the ties 
that the managers had during the past three to five years (cf. Yli-Renko et al., 2001). In line with 
Yli-Renko et al. (2001) and Adler & Kwon (2002), the quality of the ties in this study can be 
characterized by goodwill trust, reciprocal expectations, a high degree of frequent contact, and 
(intimacy) closeness. Strong ties with local officials were measured by a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for a manager’s ties are (very) good quality and 0 otherwise. Ties with government 
officials were measured by a five-point Likert scale (1 = “poor quality,” and 5 = “very good 
quality”). The question for these relationships is “What is the quality of the personal ties of the 
managers with local authority/government agencies during the last three or five years?”    
 Diversity of ties refers to the heterogeneity in network partners (i.e., alters). A manager 
maintains ties with persons in different groups. This study measures the diversity using a count 
variable is derived from asking respondents about their connections to other groups: “Are you 
now a member of (a) youth union, (b) communist party, (c) labor union, (d) trade union, (e) 
social organization?” and “Do you have a family relative or close friend who works for (a) 
government agency, (b) state-owned enterprises, (c) private enterprises?” The score is the  
number of different groups with which a manager has ties. Next, using Marsden’s (1987) index 
of qualitative variation  formula, I measured the ego-centered network diversity for the ith ego 




squared of the proportion (pj2) of alters in the jth category. I measured network diversity as the 
probability of randomly choosing people with two different attributes from the possible eight 
attributes mentioned previously. Thus, network diversity with the following formula:    
 
A diversity score of 0 indicates a perfectly homogeneous network, and a diversity score of 1 this 
implies a perfectly heterogeneous network.  
 
5.3.3  Estimation procedures 
I use a (logit) binary choice model to empirically test the hypotheses (cf. Chen et al., 2008) while 
controlling for individual characteristics, organizational characteristics, and opinions about the 
bureaucratic system. A firm has a choice to pay a bribe to public officials or not. From the 
perspective of expected utility maximization (Svensson, 2003), a firm will pay the bribe if the 
expected utility from this action is greater than the expected utility of not paying it. Because the 
expected utility of paying the bribe is unobservable, we model the difference between the 
expected utility of paying bribe and not paying the bribe as follows: 
y* = ȕ'xi + İ , (1) 
 
where y* is latent unobservable difference in expected utilities. The xi vector represents the 
characteristics of personal ties, networks, and control variables affecting the likelihood of bribery 
and the ȕ' vector is the corresponding parameters. İ is assumed to have a logistic (logit model) 
distribution.  
 I do not observe the latent variable y*, but I do observe whether a bribe has been paid out. 













y = 1 if y* > 0, and             (2) 
y = 0 otherwise.   (3) 
 
It follows that 
Prob (yi=1| xi) = Prob (İ + ȕ'xi) = F (ȕ'xi),  (4)  
 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of İ (Greene, 2003). The probability of observing 
an event given x is the cumulative density evaluated at xiȕ'. The logit distribution is given by 
. 
 
 I estimate the logit form because I assume a bell-shaped distribution for İ that has thicker 
tails than a standard normal distribution. Maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate the 
parameters of the binary choice model. To specify the likelihood equation, I define p as the 
probability of observing whatever value of y was observed for a given observation: 
,     
 
where Pr (yi=1| xi) is defined by Equation 4. If the observations are independent, the likelihood 

































 It is impossible to compute the variance of y* from the observed data or if the variance of y* 
is unknown, so the meaning of the partial change for each ȕ in y* is not clear (Long, 1997, p.70). 
To interpret the coefficients of the explanatory variables, I compute the ȕ standardized 
coefficients (Long, 1997). Assuming that  is the unconditional standard deviation of yi*, the 
yi* standardized coefficients can be calculated with respect to xi, which indicates that for a unit 
increase in xi, yi* is expected to increase by  standard deviations, holding all other variables 
constant. Assuming that is the unconditional standard deviation of xi, the fully standardized 
coefficient for xi can also be calculated, which indicates that for a standard deviation increase in 
xi, yi* is expected to increase (or decrease) by standard deviations, holding all other variables 
constant.  
 To determine the partial change in the probability of bribery, marginal effects for the logit 
model are computed following Long (1997, p.74). The marginal effects depend on the magnitude 
of the ȕs for all variables and the levels of all x’s—values of other variables, xȕ, because f is 
computed at xȕ, as follows: 
. 
 
5.4 Results  
Sometimes, the sample contains missing observations for particular items. I deleted all observations 



























observations for regression analysis. I prefer to work with a conservative dataset albeit that bias may 
exist because I exclude cases for which (partial) information is lackingǤTable 1 provides descriptive 
statistics and correlations. Of the observations, 60 percent (95 firms) reported that they did pay 
bribes. According to our data, for the firms reporting positive bribes and for the firms reporting zero 
bribe payments, the yearly average amount of bribes that firms paid was VND 94.03 million (US$ 
5273,10 with the 2009 official exchange rate of VND 17,832 to US$ 1). On average, the quality of 
ties with government officials that entrepreneurs have are from good to very good (of the 
observations, 87.56%). Ties with local government officials also show, on average, a (very) good 
quality (of the observations, 91.28%). A network diversity average score of 0.98 implies a 
heterogeneous network (ties a manager has with the number of different groups). Almost all 
managers have ties with different groups.    
 To test the hypotheses, I regress tie strength and network diversity on bribery incidence while 
controlling for opinions about bureaucratic burdens, individual people, and firms. Before running 
the logit model, I investigated whether being corrupt is driven by a different process from the 
level of corruption, given that entrepreneurs are corrupt. For this, I use the Heckman two-step or 
Tobit-2 procedure, which includes two submodels to explain the amount of bribery: the probit 
(or logit) and the ordinary least squares. The idea is that if the second submodel (OLS) is 
estimated and I ignore the link to the first submodel (probit/logit), the estimators are not 
consistent (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The results from the Heckman model, however, show no 
connection between these two stages, with insignificant values for the Mills ratio (B = 48.23; and 
nonsignificance with p = .45). Thus, sample selection issue is of less concern, and thereby, I 
conclude that logit or probit models are an appropriate choice. I therefore continue with the one 




 I estimated a logit model differentiating bribing from nonbribing firms. Table 2 presents the 
results. Model 1 includes the control variables. In Model 2 the main effects are added to the 
control variables. All coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors. Variance inflation 
factors did not report multicollinearity between constructs. The max variance inflation factor 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5. 2. The Impact of Personal Networks on Bribery Incidence 
        
variables model 1  
 
model 2  
  
marg. 
effects        
 
      
 
       
 
main effects        
ties with local governm. officials    3.444 *** 1.223 0.352 0.693 
    (1.177)     
ties with government officials    -1.146 *** -0.407 -0.395 -0.203 
    (0.375)     
network diversity    4.385  1.558 0.024 0.777 
  (19.355)     
        
control        
change in member status 0.845 *  1.228 * 0.436 0.274 0.217 
 (0.415)   (0.647)     
bribe enforcement -0.970 ***  -0.887 ** -0.315 -0.272 -0.157 
 (0.355)   (0.353)     
business license 0.447   0.572 * 0.203 0.164 0.101 
 (0.327)   (0.296)     
manager’s age 0.041   0.048 * 0.017 0.170 0.008 
 (0.026)   (0.027)     
gender: male -2.036 ***  -2.835 *** -1.007 -0.403 -0.314 
 (0.733)   (0.936)     
manager’s education: d.e. 0.694   1.130 * 0.401 0.199 0.190 
 (0.581)   (0.614)     
firm life cycle: start-up firm 1.386 **  2.123 *** 0.754 0.325 0.277 
 (0.549)   (0.674)     
firm ownership: sole-proprietorship 1.584 ***  1.332 ** 0.473 0.229 0.214 
 (0.580)   (0.636)     
constant 2.085   -1.252     
 (1.750) (19.563)     
        
log likelihood -54.537   -47.501     
pseudo R2 0.2281   0.328     
wald chi2(7)/ wald chi2(11) 19.68   24.520     
prob > chi2 0.006   0.011     
observations 111   111     
marg. effect = marginal effect        
d.e. = diploma in economics        
 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
 
     = y-standardized coefficient; 











 To check whether the logit model is suitable, I use the Hosmer-Lemeshow test for goodness-
of-fit., which measures the predicted and observed frequencies; they should match closely, and 
the more closely they match, the better the fit. This is confirmed in the model (Hosmer-
Lemeshow Ȥ2 = 10.97; nonsignificant with p = .20). The first column of Table 2 presents the 
partial change in y* with all control variables and the corresponding p-values. 
The second column of Table 2 presents the full model. The third and the fourth columns report 
the ( ) standardized coefficients and the results of the fully standardized coefficients for 
, respectively. The fifth column presents the marginal effects.  
 H1 considers the effect of strong ties on bribery incidence. Table 2 shows that strong ties with 
local officials are positively associated with a firm’s likelihood to pay bribes, as expected (ȕ = 
3.44; p < .01). Thus, strong ties with local officials are a relevant determinant of bribery 
incidence. H2 states that the likelihood of bribery is negatively related to strong ties with 
government officials. The results confirm the expected negative effect of strong ties with 
government officials on the likelihood of bribery (ȕ = 1.15; p < .01). H3 predicted that firms with 
great network diversity are less likely to pay bribes.This hypothesis is not supported (ȕ = 4.38; 
n.s.). I hypothesized that network diversity may increase the alternatives for rule-breaking or 
opportunistic behavior for entrepreneurs (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993) or reduce trust and loyalty 
between corrupt partners within a closed corrupt network (Harris, 2007) and hence decrease 
incentives to bribe. The empirical results do not support this perspective. A possible explanation 
for this non-significant finding is the following. First, the effect of network diversity on bribery 
likelihood may be moderated by the characteristics of the network ties. For instance, Choi (2007) 
suggests that only firms that have strong links with (former) bureaucrats whose jurisdictions are 









strongly related to their business can benefit more from enhancing collusive relations with the 
government (e.g., for relevant policy-related information) that those without such strong ties with 
(former) bureaucrats. Second, although diversity may increase the number of (new) ties (that, as 
argued, has a negative impact on the firm’s likelihood to bribe), these (new) ties may not directly 
related to the corrupt network (Wise & Tschirhart, 2000).        
 The results are obtained while controlling for a substantial number of other bribery 
determinants. Some of these determinants are significant and provide insights for firm-level 
bribery in transition economies. The impact of bribe enforcement on the likelihood of bribery is 
negative and significant (ȕ = 89; p < .05). Bribery is thus influenced by the degree of 
enforcement. The higher the level of the voluntariness, the less likely entrepreneurs pay a bribe. I 
find a significant and positive effect of bureaucratic burden on the likelihood of bribery (ȕ = .57; 
p < .05).   
 Table 2 reports that older managers are more likely to pay bribes (ȕ = .05; p < .10). One 
reason for this is that older people become more sensitive to the threats of sanctions, more 
dependent on the reactions of others, and more susceptive to the potential costs of sanctions if a 
bribe is not paid (Tittle, 1980). I find that the likelihood of bribery is different for men and 
women. In contrast to my expectation, however, men are less likely to engage in bribes. An 
explanation for this may be that women are on average more honest and also more compliant to, 
for example, tax payments than men (Swamy et al., 2001; Tittle, 1980). The impact of formal 
education on bribery incidence is positive and significant and also somewhat counterintuitive (ȕ 
= 1.13; p < .10). Bribery involves uncertainty and ambiguity. For this reason, better educated 




(Guerrero & Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2008). In line with my arguments, a change of member status is 
indeed positively related to the likelihood of paying a bribe (ȕ=1.23; p < .10).  
 I also find significant evidence for the impact of the firm’s life cycle on the likelihood of 
bribery (ȕ = 2.12; p < .01). This result confirms that young firms are more likely to pay bribes 
than established firms because it helps young firms to develop a network with government 
officials, which, in turn, helps them to overcome liabilities of newness (De Jong et al., 2010). In 
addition, I find significant support for single proprietorship and the incidence of bribery (ȕ = 
1.33; p < .05), confirming the importance of this control variable.  
 
5.5 Conclusions  
This study theoretically and empirically investigates the relationship between two different types 
of personal ties—ties with local officials and ties with government officials—and the likelihood 
of bribery. The results suggest that personal ties with local government officials affect the 
likelihood of bribery. Overall, this confirms the assumptions of strong ties. Strong ties reinforce 
exclusive identities, encourage in-group loyalty and particularized trust toward the members 
within a group, and thus discourage trust and cooperation toward outsiders. These factors 
increase the incentives of and the opportunities for illegal practices such as bribery, nepotism, 
and favoritism. Entrepreneurs with strong ties with local government officials may engage in 
bribes because they accept the norms of reciprocity or “normative rules” within a corrupt 
network that are strictly enforced (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999). If they break such rules, they 
may suffer personal costs (costs of not paying bribes) and other risks (e.g., being excluded from 
the network, getting caught or punished by authorities or outsiders). In this network, the moral 




to favor” within a group. This finding aligns with Lipset & Lenz’s (2000) macro study results, 
which indicate that corruption is greater for countries with high scores on familism.  
 In line with my hypothesis, entrepreneurs who have strong ties with high-level government 
officials are less likely to engage in bribes. This result confirms my rationale as to why there are 
different effects of strong ties on bribery in the two different networks. This finding also 
indicates a counterintuitive interpretation compared with the assumptions of strong ties. 
Entrepreneurs with strong ties with high-level government officials may not engage in bribes 
because high-level government officials may earn higher income and thus do not need a bribe in 
return. In addition, bribe payment is not culturally accepted in the elite network because high-
level government officials face a high risk of losing face, reputation, position, which is likely to 
lower the incentives to engage in a transaction of bribes. Therefore, the results suggest the 
necessity for researchers to conceptually differentiate the two types of strong ties with 
government officials—that is, low (local)- and high-level government officials—especially when 
conducting research in transition economies where government still plays a key role.  
 Regarding the configuration of ties, the findings indicate that network diversity is not a 
relevant variable in determining the likelihood of bribery. The idea is that the greater the 
diversity of alters entrepreneurs possess in an ego-centered network, the less likely entrepreneurs 
engage in bribery because of a decline of path dependency13, “lock-in” risks14, cohesion, 
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 This is because network relationships built over time become self-reinforcing, thereby leading to a form 
of path dependency (see Hitt et al., 2002). 
14
 Lock-in risks result from specific investments because specific investment is valuable only in a specific 






particularized trust, feelings of obligations, and core values that are fostered in a corrupt network 
(Choi, 2007).  
 In summary, this research develops and tests hypotheses how personal ties matters to firm-
level bribery activities in the context of Vietnam’s transition economy. Such an investigation of 
network determinants of bribery is scarce and theoretically underdeveloped (cf. Tonoyan et al., 
2010). Few scholars have taken on the challenge of specifying whether and how personal ties 
attribute to bribery incidence for entrepreneurs. This research is a first step in this direction. I 
explain the link between strong ties and the likelihood of bribery. By so doing, I extend the 
theory of (bonding) social capital and corruption. 
 The data make it possible to quantify bribery at the organizational level and to measure the 
key concepts. Although case study literature on corruption provides insights of single bribery-
related events, processes, structures, and methods of bribery in practice, it is limited with respect 
to the generalization of results. My efforts to acquire a relatively large sample of companies have 
provided both factual information and subjective interpretations regarding the role of personal 
ties and bribery in entrepreneurship.   
 
5.5.1 Policy implications 
The most important implication of this study is an appropriate understanding of the relationship 
between corruption and different types of ties. The reason is that entrepreneurs may vary in the 
strength and variety of personal ties with public officials, thereby leading to a various response in 
bribe transactions. Building a relationship with a local government official’s networks may 




and favoritism. As a result, the incidence of corruption seems to be more rather than less in the 
transition society. It is argued that a high level of particularized trust toward bureaucrats can 
augment an entrepreneur’s likelihood payoff paying a bribe. From a policy perspective, the 
question is how corrupt agreement can be circumvented given that at the macro level, it has 
negative effects for growth and welfare.   
 First, a weakening of particularized trust between the bureaucrat and the businessperson is 
necessary to limit corruption. Lambsdorff & Nell (2006) suggest implementation of legal 
sanctions that destabilize corrupt deals by introducing regular staff rotation in the public 
administration. Second, if strong ties facilitate bribery practices, it may cause harmful effects for 
outsiders (potential bribe payers). This also means that to circumvent bribery practices, 
entrepreneurs need to have the arrangement of a collective action against bribery, because 
everyone becomes better off if they all mutually commit not to pay bribes. Kingston (2005) 
suggests that the level of corruption in Indian states actually decreases when citizens build up 
informal norms against bribery or commit not to pay bribes. Third, the causes of corruption in 
transition economies can derive from deep roots of social norms and culture in general and the 
business environment in particular. For example, people may justify that “if others behave 
illegally, so can I” (Lefebvre, 2001). Therefore, the change of social norms and the enrichment 
of business environment together with developing anticorruption campaigns may be considered 
as the core of the subject in attempting to lowering corruption. It takes a long time to change 





5.5.2 Limitations and Further Research 
The first limitation of this study is that cross-sectional data from Vietnamese entrepreneurs in the 
Mekong River Delta is used, which limits the generalization of the results. The use of cross-
sectional data prevents intertemporal, causal analysis of processes that determine the outcomes 
observed with the use of a questionnaire. Further research could search for a longitudinal or 
panel study that incorporates bribery events over time so that a direct causality between 
individual preconditions and firm-level corruption may be identified. 
 Second, this study did not investigate indirect links between strong ties and the likelihood of 
bribery due to data limitations. Strong ties may affect corruption not only directly but also 
indirectly by, among other things, potential mechanisms that reduce opportunistic behavior of the 
bribers and thus make corruption more predictable (Harris, 2007). Further research could fill this 
gap by investigating whether entrepreneurs are confidently able to predict that the goods will be 
delivered as agreed in a corrupt transaction.   
 Third, future studies could replicate this research in other Asian or transition economies. In 
addition, a more liable and valid measure of firm competitiveness within a complex set of 
strategy given ever-changing institutions in transition economies is also necessarily warranted 
(Peng & Luo, 2000). In this study, the measure of bribery considers solely payments of cash. 
Thus, it would be worthwhile to investigate other forms of bribery. For example, entrepreneurs 
may indirectly spend money on bribery through gifts or visits to bars. New data with other 
bribery measures would enable researchers to test the role of different forms of bribery.  
 
   















Bribery has attracted the attention of scholars in various fields and is usually studied at either the 
country or the individual level (Luo, 2005). Depending on context, the word “bribery” can have 
different meanings (Bardhan, 1997). According to the World Bank  (2000), bribery is the abuse 
of public office for private gain. In our research, it is the payment of cash by an organization 
with the aim of influencing the actions of a public official. Notwithstanding substantial progress, 
it is not yet fully understood how bribes are related to their performance (Hannafey, 2003; 
Martin et al., 2007). Exploring in more detail such a firm-specific rationale of bribery would be 
important because the firm is usually the unit that decides to bribe. Although the payment of 
bribes by firms has been acknowledged (Aidis & van Praag, 2007; Svensson, 2003), relatively 
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 This chapter draws substantially on de Jong, G., Phan Anh.,T., and van Ees, H. (2012). Which 
entrepreneurs bribe and what do they get from it? Exploratory evidence from Vietnam. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice 36(2), 323-345. 
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little is known about the relationship between bribery and entrepreneurship performance in 
general, and for transition economies such as Vietnam in particular. Our study aims to further 
this new field of research by addressing this research gap. 
 We draw on the extant literature about entrepreneurship in transition economies (for 
excellent reviews see Bruton et al., 2008; Chilosi, 2001). This literature highlights the 
importance of institutions to entrepreneurship because they provide guidance, allow for routines 
to develop and ultimately reduce the uncertainty of interaction (Baumol, 2005; Boettke & Coyne, 
2009; North, 2005). Entrepreneurs in transition economies, however, face many difficulties that 
can be directly linked to deficiencies in their formal institutional structure such as legal activism 
and underdeveloped financial markets in starting up and running their businesses (Scase, 1997). 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, large parts of the new markets in transition countries developed 
spontaneously, through the initiatives of entrepreneurs. Smallbone & Welter (2001), for 
example, identify various forms of entrepreneurship under transition conditions including 
nomenclatural enterprises, self-employment and part-time businesses, small business ownership, 
and family businesses (Chrisman et al., 2008). Networking appears to be a common underlying 
principle for the various forms of entrepreneurship. In particular political connections are 
extremely important in transition economies (Peng & Zhou, 2005; Yiu & Lau, 2008). The 
incentive for entrepreneurs to establish government relationships ultimately arises from state 
control of key resources. In transition economies, the government controls bank loans, business 
formation, investment size and finance. Relationships with local government officials help to, 
e.g., mobilize resources, win orders and cope with the constraints imposed by bureaucratic 
structures, ultimately improving the performance of entrepreneurs. In this context, bribery can be 
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regarded as an investment that entrepreneurs need to make in order to operate successfully in an 
institutionally weak transition economy (Peng & Heath, 1996). 
 Although this suggests a positive relationship between bribery and entrepreneurship 
performance, there is a question to what extent such a positive relationship exists ad infinitum. 
Bribes, for example, may crowd out alternative investments and erode incentives for innovation 
or other activities such as training and marketing (Luo, 2005). The higher the bribes the more the 
disadvantages may contaminate the entrepreneurial organization. As the volume of bribes 
increases, the positive effect of the increased access to key resources may be offset by the 
inefficient allocation of resources and thus result in lower performance. This implies that bribery 
may have a diminishing return to entrepreneurship performance.  
 Hence, the purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the performance 
of entrepreneurs in transition economies by examining the relationship between bribery and 
entrepreneurship performance. In so doing, we offer the following contributions to the literature. 
First, ours is one of the few studies to assess bribery at the level of individual agents, i.e., 
entrepreneurs. With few exemptions, the existing literature is based on cross-country analyses, 
applying data on bribery derived from perception indices that are constructed by the assessment 
of foreign experts of overall bribery in a country, and explain bribery as a function of public 
policies and institutions. Aggregate data, however, offer limited opportunities to study the 
relationship between bribery and individuals and why firms facing similar institutions pay 
different amounts of bribes for the same services. We believe that micro-level empirical research 
helps to understand the likely heterogeneity of bribery within countries. Second, ours is one of 
the few studies that explicitly examined in detail the consequences of bribery for entrepreneurial 
performance. The dominant view of bribery put forward by, e.g., international institutes 
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considers bribery as an illegal act that seriously hampers the well-being of citizens. Existing 
research tends to “over-moralize” (Granovetter, 1985) bribery and, therefore, inadequately 
accounts for the potential benefits of bribery. Our work departed from the norm and, fully 
cognizant of the ethical issues involved, accepts that bribery in transition economies exists and 
that, at least at micro-level, bribery may have advantages and disadvantages. In summary, the 
present research not only shows that quantitative data of bribery at the level of individual 
entrepreneurs can be collected but also how variations in bribery explain variations in 
organizational performance. Hence, in comparison to existing studies, our research provides 
additional insights into the role of bribery at a different level of analysis using new, exploratory 
data. 
 
6.2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis 
In our research, bribery is the payment of cash by an organization with the aim of influencing the 
actions of a public official. A distinction can be made between administrative or bureaucratic 
corruption, which refers to paying bribes for services concerning the implementation of 
regulations, and state capture, where firms try to influence the formulation of laws and other 
government policies to their own advantage through illicit or non-transparent means (Fries et al., 
2003). The former includes regular payments of relatively small amounts of money by small and 
medium sized organizations to officials; and the latter relatively large amounts infrequently paid 
by in particular large organizations to political leaders. We focus on the first category as it 
establishes a direct link between the volume of the bribes and entrepreneurial returns. For 
instance, in the Vietnamese context, entrepreneurs must acquire the consent of officials in order 
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to start their business and to carry out their investment plans. A small amount of cash money 
may help to speed up the delaying bureaucratic process. 
 Bribery activities have a demand and a supply side and may involve public or private sector 
institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). There is a substantial amount of research aimed at 
understanding the characteristics of countries or public institutions that affect the demands for 
bribes (Wu, 2005). From these studies we know that national levels of bribery relate to socio-
economic factors (Getz & Volkema, 2001) and that bribery may hinder the entry of multinational 
enterprises (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). This line of research also offers various explanations to 
explain bribe extraction by bureaucrats. For example, an often-used approach to explain the 
incidence of bribery is the so-called Klitgaard formula according to which bribery positively 
depends on the monopsony power of government officials and their bureaucratic discretion and 
negatively on their accountability (Klitgaard, 1988). An alternative explanation is the wage level 
in the public sector, that is, civil servants with low wages need to supplement their income with 
bribes to reach an acceptable income level (WorldBank, 2000). 
 Contrary to the aforementioned research, the focus of our paper is on the supply side of 
bribery and on the entrepreneur as the unit of analysis (Aidis & van Praag, 2007; Martin et al., 
2007). The payment of bribes by entrepreneurs to government officials needs to be put into the 
perspective of the transition economy because the weak institutional environment promotes the 
need to establish and maintain political connections (Peng & Luo, 2000).  
 In order to explore the research question, we will analyze the positive effects of bribes and 
explain why bribes may be subject to diminishing returns. Diminishing returns means that at any 
single point in time, holding all other resources constant, the benefit-cost ratio diminishes with 
the size of the bribe. Diminishing returns offers a feasible perspective for entrepreneurs in 
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transition economies because they are usually very small firms and therefore their production 
capacity, level of innovation, labor input and capital stock is fixed, at least in the short run. 
Bribery is among the few instruments that can be varied on the short term but given the 
peculiarities of entrepreneurs in transition economies is expected to have a diminishing marginal 
return. 
 We will argue that bribes facilitate entrepreneurship performance through higher levels of 
social capital. Building such social capital will have a positive effect on performance through at 
least two different interdependent channels of influence. First, bribes increase trust and establish 
a shared belief of reciprocity (Graeff, 2005). Through bribes entrepreneurs obtain favorable 
treatment that will increase their revenues because it enables them to win government projects or 
to obtain loans. Second, bribes are investments in networks that overcome liabilities of 
“newness” or “smallness” (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Favorable relationships with public officials 
provide entrepreneurs legitimacy and thus decrease the risk for closure. These network effects 
may be subject to diminishing returns because of firm-specific congestion effects. All else equal 
the positive performance effect of an additional unit of bribery will decrease because particularly 
small and medium sized organizations cannot unlimitedly absorb new opportunities that bribes 
create (Yiu & Lau, 2008). In addition to the two network arguments, bribes can also be 
considered as “grease money”, meaning that paying bribes will speed up the bureaucratic 
processes (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). It reduces delay in moving files in administrative offices 
and in getting ahead in slow-moving queues for government services as well as the relaxation of 
audits and inspections or advice on legal ways of reducing the regulatory burden. This will 
increase the efficiency of the entrepreneur and will be reflected in higher revenues. 
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 There are also at least four rationales supporting the possibility that bribery may be an 
impediment to the revenues of entrepreneurs. The four rationales are arguments that the 
entrepreneur in a transition economy does not have control over the amount of bribes. Therefore, 
there is a tendency to bribe past the point where it is justified by the marginal benefits. First, 
bribes may increase rather than decrease the costs of red tape (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). 
Entrepreneurs that pay bribes are more likely to be under bureaucratic control and are therefore 
more exposed to bribe demands (Svensson, 2003). These entrepreneurs will pay higher bribes in 
an effort to reduce the cost of red tape, but despite the higher bribes they will have more and 
more regulations and arbitrary behavior to deal with. Second, bribes may have crowding out 
effects and opportunity costs. They create disincentives for investments in innovation, which 
limits the potential scale and scope economies as financial and human resources are misallocated 
and wasted (Bardhan, 1997). Third, bribes breed bribes. In a way, this density-dependence effect 
is a reflection of economics’ Law of Say in the bribery arena. By introducing a bribe, demand for 
additional bribes is boosted as officials are triggered to ask for more, being aware of the potential 
to regulate. As a consequence, the growth in bribes increases as the volume of bribes goes up, 
implying that bribes expand almost of its own accord. Because of the effect on the number of 
bribes, high volumes of bribes are expected to be less effective than small volumes. In a 
transition economy, a public official may try to extract as high a bribe as possible – subject to the 
virtually non-existent constraints that he/she might get caught – using all the power at their 
discretion for personal gain. Hence, entrepreneurs are either forced to pay bribes or to exit. Given 
that exiting is not a viable situation for entrepreneurs – due to high costs of starting up a new 
firm and because this new firm would face bribery again – entrepreneurs are easily trapped into 
vicious circles of ever-increasing bribes that absorb resources and limit revenues. Fourth, a 
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disadvantage of a network is that it increases liabilities of “staleness” and “sameness” (Starr & 
Bygrave, 1991). The former means that the entrepreneur will base guidelines and shortcuts on a 
relatively small sample of actors, which may impair the entrepreneur’s ability to bring a new 
perspective on business activities. The latter implies that entrepreneurs often favor familiar 
circles of network relationships. Uzzi (1997) argues that such embeddedness initially promotes 
economies of time, integrative agreements, and complex adaptation. However, these positive 
effects rise up to a threshold, after which embeddedness can derail economic performance by 
making firms vulnerable to exogenous shocks or insulating them from information that exists 
beyond their network. Consequently, putting strong and increasing, excessive emphasis on 
bribery may lead to liabilities of staleness and sameness, which may lower entrepreneurial 
performance. 
 In sum, we argue that in transition economies bribery can be revenue-enhancing but will be 
subject to diminishing returns. The arguments above lend support to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: There will be an inverted U-shape relationship between bribery and 
entrepreneurship performance. 
 
6.3 Research Methods 
6.3.1 Control variables 
We entered three sets of controls when we tested the hypothesized relationships. The first set 
concerned the human capital of the entrepreneur (Wright et al., 2007). Entrepreneurs may 
increase their human capital through work experience, formal and informal education. The 
longer an entrepreneur has held a management position in the focal firm or elsewhere, the more 
work experience has been gained. This is important because, for example, entrepreneurs with a 
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great deal of experience tended to put more weight on the process of developing formal 
strategies than those who lack the relevant managerial work experience. The level of formal 
education was defined as having an official degree as a result of full-time or long-term training, 
and it measured an individual’s knowledge or competence base. Entrepreneurs with higher levels 
of formal education were expected to generate a wider range of creative solutions when faced 
with complex problems. The level of informal training was determined by participation in 
management courses, including short-term ones (post-graduate education). These investments in 
human capital would also foster the productivity and cognitive skills of the entrepreneurs. The 
second set concerns firm characteristics, that is, firm age, firm size and the firm’s type of 
ownership. The age of a firm may be a potential moderator of a firm’s financial value as 
generated by managers (Jayaraman et al., 2000). Older firms may have lower performance levels 
than younger ones because of the continued use of outdated management and/or obsolete 
technology and their resistance to new approaches. Previous literature has documented firm size 
as an organizational attribute that significantly impacts firms’ strategic orientation and 
performance (Peng & Luo, 2000). Specifically, large firms enjoy advantages such as low costs 
and higher returns due to greater access to the capital market and economies of scale. The 
ownership structure may influence firm performance. For instance, with substantial ownership of 
cash-flow rights, sole proprietorship provides the incentive and power to undertake actions that 
will benefit the owner at the expense of the firm’s performance. In contrast, firms with 
shareholders are presumed to evaluate investments using market-value rules that maximize the 
value of the firm’s residual cash flows (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). The third set concerns the 
industry context. Firms in new, expanding industries are expected to perform better than those 
operating in old, declining industries (in Vietnam, the new industries are predominantly service-
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related, which are usually more relationship-intensive and rely more on external resources). Our 
final control variable was the level of competition. Some firms operated in emerging markets, 
that is, in new markets characterized by modest competition due to low demand and high 
uncertainty, since potential customers are often unfamiliar with the products and services offered 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Others operated in growth markets that were characterized 
by severe competition due to high rates of entry. 
 
6.3.2 Measurements 
We measured entrepreneurship performance using the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
revenues in 2004 (in millions of Vietnamese dong). Total revenue is a commonly used item in 
firm surveys because, among other things, respondents have instant and accurate knowledge of 
their enterprise’s achievements in terms of yearly revenues (Brush et al., 2008; Kuratko & 
Audretsch, 2009; Murphy et al., 1996). Bribery is measured by the amount of money that the 
enterprise pays to government officials to conduct their business (in millions of Vietnamese dong 
per year).16 Work experience was measured by the total number of years the respondent had 
worked for both the focal firm and at other firms (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Formal 
education was measured by a dummy variable that equaled 1 if a respondent had a university 
                                                   
 
16
 The question was asked in Vietnamese. We used the usual forward and backward translation process to 
obtain the English version. The specific question was: “Monthly, how much must your enterprise pay “to 
lubricate” its business affairs”. The expression “bôi trѫn” in the original Vietnamese question literally 
means “to lubricate”. This is a colloquial, synonym reference to money paid as bribes at government 
offices or administrative regulators. The closest English equivalent is “to grease someone’s palm”. In the 
survey, we explicitly defined “to lubricate” as money spend. Our measure does not include other forms of 
bribery such as gifts that may have monetary value as well. Our measure is very similar to the ones used 
by Transparency International and the World Bank. Also, we asked the respondents to indicate the 
amount in thousands of Vietnamese dong per month. For the regression analysis, we transformed this into 




degree and 0 otherwise (Aidis & van Praag, 2007). Informal education was measured by the 
number of times a respondent had participated in management training courses (Aidis & van 
Praag, 2007). The age of the company was calculated by subtracting the year the firm was 
founded from the current year (Goll & Rasheed, 2005). Firm size was measured by the actual 
number of employees who in 2004 worked frequently for the company (Peng & Heath, 1996).17 
Firm ownership was measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm was a sole 
proprietorship, and 0 otherwise (Gundry & Welsch, 2001).18 Our respondents operate in three 
main industries, namely services, trading and manufacturing. We constructed two dummy 
variables to account for industry differences, that is, one for services (that equals 1 if the firm 
operates in the service sector, and 0 otherwise) and one for trading (that equals 1 if the firm 
operates in the trading sector, and 0 otherwise). Manufacturing was considered as the base case 
in the model and was thus not included. Competition is the final control variable in our model. 
We use a perceptual measure because, among other things, it has been argued that small and 
medium-sized enterprises form their competitive maps based on perceived information and 
events (Daniels et al., 2002; Hodgkinson, 1997). In our survey we asked the respondent’s 
opinion of the level of competition in their industry. We measured the level of (perceived) 
                                                   
 
17
 As elsewhere, the number of employees in our Vietnamese organizations varied during the year. These 
entrepreneurs generally do not maintain employee records with, for example, employee contracts that 
would allow respondents to precisely determine start and end-dates for all their employees. However, 
given the relatively small scale of their companies, the respondents knew the number of employees with 
fixed appointments as well as the number of persons they employed during peaks. The former category 
consisted of persons with an oral agreement concerning working hours and salaries (written employee 
contracts are rare in Vietnam) and who worked for the company throughout the year. We used this 
information to measure the size of the company. Our respondents also indicated the number of seasonal 
employees. We decided not to use this information because the length of peak seasons was not known and 
typically varies for companies and industries. 
18
 The type of ownership in Vietnam is determined by the Central Institute for Economic Management 
(CIEM). The rights and obligations per ownership type are specified in the Enterprise Law (CIEM, 2005). 
The Enterprise Law specifies five main ownership types: sole proprietorship, Limited Liability Company, 
Shareholding Company, family business and collectives.  
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competition using a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent indicates that the company 
operates in a sector with a high or very high competition level, and 0 otherwise (Lang et al., 
1997). 
6.4  Empirical results 
6.4.1 Methods 
Means, standard deviations (SDs) and correlations are provided in Table 6.1. The yearly 
untransformed average volume of sales in the sample was VND 4,522 billion (US$ 270,290, 
with the 2004 official exchange rate of VND 15,770 to US$ 1). Of the observations, 75 percent 
(297 firms) reported that they did not pay bribes. According to our data, for the firms reporting 
positive bribes, the yearly average amount of bribes that firms paid was VND 60.2 million (US$ 
3,815). These are substantial amounts, on average corresponding to US$ 109 per worker, or 
roughly about 10 percent of the total cost. Including firms reporting zero bribe payments, the 
average payment is VND 16.1 million (US$ 1,024).  
 We obtain our findings from ordinary least square regression (OLS) estimates. In preparation 
for the regression analyses, we performed the regular tests to obtain reliable estimates. These 
tests reported satisfactory results, that is, there is no heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity or serial 
autocorrelation. Among other things, we tested for possible bias caused by collinearity among 
variables by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the regression coefficients. 
Calculations of VIF ranged from a low of 1.05 to a high of 7.64. The higher values were for 
bribery and the squared term of bribery but all were well below the cut-off figure of 10 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.4.2 Regression results 
We continue with the analysis of our second research question. Results 
from the hierarchical OLS regression analyses are summarized in Table 
6.2.  
Table 6.2. Regression Results of the Effect of Bribery on Vietnamese 
Entrepreneurial Performance 
 model 1 model 2  model 3 
 
       
 
Constant 5.52 *** 5.52 ***  5.51 *** 
 
 (0.25)  (0.25)   (0.25)  
 
control-entrepreneur        
work experience 0.11 * 0.10 *  0.10 * 
 
 (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.02)  
 
formal education 0.19 *** 0.18 ***  0.18 *** 
 
 (0.21)  (0.21)   (0.21)  
 
informal education 0.15 *** 0.15 ***  0.14 *** 
 
 (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.03)  
 
control-firm        
firm age -0.15 ** -0.14 **  -0.14 ** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.01)  
 
firm size 0.28 *** 0.28 ***  0.26 *** 
 
 (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
 
firm ownership 0.11 ** 0.11 **  0.10 ** 
 
 (0.17)  (0.17)   (0.17)  
 
control-industry        
services -.016 *** -.016 ***  -.018 *** 
 
 (0.26)  (0.26)   (0.26)  
 
trade 0.04  0.04   0.04  
 
 (0.19)  (0.19)   (0.19)  
 
competition 0.11 ** 0.11 **  0.12 ** 
 
 (0.18)  (0.18)   (0.18)  
 
independent variable bribery   0.06   0.34 *** 
 
   (0.00)   (0.00)  
 
independent variable - square term bribery      -0.29 ** 
 
      (0.04)  
 
fitness indices        
R2 0.225  0.228   0.241  
 
adj. R2 0.207  0.209   0.219  
 
F 12.453 *** 11.397 ***  11.027 *** 
 
ǻR2   0.003   0.013 ** 
 
FǻR2   1.692   5.878  
 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Note: The entries in the table are standardized coefficients ( s). The numbers in brackets 




The various fit parameters show that our model increasingly fits the data better. The R-square 
index improves from 22.5 percent in Model 1 to 22.8 percent in Model 2 (F = 1.692, n.s.) and, 
subsequently, to 24.1 percent in Model 3 (F = 5.878, p < .05). Also, the estimates remain robust 
in terms of signs and significance levels. In Model 1, log revenues were regressed on control 
variables. In Model 2, bribery was added. Surprisingly, bribery had a positive but non-significant 
effect on performance (ȕ = .06; n.s.). The bribery variable also explained only a marginal 
additional percentage of the variance beyond that explained by the control variables in Model 1. 
This indicated that in Vietnam there is no direct relationship between bribery and revenues. 
However, when we entered the squared bribery term in Model 3, we found that the bribery term 
was positive and significantly related to revenues (ȕ = .34; p < .01), and the squared term 
negative and significantly related to revenues (ȕ = −.29; p < .05). The size of the estimated 
coefficients for bribery is among the largest compared to the estimated coefficients of the other 
variables in the model indicating the relative importance of bribery for entrepreneurship 
performance. Taken together, these results confirmed our hypothesis that bribery has a 
diminishing return to entrepreneurial performance.19 
 Among the control variables, Table 2 showed that all entrepreneurial characteristics fostered 
entrepreneurship performance. Thus, work experience (ȕ = .10; p < .10), formal education (ȕ = 
.18; p < .01) and informal education (ȕ = .14; p < .01) each significantly improve the revenues. 
These relationships were in line with our expectations. The results also validate the incorporation 
of our firm characteristics. Conforming to expectations, firm age was negatively (ȕ = −.14; p < 
.05), and firm size (ȕ = .26; p < .01) and sole proprietorship (ȕ = .10; p < .05) were positively 
related to revenues. Finally, Table 2 reports that entrepreneurs who operate in service industries 
report mediocre performance more often than those who operate in other industries (ȕ = −.18; p < 
.01), albeit that the dummy for trade reports has a positive but non-significant effect on revenues 
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 Because the log function is monotonic, this result applies to the relationship between revenue and 
bribery as well.  
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(ȕ = .04; n.s.). A high level of competition as perceived by our interviewees increased 
performance as expected (ȕ = .12; p < .01). 
 
6.4.3 Robustness tests 
We performed five additional tests of robustness. First, we replaced the missing value for a 
particular question by an estimated mean value of that question. By doing so, we were able to 
include all 606 observations, to compare the regression models and determine whether a sample 
bias existed. It turned out that the regression results were the same as for the conservative dataset. 
Additionally, a one-way ANOVA test was employed to compare the final sample and the cases 
deleted. No significant difference was found in terms of industry, size, bribery and revenues. 
Second, although all of our VIF values are well below the threshold value, in an additional test, 
we mean-centered bribery to minimize the threat of multicollinearity in equations where we had 
included the squared term of bribery. This did not affect the regression results. Third, we re-
estimated our model for a sample without potential outliers. This also did not change the results. 
Fourth, we estimated our model for a sample with firms that pay positive bribes (n = 106). 
Accounting for outliers, the results from this test confirmed the non-monotonic relationship 
between bribery and firm performance in terms of revenues (log), by and large. Fifth, we also 
estimated a set of regression models with net profits as the dependent variable (n = 363, the 
number of observations is somewhat smaller due to missing values for net profits). Accounting 
for outliers, these results also showed a non-monotonic relationship between bribery and net 
profits. Separate tables for these robustness tests are available from the first author upon request. 
 
6.4.4 Limitations 
Our study is not without limitations. First, the use of cross-sectional data from Vietnamese 
entrepreneurs in the Mekong River Delta limits the generalizability of our results. Second, it is 
well known that cross-sectional databases prevent intertemporal, causal analysis of processes that 
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determine the outcomes observed with the use of a questionnaire. Third, a lack of other financial 
measurements for performance, such as market share or sales growth, limits us to using revenues 
as a performance measurement (with the exception of net profits, see the robustness tests for this). 
Within the entrepreneurship literature, entrepreneurial performance can be revenues but it can 
also be the launching of the venture, survival after a number of years, growth or value created. 
The sets of determinants for these alternative measures overlap but may not completely coincide. 
Similarly, our measure for bribery considers solely payment of cash. The interaction between an 
entrepreneur and a public official may also incorporate other forms of bribery. For example, 
entrepreneurs may indirectly spend money on bribery via, e.g., gifts or visits to bars. Our measure 
may understate the total amount of bribes paid when direct and indirect expenditures go together. 
New data with other bribery measures not only allows us to test the role of different forms of 
bribery but also whether our measure understates bribery and how this matters for the 
performance of entrepreneurs. 
 Fourth, the concept of diminishing returns applies to a single firm situation. We test our 
proposition in a cross-section sample of firms with the presumption that the firms are 
homogeneous. This presumption is a limitation and contributes to the exploratory nature of our 
research. We would like to mention that our approach is common practice in management 
research. Individual decisions and behavior such as the development of trust, for instance, are 
often tested with cross-sectional data (Chua et al., 2008; Welter & Smallbone, 2006). 
Nonetheless, more research including longitudinal data is needed to overcome this limitation. 
 Fifth, our results may be biased because our analysis was based on a non-random survey. A 
random dataset in Vietnam was difficult because a list of Vietnamese entrepreneurs in general as 
well as of those who bribe in particular was not available. Similarly, we used one respondent per 
company to obtain our information. Our assessment relies on the personal judgments of these 
individuals which is a recognized limitation of the study. Although management research often 
obtains reliable information from single respondents (Seppänen et al., 2007), bias may exist due 
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to person’s vested interest in the practices being described. For larger organizations it is a 
question to what extent a single respondent represents the overall firm. Bias may also exist 
because we measure all our constructs from one survey (no secondary data were available to 
apply triangulation) and we did not use multiple questions to measure bribery. As a result, 
respondents may have reported too high or too low levels for bribery and revenues. Our focus, 
however, is not on levels of bribery and revenues per se, but rather on the correlates (Svensson, 
2003). We believe that the data-collection strategy has minimized bias in the correlation between 
our key variables. The whole survey instrument was carefully piloted and built on existing 
surveys. The survey was implemented by academic researchers whom most entrepreneurs had 
confidence in – in Vietnam there is a deep-rooted distrust of the government – and so avoided the 
problem of suspicion by the entrepreneurs concerning the objective of the data-collection effort. 
Furthermore, the sequence of the questions first addressed the overall performance and the 
background of the entrepreneur. The bribery question was asked in the middle of the interview, 
by which time the interviewer had established some necessary credibility and trust. The questions 
were simple and we used different scales for revenues and bribery. Nonetheless, bias may exist 
and a replication of our study with, for example, more and other questions concerning bribery 
would allow for cross-validation of the non-monotonic relationship between bribery and revenues 
that is reported here. 
 
6.5    Conclusions 
6.5.1 Added value of the research 
The role of entrepreneurs in economic theory and in Western economies is well established 
(Brush et al., 2008; Low, 2001). By the same token, we suggest that entrepreneurs play an 
important role in transition economies as well (Yamakawa et al., 2008). They create employment, 
productivity growth and innovation and produce important spillovers that affect regional 
economic growth. Until now, the performance of entrepreneurs in transition economies in general 
  
187 
and that in Vietnam in particular has largely remained unaddressed. Thus, our added value of this 
research is threefold. The first contribution concerns the role of bribery in transition economies. 
The results have implications for and must be taken into consideration in entrepreneurial decision 
making. Our emphasis on bribery complements recent performance literature that focused on 
human capital (van Praag & Versloot, 2007). Notwithstanding the importance of these and other 
performance antecedents, we argue that bribery is key for entrepreneurs who operate in a business 
environment with insufficient formal institutions, and that is dominated by a dual market 
structure (state versus non-state-owned enterprises) and powerful government officials who, 
among other things, preferentially distribute government resources. The precise form of the 
relationship between bribery and entrepreneurship performance is, however, an open question. 
Bribes enable entrepreneurs to use government resources, avoid red tape and thus foster revenues. 
We suggest, however, that bribes are subject to diminishing returns because high levels of bribes 
increasingly absorb the returns on entrepreneurial activities, and distort entrepreneurial spirit and 
behavior. 
 The second contribution concerns the empirical study. In the analysis of the relationship 
between bribery and entrepreneurship performance, we used unique firm level data. Firm-level 
data is needed not only to understand bribery and how it works for entrepreneurs, but also to 
move beyond the available country and individual-level studies. Our research was based on 
primary data collected from the owners directly responsible for their Vietnamese firms. The topic 
of research (i.e., bribery and revenues) and the research context (i.e., a transition economy) make 
large-scale empirical studies at firm level challenging. For example, there is no government 
database on bribing by firms. Hence, a database like ours is exceptional and shows that firm-level 
information on bribery can be collected by means of a carefully designed questionnaire and data-
collection strategy (Svensson, 2003). 
 Our third contribution derives from the significant empirical findings of our work. Measuring 
bribery with quantitative indicators is one thing, explaining variations in bribes is another. To the 
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best of our knowledge, ours is one of the first that has explored the relationship in transition 
economies between bribery and entrepreneurship performance in terms of revenues. We found 
support for a diminishing return of bribery to revenues, while controlling for a substantial number 
of entrepreneurial, firm and industrial characteristics. By doing so, we eliminated potentially 
spurious relationships as well as alternative explanations for entrepreneurship performance. 
 
6.5.2 Future research 
Given the increasing focus on bribery and entrepreneurship performance in transition economies, 
our study can only be a first step. We would like to mention that Vietnam shares many 
similarities with its neighbors (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea) as well as 
China. For more than a hundred years, China occupied Vietnam. The countries share the cultural 
inheritance of Confucianism and have similarities in market structures, state ideologies, reform 
processes, institutional frameworks and entrepreneurial vividness (Heberer, 2003). A next logical 
step would be to test our model in China and, in so doing, determine whether the role of bribery 
in entrepreneurship performance in these two countries is similar as well. In a similar vein, new 
data from entrepreneurs in Central and Eastern European countries or advanced nation states 
allow testing of the general validity of our findings in other transition economies and whether our 
perspectives hold for modern democracies as well. Although bribery is omnipresent in transition 
states it is acknowledged that it also exists in Western economies (Wu, 2005). An international 
firm-level dataset enables us to investigate the combined effect of macro- and micro-level 
variables on e.g. the incidence of bribery payouts by entrepreneurs and, as such, to determine how 
the role of bribery for entrepreneurs varies across institutional frameworks. New data collection 
would also allow confirmation of the validity of our results by utilizing financial and non-
financial performance indices other than revenues or net profits as well as alternative measures 
for bribery.  
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 Our results only suggest that bribery may have a non-monotonic relationship with 
entrepreneurial revenues, while no evidence of causality can actually be provided. Although we 
provide theoretical arguments that bribery impacts revenues, one could also argue that revenues 
determine bribery. For example, some of the low-revenue firms may have small transactions that 
call for small bribes to local officials. Bribery in Vietnam, however, involves much asymmetric 
information. Government officials usually do not know the size of revenues of a particular 
entrepreneur either because the entrepreneur will not provide credible information or the 
entrepreneur lacks this information (a new entrepreneur does not yet know his revenues and 
costs). Government officials may use firm size as a proxy for revenues because large firms will 
likely earn large revenues. In that case, however, the reversed causality will likely run via firm 
size and may bias results for large companies (albeit those large firms will also have more 
opportunities to impose political power or ignore bribery demands). Our Vietnamese respondents 
manage and own small and very small organizations, and size has been included as a control 
variable in our model. Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman or augmented regression test 
reports that our OLS estimates are consistent, and therefore that endogeneity with respect to 
revenues and sales in our sample is of less concern (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). Nonetheless, 
additional longitudinal or lagged data will be needed to test alternatives and address the causality 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)  
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de oorzaken en gevolgen van corruptie voor bedrijven in transitie 
economieën, meer specifiek voor ondernemers in Vietnam. Een transitie economie bevindt 
zich in de overgang tussen twee economische systemen. In het geval van Vietnam is het de 
overgang van een centraal geleide economie naar een markteconomie. Corruptie kent vele 
vormen. In dit proefschrift gaat het over omkoping: het (regelmatig) betalen van kleine 
geldbedragen aan overheidsambtenaren om iets geregeld te krijgen zoals het (sneller) 
verkrijgen van een vergunning of lagere belastingen. 
 Omkoping is als fenomeen niet nieuw. In toenemende mate, is het een belangrijk 
onderwerp van overheidsbeleid over de hele wereld. Ook het academische onderzoek naar 
omkoping is toegenomen. Inmiddels zijn er gevestigde theorieën die het ontstaan en 
verdwijnen van corruptie kunnen verklaren (zie Bardhan, 1997 voor een uitgebreid 
literatuuroverzicht). In de recente literatuur wordt getracht omkoping te verklaren vanuit een 
breed maatschappelijke perspectief. Zo stellen sociologen bijvoorbeeld dat de nationale 
cultuur een voedingsbodem voor omkoping kan zijn. Economen wijzen het ontbreken van 
transparante instituties of de slechte kwaliteit van overheidsdiensten als hoofdoorzaken van 
omkoping aan (Treisman, 2000; Wu, 2009).  
 Inmiddels zijn er relatief veel (empirische) studies verschenen die omkoping verklaren 
met behulp van kenmerken van landen. Een bedrijfsmatig perspectief op omkoping echter, is 
nog onderbelicht. Een dergelijke micro-economische benadering kan interessant zijn, 
vanwege de aandacht voor de oorzaken en gevolgen van omkoping op bedrijfsniveau. Is er 
bijvoorbeeld een relatie tussen omkoping en ondernemingsactiviteiten? Betalen sommige 
ondernemers eerder steekpenningen dan anderen en zo ja, waarom? Bestaat er een verband 
tussen de hoogte van de omkoping en de prestatie van de onderneming? Het antwoord op 
deze vragen kan een bijdrage leveren aan de recente literatuur en een nieuw perspectief 
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bieden op omkoping als aanvulling op de bestaande landenstudies. Bovendien is een studie 
vanuit een micro perspectief over de relatie tussen het gedrag van bedrijven en omkoping 
vooral relevant voor economieën in transitie vanwege de complexe relaties tussen 
ondernemersactiviteiten en grootschalige institutionele veranderingen die in deze landen 
plaats vinden.  
 Dit proefschrift bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken: Naast de inleiding, een literatuuronderzoek, 
een hoofdstuk dat de onderzoekscontext en twee bedrijfsenquêtes beschrijft, en drie 
empirische studies. Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een overzicht van de empirische literatuur over 
corruptie, waarbij lacunes worden geconstateerd, die de grondslag vormen voor het 
empirische onderzoek in de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6. Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich vooral op 
onderzoek naar corruptie op bedrijfsniveau, dat wil zeggen, omkoping vanuit het perspectief 
van een organisatie. De literatuurstudie toont aan dat er nagenoeg geen onderzoek is naar 
corruptie op bedrijfsniveau, terwijl een bedrijfsmatige analyse van omkoping noodzakelijk is 
voor een begrip van deze vorm van corruptie in transitie economieën: het zijn vooral 
bedrijven die zich met omkoping in laten. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 worden zowel de onderzoekscontext (Vietnam) als de data die voor dit 
promotieonderzoek is verzameld in detail beschreven. Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt welke 
bedrijven in een transitie economie geneigd zijn steekpenningen te betalen aan ambtenaren, 
en welke dat niet geneigd zijn te doen. Dit hoofdstuk is een aanvulling op het kleine aantal 
studies dat de effecten van bedrijfs- en omgevingskenmerken op de kans op omkoping 
hebben onderzocht (Chen et al., 2008; Clarke & Xu, 2004). Er wordt onderzocht op welke 
manier interne en externe druk de kans op omkoping kunnen verklaren. De stelling is dat 
hoewel alle bedrijven in een transitie economie in meer of mindere mate onder druk staan om 
steekpenningen te betalen, er verschillen zijn in de manier waarop zij op interne of externe 
druk reageren. Op basis van een logistische analyse van het gedrag van 352 Vietnamese 
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ondernemers kan worden geconcludeerd dat de kans op omkoping kan worden verklaard uit 
bedrijfs- en omgevingskenmerken. Meer in het bijzonder geldt dat de kans dat een bedrijf in 
een transitie economie steekpenningen aan een overheidsambtenaar betaalt, wordt beïnvloed 
door (a) bedrijfskenmerken (vooral de leeftijd en de omvang van de onderneming) en (b) 
door variaties in de bedrijfsomgeving (en dan vooral de mate van de gepercipieerde 
concurrentie en de kwaliteit van de overheidsdiensten). 
 In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de samenhang bestudeerd tussen persoonlijke relaties (netwerken) 
en de kans op omkoping door Vietnamese ondernemers. Meer in het bijzonder wordt 
bestudeerd hoe verschillende netwerken (bedrijven kunnen een netwerk met lokale 
ambtenaren of ambtenaren op nationaal niveau hebben) en de diversiteit van dergelijke 
netwerken de kans op omkoping vergroten. Op basis van de analyse van hoofdstuk 5 kan 
worden geconcludeerd dat persoonlijke banden met overheidsambtenaren de kans op 
omkoping beïnvloeden. Dergelijke banden versterken exclusiviteit, bevorderen loyaliteit 
binnen de groep en het onderlinge vertrouwen, en vergroten zo de verleiding en de 
gelegenheid voor illegale praktijken zoals omkoping. Het blijkt dat banden met lokale 
ambtenaren de kans op omkoping vergroten, terwijl banden met rijksambtenaren deze kans 
verkleinen. 
 Hoofdstuk 6, tenslotte, onderzoekt de relatie tussen de omvang van het bedrag aan 
steekpenningen en bedrijfsprestaties. De stelling is dat enerzijds omkoping bedrijfsprestaties 
kan bevorderen omdat het ondernemers in staat stelt om een vertrouwensband met 
ambtenaren op te bouwen en zo een netwerk van informele relaties met de bijbehorende 
voordelen te ontwikkelen (bijvoorbeeld voorkeursbehandelingen, geen nadelige effecten voor 
nieuwkomers op de markt, legitimiteit). Anderzijds kleven er ook nadelen aan omkoping, 
zoals hogere bedrijfskosten, een inefficiënte verdeling van financiële middelen, vicieuze 
cirkels van alsmaar toenemende corruptie, en de negatieve effecten van onderlinge 
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verwevenheid. Op basis van de analyse van hoofdstuk 6 kan worden geconcludeerd dat ook 
omkoping onderhevig is aan afnemende meeropbrengsten: een beetje omkoping leidt tot een 
verbetering van de bedrijfsprestaties. Naarmate de bedragen voor omkoping groter worden, 
neemt de bedrijfsprestaties minder toe en uiteindelijk af. Er bestaat dientengevolge een niet-
lineair verband tussen de omvang van de omkoping en de bedrijfsprestaties. In een transitie 
economie kunnen relatief kleine omkoopsommen de bedrijfsprestaties bevorderen, terwijl 
grotere omkoopsommen een negatief effect hebben. 
 Samenvattend, dit proefschrift levert drie bijdragen aan de bestaande literatuur. Samen 
geven deze drie onderzoeksresultaten een beter begrip van de bedrijfsspecifieke oorzaken en 
gevolgen van omkoping door ondernemers in transitie economieën. Op deze manier geeft dit 
onderzoek een zinvolle aanvulling op de verschillende landenstudies en sector analyses van 
corruptie. Aangetoond is het belang van een beter begrip van bedrijfsspecifieke dimensies 
van omkoping, enerzijds ter ondersteuning van de ontwikkeling van beleid dat tot doel heeft 
om omkoping in transitie economieën te reduceren, en anderzijds om managers te helpen 
adequaat om te gaan met corruptie. 
 
 
 

